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This thesis examines trade between New Zealand and 
Japan in the period 1928-1958. These are the years in 
which New Zealand and Japan signed commercial treaties 
establishing Most Friendly Nation relations. The study is 
both of the nature of the trade itself, i.e. the 
commodities and the infrastructure of trade, and of the 
effect of trade on political relations and issues. study 
of the infrastructure deals with Trade commissione~s, 
shipping, private trading organisations, and the activities 
of small businesses. 
The aim of the thesis is to analyse why New Zealand 
and Sapan did not develop an extensive trading relationship 
in this period given their complementary economic activity. 
Very little has been written of this topic and thus much of 
the thesis, especially de°'ling with official (and at the 
time confidential) policy on trade with Japan covers areas 
dealing with New Zealand history that have not previously 
l:>een researched. Other areas in which this thesis has 
attempted to 'cover new ground' are shipping and private 
business activities between New Zealand and ~apan. 
The primary method of investigation has been by 
research on archival material of the Department of 
Industries and Commerce. Unpublished histories of shipping 
were also made available to me, and interviews were 
conducted with businessmen who were involved with 
x 
importing/exporting to Japan in the post-war period. oral 
history has thus been used to supplement research on 
archival material. 
The thesis, as summarized at the end, details the 
major impediments that prevented the development of an 
extensive trading relationship and the importance of New 
Zealand's commercial relationship with Britain as a 
determining factor on relations with Japan. 
xi 
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OBJECTIVES AND THEMES 
The modern relationship between New Zealand and Japan 
has occasionally been likened to that of both countries 
looking down opposite ends of a telescope at each other: 
New Zealand, looking through the eye-piece, sees Japan as 
an industrial giant and our single largest trading partner. 
Japan, on the other hand, sees in New Zealand an 
insignificant economy. New Zealand is considered the home 
of the All Blacks, a scenic destination for honeymoon 
tourists, and perhaps also the home of countless sheep. 
For two Pacific nations that are nearly equal in size and 
not too far removed from each other, there is an imbalance 
in mutual perceptions which is founded in economics. 
Trade between New Zealand and Japan has played an 
important role in affecting these mutual perceptions. This 
is true not only in the quantity of commodities exchanged 
but also in their nature. New Zealand now sends large 
quantities of unwrought aluminium to Japan, but this is not 
generally known there. In contrast Japanese consumer goods 
such as cars, cameras, stereos, and other electronic 
2 
marvels are commonplace in New Zealand. In this at least 
it is easy to observe the influence that trade does or does 
not have when nameless commodities are exchanged for brand-
name commodities. Thus New Zealanders largely associate 
Japan with her products, but the reverse is not true: 
Japanese think of New Zealand as a place, and the trade 
that is tourism is consumed in New Zealand. 
For the period covered in this study, 1928-1958, the 
analogy of a telescope is not so appropriate despite 
similarities to the present. The most obvious of these 
similarities is that wool for silk and cotton, and 
aluminium for cars and electronics, are both essentially 
exchanges of raw products for consumer goods. Another 
similarity is that even at minute levels of trade, Japan 
occupied higher levels of New Zealand trade statistics than 
vice ve.rsa, i.e. in the ea:irly 1930's New Zealand took 
between 0.1% to 0.2% of Japan's total exports and probably 
only a little more in the late 1930's. 1 ' Except for the boom 
years 1936-37 Japan took an average of about 1% of New 
Zealand's total exports in the 1930'~. 2 Post war figures 
give New Zealand taking up to 0.6% of Japan's total exports 
in 1951-1952. 3 Japan took up to nearly 3% of New Zealand's 
l Wright, P.G. Trade and Trade Barriers in the Pacific 
(Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, 1935) p.203. 
See Table 2, p.12. 
Calculated from United Nations Yearbook of 
International Trade Statistics, 1952 (Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Off ice, United 
Nations, New York, 1953) p.207, and United Nations 
Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1955 
(Department of Economic and Social Af tairs, Statistical 
Office, Unite~ Nations, New York, 1956) p.443. 
3 
total exports in 1957. 4 Thus trade levels, though small, 
have always been measurably larger for Japan's place in New 
Zealand's trade than vice versa. 
The analogy of the telescope has its flaws, however, 
of which the main one is that the very levels of trade 
themselves only ranged from non-existent to minute for both 
countries during this period. The volume of trade between 
New Zealand and Japan grew to significant levels during the 
1960's and 1970's, when the percentage of total exports 
that Japan took increased in a series of steps from the 1% 
level up through to 13% in 1980. Two way trade in the 
1980's was at about 18%. 5 The period 1928-1958 is thus a 
'pre-modern' age of New Zealand-Japan trade relations. 
This thesis is an attempt to give an account of how 
trade took place in this period. The period itself may 
seem a difficult one: right in the middle of these thirty 
years war obviously had a devastating effect on trade. The 
dates themselves, 1928 and 1958, however, mark the signing 
of two trade treaties between New Zealand and Japan. The 
first established Most Friendly Nation status in trade 
relations that lasted up to October 1941. The Trade 
Agreement of September 1958 re-established this Most 
Favoured Nation status in trade relations, and is still in 
effect. Thus 1928 marks a convenient starting point as the 
Agreement provided an essential basis of trade. 1958 marks 
4 
5 
See Table 2, p.12. 
Compiled from the New Zealand Official Yearbook (NZOY), 
various years. 
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the convenient ending point as after this Agreement, which 
in effect established GATT relations between New Zealand 
and Japan (later formalized in 1962), trade grew and 
changed in nature into its present condition. Though trade 
relations did not change overnight from a 'pre-modern' into 
a 'modern' period, the few years at the end of the 1950's 
and beginning of the 1960's largely mark this 
transformation. 
I have not attempted an extensive analysis of the 
Trade Agreements themselves. The best description of the 
negotiations in 1928 (which I have largely drawn from) can 
be found in M.P. Lissington's New Zealand and Japan .1900-
1941 in Chapter 8 'Commercial Relations'. This 
description is taken from the files of External Affairs 
(previously 'P.M.' files). Nothing was located in my search 
of Industries and com~erce files in the National Archives 
on the negotiations, but it was noted that many Industries 
and Commerce files for the 1920's were lost in a fire. 6 
Hope for locating a file on the negotiations is probably 
unwarranted. The 'Agreed Minutes' of the negotiations 
leadin9 up to the 1958 Trade Agreement can be found in 
Barry Mccaul 's unpublished M.A. thesis 'New Zealand and 
Japan 1952-1969', Appendix three. 
This thesis has been more concerned with the 
background issues and attitudes, often confidential, to 
trade in an attempt to explain why trade did not develop in 
6 Department of Industries and Commerce (IC) Memo. IC 
114/1 (pt.1). 
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the period between 1928 and 1958 as it apparently should 
have. 
Speaking at the end of 1957, the Japanese Minister to 
New Zealand, H. Shimidzu, commented on the complementary 
nature of Japan's economy with New Zealand's economy. 
Japan's economy was, he said, based by necessity on 
industry while that of New Zealand was based on primary 
production. This was of course plain for anybody to see, 
but because of this situation another truism arose in that 
the products of the two countries were not in competition, 
but were rather complementary: 
Thus it would be to the advantage of both New 
Zealand and Japan if trade between them could be 
promoted and expanded, for it could be achieved 
by fulfilling each other's economic needs. 7 
The question that naturally arises from this is why 
thi~ symbiosis has been found to be a desirable one only 
comparatively recently. Why is there a 'pre-modern' age of 
trade relations at all? This tP,esis is thus primarily 
aimed at trying to answer these questions and to 
investigate the possibility that the relations that are in 
existence today could have been achieved several decades 
earlier than they were. As one historian commenting on 
this proposition and its relation to World War II has 
succinctly written: 
7 Press November 6, 1957. 
Forty years later a New Zealander might wonder 
why all the suffering and loss had had to happen. 0 
6 
In much the same way I have wondered why trade did not 
develop in the 'pre-modern' period along the lines that it 
should have given the benefits of this symbiosis which are 
accepted today. 
Several themes are consistent throughout the period 
1928 to 1958. The Coalition and then National Government's 
policies on trade contrast with Labour's policy as 
reflecting their supporters' int~rests: f arrners and 
rnanuf acturers were often at odds over cheap Japanese 
imports. Walter Nash is a central figure in the debate on 
trade with Japan for the entire thirty years of the study. 
His attitudes on Japanese imports often reflect Labourts 
hostility, especially in the post-war period, to trading 
with Japan at all. Ironically it was Nash who was Prime 
Minister in 1958, and who signed the Treaty of that year 
with Japan. Economic realities often modified both Labour's 
and National's ideals. Another consistent theme is the 
regular outcry that New Zealand was being 'flooded' with 
cheap Japanese goods. Although it could still be heard 
after World War II, an analysis of the major period of the 
debate, that of the Depression, will be done to investigate 
whether this was in fact t~ue. 
The study will also refer to the policies of the U.S., 
Australia, and Britain, on trade with Japan where there is 
8 Taylor, N.M. The New Zealand People at War: The Horne 
Front (Historical Publications Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1986) p.1288. 
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some bearing on New Zealand. The structure of the study is 
essentially chronological, with one chapter qn shipping in 
both the pre and post-war periods placed where most 
appropriate. Because shipping is largely different in 
theme to other aspects of trade it has been treated 
separately. 
SOURCES 
Sources for the study were varied. A large range of 
secondary works were consulted for which a complete list 
can be found in the Bibliography. 
The six major primary sources were: the files of the 
Department of Industries and commerce and Department of 
External Affairs held in the National Archives in 
Wellington; a number of personal interviews or 
correspondence with people directly involved in business 
with Japan or shipping with Japan during this period; 
three unpublished private manuscripts on shipping with 
Japan made available by persons involved in shipping; the 
newspaper collection of Mr. Ian Farquhar, New Zealand 
shipping historian, on various aspects of ships and trade 
with Japan; an unpublished history of F. Kanematsu 
(N.Z.)Ltd: and finally the annual reports on statistics of 
trade with Japan. 
The files of the Departments of Industries and 
Commerce and External Affairs that were consulted pertained 
to policy aspects of trade with Japan. Those files dealing 
8 
with very specific commodities, such as wool or timber, 
were extensive and at a cursory examination found nqt to be 
of a nature that would have justified the exhaustive search 
necessary to view them all. The files were also somewhat 
haphazardly arranged, being that of the order in which they 
were received and bearing little relation to their official 
contents. At the time of writing another set of archival 
material had just been received by the National Archives 
from the Department of Industries and Commerce. This was 
inaccessible, as was one file (114/9/1) which even though 
available had been misplaced. Almost all files consulted 
were made up of memos and correspondence between, to, or 
from various Government Departments. 
A number of private interviews were conducted with 
persons involved with business with Japan, both importers 
and exporters, during the 1950's. Other interviews were 
conducted with persons who had worked for Japanese shipping 
companies during the same period. Fortunately, many of 
these people now iive in Christchurch and were happy to be 
interviewed in person. Three interviews were conducted by 
phone. The major points of these interviews relating to 
the topic were checked by the interviewees and a copy 
deposited in the New Zealand Room of the Christchurch 
Public Library. A list of the interviewees can be found in 
the 'Acknowledgements'. 
Correspondence was also received from Mr. Fred 
Henderson of F. Kanematsu (N.Z.) Ltd., and also from Dr. 
Douglas Kenrick.in Tokyo. Dr. Kenrick owned the first New 
9 
Zealand trading and shipping company in Japan after World 
War II. It was in the area of interviews and correspondence 
that a major problem, and ~ystery which remains unresolved, 
appeared. A crucial participant in the topic is Mr. Reuben 
Challis, New Zealand Trade Representative in Tokyo from 
1947 to 1952. Despite an active search the whereabouts of 
Mr. Challis, if he is still alive, remains unknown. (Dr. 
Bennett, my supervisor, also attempted to locate Challis on 
my behalf.) 
Three short unpublished manuscripts were received. 
These are private histories of the shipping 'Conferences' 
that operated at this time. Their authors are anonymous 
but cross-checking reveals a reasonable degree of 
consistency. These are listed with their titles in the 
Bibliography but in the text of the study simply as 
Manuscript No.1 etc. These have been deposited with the 
interviews. 
Shipping historian Ian Farquhar kindly made available 
copies of many newspaper articles on shipping and trade 
with Japan. All articles are dated but some are not 
sourced. Where possible an alternative reference has been 
established in the Press, but where this has proved 
impossible the reference is sourced as 'Farquhar 
Collection' with the date of the article. 
An unpublished history of Kanematsu (N.Z.) Ltd., was 
received, but giving regard to the intention that this will 
soon be published in its own right only minimal use of it 
was requested. Nevertheless it establishes some important 
10 
facts relating to the activity of this Japanese trading 
company in New Zealand. It is cited in the text as History 
of Kanematsu. The author is anonymous. 
The final major source of information lay in the 
annual statistical reports on trade. This is, in fact, the 
easiest way to establish an historical perspective on trade 
with Japan. A wealth of official statistics on imports and 
exports has been published, and Japan features prominently. 
Dealing with these statistics has, however, revealed a 
number of problems which are detailed in the section 'Notes 
on statistical Sources' (Appendix 1). All statistical 
notes and tables in the text are derived from these sources 
unless otherwise stated. 
The nature of the wide range of primary sources has 
led, I believe, to a great part of this thesis being made 
up of previously unrecorded material. Especially in the 
area of shipping there are almost no secondary sources. 
While I hope that I have made a contribution to knowledge, 
any errors in interpretation remain completely my own. 
STATISTICAL OUTLINE OF TRADE 
The best way to obtain an overall glimpse of the 
nature of trade between New Zealand and Japan from 1928-
1958 is by doing a brief statistical analysis. By doing 
11 
this first I hope the reader can gain a preview of the 
topic before dealing with the details. The statistics of 
imports and exports reveal that prior to World War II, silk 
and cotton fabrics (or 'textiles') were the main 
commodities imported from Japan; wool and casein the main 
exports. After World War II various types of metal and 
then textiles were prominent imports; exports were 
dominated by wool, with hides and skins prominent to the 
mid 1950's, then frozen meat, timber, and casein became 
important. Thus, in a nutshell, wool was the major export 
of this entire period, while textiles were replaced by a 
range of goods as the major import after World War II. 
In the two tables and derived graph below are charted 
the rises and falls of Japan as a trading partner by the 
percentage of imports and exports of New Zealand's total 
trade. It can be seen that levels of import$ and exports 
remained fairly contiguous throughout this period; rising 
and falling together. The graph also gives a summary 
picture of trade for the period 1928-1958. 
Table 1 Proportion of Import Trade with Japan 
1928-1958 (%) 9 
1928 1. 28 1943 
1929 1.28 1944 
1930 1. 33 1945 
1931 1. 26 1946 
1932 1.94 1947 
1933 2.64 1948 0.05 
1934 2.67 1949 0.30 
1935 3.03 1950 0.30 
1936 3.00 1951 1.18 
1937 2.90 1952 1.64 
1938 2.18 1953 0.24 
1939 2.10 1954 0.50 
1940 1.65 1955 1.01 
1941 0.44 1956 0.95 
1942 0.02 1957 0.85 
1958 1.12 
Table 2 Proportion of Export Trade with Japan 










































































GRAPH 1 Proportion of New Zealand's Import and Export 
Trade with Japan 1928-1958 11 
Years 
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n..,,,...,~ .... 1932 .... 
~..,, .. , 1931 
I 1930 I 
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1928 
5 4 3 2 1 
~ 0 
11 Based on above NZOY statistics. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRADE TREATY AND DEPRESSION, 1928-1931 
The Japanese people as a whole know 
rather little about the British 
dominions south of the Equator. But 
their interest in Great Britain is very 
deep. 
Yusuke Tsurumi 
Japanese delegate to 1927 
IPR Conference . 1 
14 
BACKGROUND 
Japan and New Zealand shared a common interest, 
Britain, and a common disinterest, each other, for many 
years prior to the signing of the 1928 Trade Agreement. 
Although trade levels between the two countries had risen 
briefly after World War I, they were overall at pitifully 
small levels. New Zealand looked to Britain for military 
protection and determination of foreign policy, and equally 
importantly, as the major market for her primary produce. 
Japan 'barely penetrated' New Zealand consciousness until 
1905 and the Japanese triumph at Mukden. 2 Where it did 
1 Condliffe, J.B. ed. Problems of the Pacific, 1927 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1927) p.502. 
Lissington, M.P. New Zealand and .Japan, 1900-1941 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1972) p.1. 
15 
penetrate it was the fear of Asian immigration that was 
foremost in people's minds. Fear of Japanese immigration 
prevented the Government becoming a party to the Anglo-
Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894 which established Most 
Favoured Nation relations. The same fear prompted the 
Government to again refuse to adhere to the renewed Treaty 
in 1911, allowing some Australian states, which had secured 
a modified form the Treaty from Japan, to start gaining the 
commercial advantage that New Zealand was then ever trying 
to compete with. 3 New Zealand w~s almost denying it was 
even a Pacific country. one historian has written: 
New Zealand's aspiration was to be regarded as 
organically a part of the Empire, an outlier of 
Britain, not an associated nation. Its defence 
would be closely integrated with imperial defence 
with no disturbing nationalistic divisiveness. 
Even at that time, wh.en the divisiveness of 
Australian policy was far more theoretical than 
real, as British acceptance of it showed, the New 
Zealanders were against it. 4 
New Zealand was part of an Empire - a phrase pref erred 
over 'Commonwealth' until 19355 and more importantly as far 
as Japan was concerned, a 'White' Empire; the 'White-
5 
See ibid, pp.2-3 for Lissington's sources and a 
slightly extended description of these events. See 
also Bennett, N. 'Consul ta ti on or Information? Britain, 
the Dominions and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, 1911'in The New Zealand Journal of History, 
Vol.4, No.2, October 1970, pp.178-194. 
Grattan, C.H. The Southwest Pacific Since 1900 
(University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1963) p.255. 
Mcintyre, W.D. New Zealand Prepares for War: 
Policy 1919-39 (University of Canterbury 




ordained division of the world'. 6 Trade patterns, trade 
relations and the goods of trade itself were but a natural 
reflection of this. Opinions of Japanese varied from 
admiration for their assimilation of Western ways and 
defeat of Russia, to coolness as a possible military threat 
and supposed 'Yellow Peril' (a reason Sir Joseph Ward 
invited the American fleet to New Zealand in 19087 ), to 
outright hatred: Bob Semple publicly referred to 'slit-
eyed little yellow dogs'. 0 Parliamentarians, journalists, 
and cartoonists all at some time gave indications of the 
contemporary perceptions of Japan, and indeed a great deal 
has been written on New Zealand's changing foreign policy 
prior to World War II. But one historian has summed it up 
thus: 
It is an odd thing but .before the Second World 
War New Zealand was moving further away from its 
Pacific environment rather than closer to it. 9 
It is in this light that trade relations with Japan 
must be seen of the eve of the 1928 Trade Agreement. 10 
6 
10 
Bennett, N. 'Japanese Emigration Policy 1880-1941'. 
Paper presented to NZASIA conference, Christchurch, 
August 1989. 
Lissington, New Zealand and Japan, p.8. 
Ward - Prime Minister 1906-1912. 
Sir Joseph 
Hobbs , L. R. The Thirty Year Wonders ( Whi tciombe & Tombs, 
Christchurch, 1967) p.76. 'Bob Semple - Labour 
Minister, 1935-1949. 
Jackson, W.K. 'New Zealand in the Pacific' in Brown 
B.M. ed. New Zealand in the Pacific (New Zealand 
Institute of Public Administration, Wellington, 1970) 
pp.21-22. 
Milner, I.F.G. New Zealand's Interests and Policies in 
the Far East (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 
1940) has an excellent chapter on the 'Historical 
background to 1930.' 
17 
Japan's trade relations with New Zealand must be seen 
in the same context; The Japanese were not unaware of the 
'Whiteness' of the British Empire. At the 1929 Institute 
of Pacific Relations (IPR) Conference a Japanese delegate 
fully expressed this sentiment: 
Peoples other than the Anglo-Saxons arriving 
later in the world arena found themselves 
compelled to be content with their own smaller 
areas of territory. This fact and certain 
unhappy prejudices which create political 
barriers to trade and migration are important 
factors in the present economic depression. 
And further: 
Japanese opinion is beginning to ask whether the 
more fortunate nations of the Pacific are going 
to perpetuate their present narrow economic 
nationalism which is comfortable for them but 
exceedingly distressful for a small country like 
Japan. 11 
The same delegate at the 1931 IPR conference would have 
excluded New Zealand and Australia from a 'closed' Pacific 
Trade Agreement because of their 'Britishness'. The 
pol;i.tical and trade situation in the Pacific was 
unacceptable as it had been: 
.•. brought about by European nations coming into 
the Pacific and closing certain territories 
economically and politically, to those people who 
from time immemorial have dwelt in the Pacific. 12 
New Zealand's and Japan's views of trade were 
dichotomous: New Zealand belonged to, and was moving 
further toward, the 'White' Empire based in Britain. Japan 
11 
12 
Quoted in Lasker, B. ed. Problems of the Pacific. 1931 
(Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1932) p.34. 
Quoted in Lasker, B. ed. Problems of the Pacific, 1931 
p.35. 
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traded with Pacific markets, East Asia, the U.S., and 
south-East Asia, and was to move towards military 
aggression to create her own Empire. Trade agreements 
between these dichotomous movements were bound to be 
ephemeral, subject to the much wider movements in history 
that were taking place. But little if any of this could be 
seen by 1928. 
'!'RADE WITH JAPAN 
New Zealand's trade with Japan was largely carried out 
prior to World War II as an extension of Japan's trade with 
Australia. Japan dominated the shipping of the goods and a 
large part of the trade went through Japanese Trading 
Companies based in Australia, especially Sydney. The 
infrastructure of trade was thus almost completely supplied 
by Japan. Beside the shipping of the goods, which is dealt 
with separately in the next chapter, the two other 
infrastructures that illustrate the importance of Australia 
as an intermediary in New Zealand's trade with Japan are 
Government representation and the penet~ation of Japanese 
trading companies. 
New Zealand did not establish an official 
representative of any kind in Japan prior to World War II. 
Even though it has been noted that there was a 
'transformation of the country's foreign policy' with the 
19 
election of Labour in 1935, 13 even when exports to Japan 
leapt in 1936-1937 no official trade representative was 
sent there. As early as 1925 a New Zealand businessman in 
Yokohama, a Mr. W.M. Squire, had offered to be an honorary 
(unpaid) trade representative for New Zealand interests in 
Japan . 14 Despite the possible benefits of such a 
representative, a survey of local firms already trading 
with Japan by the Secretary of the Department of Industries 
and Commerce led him to believe that such an appointment 
would be of 'little practical value'. Trade with Japan was 
settled at this time with no new markets developing. But 
the firms consulted had established contacts or agents in 
either Japan or Sydney. Especially in the case of wool, 
all purchases by Japan (indeed Japanese buyers often 
visited wool sales in New Zealand) , was done through 
companies in Sydney . 15 The conclusion that Squire would not 
benefit these companies was understandable, but the survey 
did not include any dairy interests, or other interests, 
who would probably have indicated a trade representative 
would have helped establish new markets. After the dairy 
interests moved in another direction, that of receiving a 
tariff concession by way of the Trade Agreement (as they 
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less apparent need for a trade representative in Japan, and 
this remained the situation until after World War II. 
Japan, for her part, only established a Consulate-
General in New Zealand (in Wellington) in 1938, when there 
were still only about forty Japanese subjects resident in 
New Zealand. 16 Japan did, nowever, send a Trade 
Commissioner to Wellington either in 1929 or early in 
1930. 17 Very little is known of this man, apparently named 
Kabudo. What information is known has been gleaned from an 
informant who boarded with him in the Wellington YMCA in 
the early 1930's. From this source it has been learned 
that Kabudo was primarily concerned: 
... with getting all or as much as he could of the 
know-how we enjoyed in manufacturing certain 
articles. 
To do this Kabudo would bring 'squads' of Japanese 
people to New Zealand and send them out to observe various 
industries such as iwoollen manufactures' and 'boot-
making' . 18 This may not seem so far fetched considering 
that Professor Belshaw, who visited Japan in 1929, noted 
that dairy factories had been established in Hokkaido: 
... very much on the New Zealand model, following 
on a visit to New Zealand of Japanese experts a 
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The circumstances of Belshaw's visit and his report 
are dealt with below. Kabudo was thus the first official 
Japanese representative in New Zealand; the 1928 Trade 
Agreement itself was negotiated through the Consul-General 
in Sydney. Kabudo probably contributed little to the 
development of trade relations, but his very presence 
highlighted Japan's interest in New Zealand. 
The way in which Japanese trading companies came to 
New Zealand is another example of infrastructure connected 
to Australia. The penetration of Japanese trading 
companies into New Zealand prior to World War II was not 
nE;!ar~y as extensive as in the case of Australia. over 
thirty Japanese companies, including the seven great sogo 
shosha (general trading companies) were established in 
Australia by 1941. 20 In New Zealand prior to World War II 
three Japanese trading companies can definitely be 
identified; Mitsui & Co. (N.Z.) Ltd, F. Kanematsu (N.Z.) 
Ltd. and Banno Brothers Ltd. Of the last little is known 
except it was established in New Zealand after 1934, but 
even though only Mitsui was associated with a Zaibatsu, all 
three companies were big sogo shosha, and all three were 
also established, in Australia. Mitsui established a 
representative in Wellington in 1934, 21 but Mitsui & co. 
( N. z. ) Ltd. was control led from Australia where Mitsui 
20 
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Bussan acted as the defacto holding company. 22 F. Kanematsu 
(N.Z.) Ltd. was also a subsidiary of F. Kanematsu & co. 
(Aust.) Ltd. which it~elf was founded as early as 1890. 
The latter company held half of the 5, ooo shares in F. 
Kanematsu (N.Z.) Ltd. when it was officially established in 
1937. But F. Kanematsu & Co. (Aust.) Ltd. was active in 
New Zealand even before this date. Bone in quarter beef 
was purchased from the New Zealand Refrigerating Co. Ltd. 
in Christchurch in 1932. In 1936 a consignment of butter 
was purchased from the Kaipara Co-operative Dairy Co. Ltd. 
in Helensville, and trade in other commodities also took 
place. 23 Although Mitsubishi Shoji did not establish an 
off ice in New Zealand there was still an Australian 
connection, illustrated by the visit of the Manager of 
Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd., Sydney, in February '.!-934, 
when he met with Forbes, and the Secretary of the 
Department of Industries and Commerce. 24 Undoubtedly the 
bulk of trade with Japan took place through these Japanese 
trading companies prior to World War II. The Japanese 
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The only New Zealand firm located in Japan was the New 
Zealand Insurance Co. (Ltd.) established there in 1883.n 
No trading companies established official branches in Japan 
prior to World War II. Trade with Japan was organised by 
Japan either by official representation in New Zealand 
(intermittent until 1938) or as an extension of the trading 
company network in Australia. Until 1938 when a Consul-
Gerteral was established in Wellington the trading companies 
were all-important. 
Nor did the Department of Industries and Commerce make 
any attempts to explore new markets in Asia or Japan. In 
one of the few instances of a Departmental report on trade 
possibilities in Asia, that of Horace Belshaw's 1929 
'Report on the Prospects of Extending New Zealand's Trade 
with Japan, China, and Hong Kong', little credit can go to 
the Department itself. Belshaw did not travel to Asia at 
the Department's behest; rather he travelled to Japan in 
1929 to attend the Institute of Pac~fic Relations 
Conference of that year in Kyoto, and was approached to 
write a report on trade possibilities in Asia while he was 
' 
abroad. 27 Belshaw's report was also far too ambiguous to be 
of any real value. In Parliament three years later it was 
described as showing that there was a 'tremendous potential 
26 
27 
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market for our manufactured goods and also primary 
produce'. It was also described as being responsible for 
Australia's increase in trade with Japan after supposedly 
falling into 'Australian hands'. 28 A commentator some ten 
years later considered it had held out 'little promise' for 
any major expansion of exports. 29 Belshaw had, by both 
detailing the possibilities and hindrances involved in 
developing Asian markets (both of which were considerable) , 
written a report which could be used by both the 
protagonists and antagonists to developing Asian markets. 
The Department preferred the status guo, an approach which, 
as will be shown later, was typical of attitudes on trade 
with Asia at this time. 
1928 TRADE TREATY 
By the end of the 1920's New Zealand butter exporters 
had be~n receiving for 'fully forty year' reports that 
indicated a 'golden age' was going to dawn for them by 
changes in the diet of tl)e Chinese and Japanese. 30 Probably 
unaware of the possibility of establishing a ·trade 
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motivating force in the first step of the 1928 Trade 
Treaty. The immediate urge could well have been the crisis 
of the dairy industry in the 1920's. Negotiations for an 
agreement with Japan were urged by the New Zealand co-
operative .Dairy Company in 19 2 5. 31 As New Zealand used 
Britain as an essential intermediary in establishing 
commercial treaties, these negotiations were with reference 
to the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty and 1925 
Supplementary Convention. 32 New Zealand had declined to 
accede to thes.e agreements through fear of Asian 
immigration (see above). A solution seemed to be offered 
by the Canadian commercial Agreement with Japan, i.e. a 
proviso stating that the status quo would continue as far 
as immigration policy was concerned. Canada benefited by 
a reduced tariff on her exports of butter to Japan by being 
a party to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1911. But as the 
process would take time Japan suggested that negotiations 
be held directly with the New Zealand Government. The 
Government at first 'baulked' at this suggestion but 
acquiesced under pressure from dairy interests. 33 
Negotiations were begun toward the end of 1927, and 
were 'long and complicated'. It was the Government's desire 
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treatment between New Zealand and Japan without any 
reference at all to the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Commercial 
Treaty. This was unacceptable to the Japanese negotiator 
(the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney) who considered the 
establishment of Most Friendly Nation status as a modus 
vivendi until New Zealand acceded to this Treaty. He also 
demanded that these relations extend to icommerce, customs 
and navigation', and also that the period of notification 
of termination of the Most Favoure<;i Nation Agreement be 
three months, whereas the Government preferred a one month 
period. 34 Finally, the Government had entered negotiations 
with the intention of including a proviso that the 
Immigration Restriction Act would not be affected, but this 
as well (not surprisingly) had been unacceptable. 
on all four of these problems Iyemasu Tokugawa, the 
Consul-General, got what he wanted. The Treaty was signed 
with Tokugawa on July 24th 1928, but he was still making 
things di ff icul t for the Government. Downie Stewart35 who 
had negotiated with Tokugawa for the Government, now found 
himself under attack in Parliament for the apparent haste 
with which the Treaty was signed. ~okugawa had insisted 
that .the signing coincide with the visit of HIJMS Idzumo 
and Yukumo which arrived in Wellington on the 29th, which 
had left no time for debate in Parliament. He was milking 
34 
35 
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all possible benefit from the signing of tne Trade Treaty 
for Japan: maximum media coverage would not fail to note 
that the Trade Agreement materially benefitted New Zealand 
rather than Japan. Tokugawa had gained compliance with his 
demands by giving butter exporters ~d per pound reduction 
on the import duty of butter. Japan had received 'no 
concession' in the form of duty reductions on imports, 36 so 
the Government was saved from the barbs of manufacturers 
while it had apparently aided farmers. 
In looking at the way in which this Treaty came about 
several aspects are prominent: the initial suggestion was 
provided by dairy interests; the Japanese Government 
suggested that negotiations take place without Britain; 
the Government acquiesced to all of Tokugawa's demands; 
and it was Tokugawa who (inconveniently) rushed the signing 
of the Treaty. No initiative came from the New Zealand 
Government at any .time. The Government in fact went 
further than doing nothing by reneguing on its promise to 
accede to the 1911 Treaty, at least for the short time it 
was left in power. But no Government after it did accede 
to the 1911 Treaty, and the temporary Most Favoured Nation 
status became a permanent arrangement until 1941, even 
though it was never meant to be so. 
Even though it was the first trade agreement concluded 
without British intervention with any country outside the 
Commonwealth, it would be a mistake to overemphasise the 
36 NZPD Vol.217 p.663. 
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significance of this fact. Primarily the Trade Agreement 
was seen as an answer to an immediate, practical problem to 
reduce tariffs on New Zealand butter. But the Japanese did 
not buy more butter~ they bought wool instead. The Trade 
Agreement was a failure in its primary objective, but also 
as permanent diplomatic relations were not established 
either the Trade Treaty was more of an enigma in the 
overall pattern of trading relations than a sign of a 
change in trade patterns. New Zealand remained a British 
farm. What the Japanese gained is questionable, but 
certainly they did not lose anything. It will be shown 
later that Japan's attempts at diplomacy to try to offset 
criticism of her military expansion were, at best, clumsy 
and easily interpreted. The 1928 Trade Treaty could well 
have been an early example of how Japan was attempting to 
dent Commonwealth unity. And even though it established a 
basis for a trading relationship, the trading relationship 
itself did not develop. 
WALTER NASH 
Sitting in the audience at the 1927 Institute of 
Pacific Relations Conference in Honolulu as leader of the 
New Zealand delegation, Walter Nash could well have nodded 
in agreement with the statements of Yusuke Tsurumi (see 
above). Tsurumi was, after all, describing a world that 
Nash could approve of. New Zealand had, since the mid-
29 
nineteenth century, regarded the Pacific south of the 
Equator as an 'exclusively British zone of interest', 
especially for defence purposes." 
Tsurumi was confirming this. Nash too had spoken of 
New Zealand's relatio.nship with Japan and China. In 
referring to better communications, transport, and mail he 
consider~d that the East was automatically drawing closer 
to New Zealand. 38 But these were words of tact and 
diplomacy rather than his own desire as to the development 
of trade relations with Japan. Nash may have become more 
conscious of the Pacific and that New Zealand was a Pacific 
country by his attendance, 39 but this· did not fundamentally 
affect his concept of New Zealand's trade problems. 
certainly his view of New Zealand's trade with Japan was 
one that regarded Britain as an essential intermediary. 
Direct trade with Japan (which went through Australia 
anyway) was, as he noted, 'very small', consisting of the 
exchange of wool for textiles. Nor did Nash lament the 
absence of a direct shipping line to Japan which was the 
major impediment to trade at this time. What he did lament 
was the rapid industrialization of the East. As Japan 
industrialized there was an adverse effect on Britain's 
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purchasing power declined so did New Zealand's ability to 
export primary products to her traditional market. Nash 
suggested a 'readjustment of exports' would offer a 
possibl~ long-term solution, but his vagueness suggests a 
degree of uncertainty; it is not clear whether he was 
referring to New Zealand or British exports. 40 But in 
either case what Nash certainly did not envisage was Japan 
becoming a major trading partner of New Zealand, and nor 
did he desire it. This was an opinion that he retained as 
a major protagonist in the debate over trade with Japan for 
the next thirty years until as a Prime Minister in the 
middle of a balance of payments crisis he was found to 
acknowledge the value (indeed the necessity) of 
establishing good trading relations with Japan. 
Nash was also an archetypal 'Labour' man when 
discussing trade with Japan. Writing in 1929 he suggested 
that Asia could actually provide viable markets for New 
Zealand primary products, but with a catch that was to be 
echoed by th.ose in the Labour Party and their sup.porters 
for many decades: 
t . 1 . t u .•. expor s imp y 1mpor s .•.• 
The necessity to import Japanese manufactured goods 
which were significantly cheaper than locally made or 
British ones was seen as an inevitable result of exporting 
40 
41 
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to Japan. Nash, in suggesting that there would be 'much 
agitation' against imports of manufactured goods in 
competition with New Zealand factories correctly predicted 
the debates in Parliament about cheap Japanese imports 
(many of which had their origins in lobbying by 
manufacturers' groups) from 1932 onwards. Nash propounded 
another Labour view of trade with Japan: that Japan should 
trade with China. He suggested that Japan should sign a 
reciprocal trade agreement with China, and that New Zealand 
(despite the fact it had just signed a trade agreement with 
Japan) should do the same with other countries. Nash's 
view of the 1928 Trade Treaty was less than enthusiastic. 
Writing in the same volume that Nash expressed these 
ideas Dr. Guy Scholefield gave the contrary view of the 
1928 Trade Treaty: 
It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the 
importance of the rapprochement from the point of 
view of Pacific relq,tions. 42 
Scholef ield regarded the Trade Agreement as evidence 
of assimilation in the Pacific between East and West, but 
he was being as hopelessly idealistic as Nash was being 
unimaginative as to the possibilities of trade with Japan. 
But then this was a trait he shared with most of his fellow 
countrymen: Nasn may not have been an Anglophile, 43 but his 
concept of trade with Japan was grounded firmly in the 
42 
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traditional economic relations that New Zealand had with 
Britain. 
DEPRESSION 
Of the commodities that were the principal products of 
the Pacific countries, full three-quarters were severely 
affected by the onset of the Depression. In Japan's case 
rice and silk were affected, in New Zealand wool and 
butter. 44 The decline in Pacific trade specifically was of 
much greater consequence to Japan than New Zealand. Of 
Japan's exports to all foreign countries in 1929 nearly 70% 
were of textiles. 45 About 58% of J,apanese imports (by 
value) in 1929 were of textiles. Thus New Zealand was a 
fairly typical customer of Japan. 
It is unfortunate that a lack of statistical data 
prevents a comparison of prices with British textiles or an 
analysis of the effect of the Depression on prices. The 
only statistical data available for these purposes is found 
in the series Statistical Report on Prices etc. for the 
three years 1928-1930 (when the Depression caused the 
cessation of the compilation of these data) where retail 
prices of some textiles are given. One example, that of 
crepe cloth, lends itself well for analysis. Retail prices 
44 
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are given for the four main centres, in the table below 
Christchurch prices are shown as representational of these. 
Japanese cloth came in 30 inch widths; English cloth in 36 
inch widths. Both were measured by the yard. 
Table 3 Retail Prices of Japanese and English Crepe Cloth 
1928-193046 
1928 1929 1930 
Japanese crepe cloth 10-lO~p 9~-ll~p lO~p 
English crepe cloth 1'7~ - l 161.- l 161. p 
1'8~p l 17-~ p 
!I . 
At least for these three years prices were very stable 
with only a slight reduction in prices, but more 
importantly Japanese crepe cloth was about half price 
of the English cloth. 
In New Zealand's case exports of wool to Japan can be 
analysed by statistical data. These exports reached their 
lowest in 1930, though the price per bale reached its 
lowest in 1932: 
46 Compiled from annual statistical reports on Prices, 
etc. for these years. 
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Table 4 Exports of Wool to Japan, 1928-193847 
Bales Value Approximate Price 
per Bale (£) 
1928 22,891 558,226 24 
1929 16,978 339,126 20 
1930 6,972 76,101 11 
1931 18,613 179,049 10 
1932 22,090 181,246 8 
1933 27,305 233,229 9 
1934 36,058 689,851 19 
1935 24,887 241,697 10 
1936 82,800 1,265,836 15 
1937 118,569 2,705,946 23 
1938 32,207 478,152 15 
Exports of wool then recovered in the late 1930's. 
Even though the prices of Japanese textiles in New Zealand 
cannot be analysed very well, it can be seen that the 
Depression severely affected wool exports to Japan. 
In September 1931, when the ~anchurian incident could 
perhaps have elicited some kind of reaction to trade with 
Japan under norm~l circumstances, the deepening crisis in 
New Zealand saw the formation of a Coalition Government. 
Cheap Japanese consumer goods were a common sight in city 
shops and even if they did not have a good reputation for 
quality New Zealanders were not about to reject them in a 
time of widespread financial misery. 
47 ·compiled from annual statistical reports on Trade and 
Shipping for these years. 
CHAPTER THREE 
PRE-WAR SHIPPING BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN 
There seems to be no doubt but that the principal 
difficulty that stands in the way of the 
development of our trade with the East is the 
lack of adequate shipping facilities. A regular 
direct shipping service with refrigerated space 
would enable several of our products to find a 
remunerative market in for instance, Japan and 
South China .... 
35 
Department of Industries and Commerce 
Annual Report - 19301 
THE BRITISH CARTEL 
While pointing out the major impediment to expanding 
trade in Asia the Report of the Government Department most 
closely associated with trade could offer no solution. In 
1930 the ships that regularly serviced New Zealand's 
international trade were British. If they did not travel 
to Japan, nor did New Zealand goods. The trade that was 
carried out with Japan was by way of Australia, which was 
serviced by Japan's merchant fleet (see below). Goods had 
to be transhipped in Australia adding to their freight 
cost. Part of Australia's massive advantage in trading with 
Asia was the availability of shipping. 
IC Annual Report, 1930, p.11. 
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New Zealand laboured under an inadequate 
infrastructure to find new markets, and only had herself to 
blame. Shipping services could have been provided; in the 
late 1960's the arrival of private companies in competition 
to the British ones upset the 'stable' nature of shipping 
(a euphemism shipping companies use to justify the 
formation of cartels) and started the long overdue debate 
on the traditional dependence. Even in the 1930's private 
shipping companies could be cajoled to provide a service 
along non~traditional routes ('berths'). The Department of 
Industries and Commerce did just this in 1937 when a 
service to the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and other nearby 
territories was deemed desirable. 2 
New Zealand never did attempt to establish such a 
service to East Asia, however, and only two token efforts 
were made. The first was in 1924 when a group of 
manufacturers and exporters lobbied the Government to start 
a direct shipping service to Asia. A Dutch shipping 
company proposed a service which, for reasons unknown, was 
rejected. Instead, and not surprisingly, the Department 
approached the Union Steamship Company. 3 Al though this 
attempt soon collapsed due to a lack of cargo it is 
indicative of the attitude of the Government that it had 
decided to approach a British controlled company. (The 
IC Annual Report, 1937, p.14. 
Stewart, W.D., New Zealand's Pacific Trade and Tariff, 
(Institute of Pacific Relations, Wellington, 1931), 
pp.25-26. 
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union steamship Company was owned by the Pacific and 
oriental (P.& O.) Group - a British conglomerate.) Thus 
while it was possible to establish a private shipping line 
to the Dutch East Indies, and it was probably a Dutch 
shipping company anyway, it seems obvious that for trade 
to East Asia the Government was unwilling to go outside the 
possible British services. 
The British monopoly on shipping services to New 
Zealand was established by the formation of a cartel of 
shipping lines, euphemistically called a 'Conference'. 
conferences were arranged for different types of services 
in different directions. 4 The term 'New Zealand Conference 
Lines' is something of a misnomer in that it refers to the 
cartel of British shipping companies that serviced New 
Zealand. It cannot b,e overemphasised, the ref ore, that the 
British shipping companies that New Zealand relied upon had 
arranged themselves to ward off competition. 
The first 'fully fledged' New Zealand conference was 
formed in 1921, made up of the New Zealand Shipping Company 
(owned by P. & o. ) ; the Federal Steam Navigation Company 
(owned by the New Zealand Steamship Company); the 
Commonwealth and Dominion Line (from 1936 the Port Line); 
and the Shaw Savill and Albion Company. In 1932-1933 the 
inclusion of the Blue star Line established the Conference 
which monopolised the New Zealand-Britain 'liner' trade 
See Commission of Inquiry Into New Zealand Shipping, 
New Zealand Shipping; Report (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1971), p.215 for a full definition. 
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until the first challenge by the Dutch companies Royal 
Rotterdam Lloyd and the Nederland Line in 1961. 5 Thus 
through the period of this study trade to Britain and 
Europe was dominated by these companies. 
The dependence of New Zealand on the British naval 
fleet for defence prior to World War II had its counterpart 
in the dependence on Britain's merchant fleet for 
transport. Whereas the promised fleet never did come to 
defend New Zealand from Japan, British shipping continued 
to serve New Zealand during the war and afterwards. And 
New Zealanders were grateful for it. The service of 
British shipping to New Zealand tied the pattern of trade 
as much if not more than the tradition of Britain being the 
major market for New Zealand commodities. 
THE ARRIVAL OF JAPANESE SHIPPING 
With the onset of the Depression and decline of prices 
trade between Pacific countries was reduced. This led to 
a severe decline in Pacific shipping which had already been 
affected by increased competition. 6 Obviously a period of 
depression would not have seemed a good time to initiate a 
Ministry of Transport, Towards a New Zealand Shipping 
Policy: a Discussion Document (Ministry of Transport, 
Wellington, 1983), pp. 7-8. 'Liner' refers to a regular 
scheduled service as opposed to a 'tramper' service, 
which is irregular, unscheduled, and often chartered 
only for single journeys. 
Lasker, ed. Problems of the Pacific, 1931, p.4. 
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regular shipping service, but it was a time of increased 
activity of the Japanese merchant fleet, from 1930/1 to 
1935/6, due to an expansion of the import trade to Japan 
during these years. 7 This coincided with the inauguration 
of a Japanese run service to New Zealand. 
On November 1st, 1930, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha 
Shipping co. (OSK) started a monthly service to New Zealand 
via Australia, saving previously unavoidable transhipment 
costs in Australia. The existence of regulations on fruit 
in Japan did, however, prevent transhipment there for China 
and other Asian Jnarkets. 0 Perhaps in response to this, bu.t 
also in an attempt to use the Japanese service to best 
advantage, in July 1932 the Department of Industries and 
Commerce asked OSK (unsuccessfully) to expand its service 
to include China and Hong Kong. 9 
The problems of shipping between New Zealand and Japan 
were not completely solved however, as a direct service was 
needed. This was finally provided by the Japanese in 
January 1936, when the Yamashita Kisen Kaisha (YKK) started 
a direct service between New Zealand and Japan. (This can 
be attributed to commercial reasons rather than the outcome 
of the 1935 elections.) YKK was a subsidiary of the 
Yamashita Steamship and Mining Co. Ltd. of Kobe. It had 
7 Burley, K.H., British Shipping and Australia, 1920-
19~9 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968), 
p.46. 
IC Annual Report, 1932, p.10. 
Press July 9, 1932. 
40 
started a monthly service in 1921 on a circular route, 
Japan to the West Coast, to New Zealand and Australia, and 
then back to Japan.w At about the same time it had also 
offered to put on a direct service between New Zealand and 
Japan. To this end YKK established a representative in 
Wellington who travelled through New Zealand trying to 
promote business. YKK even appointed Wright, Stephenson & 
Co. Ltd. as their agents but after a year pulled out 
because of a lack of support.u It is not known if any 
direct sailings actually took place though, intermittent, 
indirect sailings apparently did. Within a few years YKK 
was joined by Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha and Kokusai Kisen 
Kaisha to form the Japan Australia Line. 12 OSK, which had 
called at New Zealand ports as early as 1920 ,13 started a 
direct service to New Zealand from May 1936. 
Interestingly, one of the three founders of OSK was F. 
Kanematsu of F. Kanematsu (N.Z.) Ltd. Kanematsu also had 
a trading company operating in Australia14 , indicating a 
commonality of interests that existed between OSK and these 
trading companies. 
In 1936 the number of bales of wool exported to Japan 
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direct service to Japan was short lived, however, as during 
the 1936 (June-December) Trade Diversion dispute between 
Australia and Japan the shipping service between those two 
countries was disrupted. As a consequence the relatively 
new direct service to New Zealand was diverted to include 
Australian ports. At the end of the trade dispute direct 
sailings between New Zealand and J~pan recommen.ced. 15 
The expansion of the Japanese merchant fleet's 
activities could not keep pace with the demand for shipping 
and in August 1937 the Japanese Minister for Communications 
advised a Shipping Federation Conference that the 
Government wanted to control shipping to deal with the 
shortage of tonnage. The conference promised compliance. 16 
The Mitsubishi Monthly circular of November 1937 also 
referred to a shortage of shipping as being a major 
restriction on Japan's export drive. 17 Earlier, in 
September 1937, an embargo on the export of scrap metal to 
Japan by New Zealand watersiders had led to a predictable 






It is very disappointing considering that we 
established a special New Zealand line, trying to 
foster trade as a benefit to both countries. 18 
IC Annual Report, 1937, p.19. 
Press August 31, 1937. 
Shepherd, J., Australia's Interests and Policies in the 
Far East ( lnternational Secretariat; Institute of 
Pacific Relations, New York, 1939), p.151. 
Press October 20, 1937. 
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The last Japanese ship to travel to New Zealand before 
world War II was the YKK ship Yamagiku Maru. Its arrival 
was given some publicity as it was due on Tuesday 29th July 
1941.H This was only a few days after Nash's announcement 
on Government restrictions on trade with Japan, and there 
was some speculation as to whether it might be diverted. 
After a delay, apparently caused by pad weather, the ship 
arrived in Auckland on Friday August 1st. 20 
The New Zealand Government's declaration put 
businesses which had cargo on the ship, or intended to put 
cargo on the ship, in a difficult position. They were 
reported as saying they had received no information as to 
whether they could get the cargo, or how they could pay for 
it. 21 The cargo was discharged and it then sailed for 
Wellington and Lyttelton where it unloaded a hundred tons 
of cargo and loaded 1700 sheep. It then s~iled directly 
for Japan on August 14th. 22 No other Japanese ships visited 
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AUSTRALIAN SHIPPING INTERESTS 
In all that has been said above, in neither the 
chronology of events nor apparent motives does there appear 
to be any difficulty: Japanese ships operated either 
indirectly or directly to New Zealand from about 1921, and 
certainly more regularly rrom 1930 to 1941, and this was in 
line with an overall expansion of the Japanese merchant 
fleet's activities vis-a-vis an expansion of trade. 
There is, however, a fundamental and difficult problem 
concerning the influence of shipping Conferences qn trade. 
Writing in 1933, Downie Stewart suggested that some New 
Zealand exporters had offered very competitively priced 
goods in some Asian markets only, in their opinion, to be 
shut out by Australian shipping interests lobbying 'Eastern 
commercial houses' to refuse New Zealand agencies. 23 This, 
of course, does not constitute evidence of such a thing, 
but there has also been the suggestion in the post World 
War II shipping arrangements that Australia did more to 
protect its interests at the expense of New Zeaiand 
interests (see Chapter 8). The question arises as to how 
different the pre-war situation was to the post-war. Of 
the four shipping lines that ran between Australia and 
Japan before World War II; namely Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
Stewart, New Zealand's Pacific Trade and Tariff, p.26. 
W. Downie Stewart - Minister of Industries and Commerce 
1926-1928. 
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(NYK), OSK, Japan-Australia Line (actually three Japanese 
companies), and the Eastern and Australia (E.& A.) Line, 
only the last was not Japanese owned. The E.& A. Line was 
in any case owned by the P.& o. Group, i.e. it was British. 
As such it is difficult to imagine that Australian shipping 
interests, which were in the 1930's continually facing the 
expansion of the Japanese fleet and their own weakening 
position, could have had such influence. 24 The only time 
this could have been true was much earlier. The Conference 
in question was formed in the early 190G's or 1890's after 
NYK started a liner service between Japan and Australia. 25 
The .first such service had been started in 1872 by the E.& 
A. Line between Australia, China and Japan. It appears that 
these two companies then came to an arrangement into which 
OSK and the Japan-Australia Line entered in 1919 ( 1920?) 
and 1925 respectively. Thus the position of the E.& A. 
line which could have been influenced by Australian 
shipping interests moved from that of monopoly to minority. 
Further, any influence that Australian interests could have 
exerted at the transhipment stage of New Zealand cargo to 
Japan would have been lost from 1930 (see above). Thus it 
would seem that even in the initial stages of OSK's service 
to New Zealand, when it was acting as an extension of the 
Australia-Japan Conference routes, Australian shipping 
1nterests could not have exerted any great detrimental 
24 
25 




effect. Also, as both OSK and YKK were part of the same 
Australian Conference, it would seem reasonable to expect 
that they operated under a mutual arrangement for their 
direct service to New Zealand. 
While it would seem to be difficult to assert that 
Australian interests could have greatly affected New 
Zealand's trade with Japan in the 1930's, it is also 
important to remember that during the 1936 Australian-Japan 
Trade Diversion dispute, the direct services of OSK and YKK 
to New Zealand were both disrupted to take in Australian 
ports. 26 The fact that the state of Australia's shipping 
arrangements with Japan affected New Zealand cannot be 
denied. 
One of the matters that remains unresolved regarding 
pre-war shipping is the participation of another shipping 
company Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) of which Mitsubishi had 
the controlling interest27 • several unofficial sources give 
this shipping company as operating a large proportion of 
the New Zealand trade with Japan. 20 It remains to be 
resolved whether NYK actively participated in its own 
right, or operated to New Zealand through other shipping 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OTTAWA AND DEPRESSION, 1932-1935 
There may be little in the Ottawa Agre~ments that 
would give any warrant for Japanese military 
actions in Manchuria, but the fact that Japanese 
military leaders could successfully use them as 
a talking point in defending their policies 
before Japanese public opinion was something that 
seemed to demand serious attention. 
Report on Institute of Pacific 
Relations Conference, 1933. 1 
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THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE 
The Imperial Economic Conference held at Ottawa from 
July to August 1932 illustrated how ephemeral the 1928 
Trade Agreement with Japan had been. Though the Trade 
Agreement remained in effect, Ottawa represented the 
greater forces, the dichotomy, of White versus non-White 
Empire politics. In 1931 a Japanese delegate at the IPR 
Conference would have excluded the Dominions from a 
'closed' Pacific trade agreement. Now, just a year later, 
Japan had been excluded from a closed British Empire trade 
l Lasker, B. & Holland, W. L. , eds. Problems of the 
Pacific, 1933 (Oxford University Press, London, 1934) 
p.203. See also Trotter, A., Britain and East Asia 
1933-1937. (Cambridge university Press, London, 1975) 
pp. 16-1 7 for Japan's reaction to the Ottawa Agreements. 
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agreement (actually a series of bilateral agreements). The 
fact that Japanese military leaders now used tbis situation 
to def end their own empire-building was of course a cause 
of concern; the 'Yellow Peril' was striking back, but it 
was hardly surprising. 
Ottawa was about tariffs, and tariffs were (and are) 
one of the chief methods by which Governments can control 
trade. Tariffs have the dual function of raising the 
prices of goods in competition to local products, thus with 
any hope affording a degree of protection to local 
industry, and being a source of revenue for Governments. 
The solutions to the problems of the Depression were seen 
to lie, for New Zealand, in the condition of the external 
market. If production was the only way out of the 
Depression, as the Coalition Government believed, then the 
key to making this policy work was the prevention of 
British tariffs (and quotas) on New Zealand exports. But 
this is just what Britain threatened: a protective tariff 
effective from November 15th, 1932, unless agreement could 
be reached at Ottawa. The great discovery that the British 
market was not bottomless affected not only trade with Asia 
but with other 'foreign' suppliers as well. Ottawa was as 
equally directed against Argentina and Denmark as it was 
against Japan. It was not the industrialization of Japan 
~hat had upset New Zealand's trade with Britain, as Nasb 
had predicted, but these other suppliers of commodities in 
competition with New Zealand. Thus: 
The New Zealanders had no fear of a 'closed 
Empire; with themselves as primary producers in 
it. Rather they welcomed the idea. 2 
New Zealand even argued (unsuccessfully) 
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for 
reciprocal treatment above all the other Dominions as her 
tariffs on British goods were the lowest of any Dominion. 
While Ottawa did succeed in setting up a series of 
bilateral agreements, and Britain did in theory accept the 
concept of Imperial preference, the Dominions could not 
absorb all British exports in exchange for lower tariffs. 
Britain was established in a world-wide trading network, 
and was forced to trade outside the circle of agreements. 3 
Even worse, Britain soon threatened restrictions on imports 
of meat and then butter to protect farmers, and even though 
these did not eventuate the British Government soon 
established various kinds of subsidies to protect farmers; 
a move which effectively worked against New Zealand by 
lowering prices on the British market. 4 Ottawa became a 
'source of anxiety, not a liberation from cares', and as 
far as the dichotomy was concerned: 
As Ottawa was the culmination of the long 
dominions campaign to mold United Kingdom trade 
policy into a shape advantageous to the 
dominions, so for New Zealand it became a 
campaign to keep it in a shape advantageous to 
her. The net immediate effect of the effort was 
Grattan, C.H., The Southwest Pacific since 1900 
(University of Michigan Press, Chicago, 1960), p.277. 
Sinclair, Walter Nash, p.135. 
Milner, New Zealand's Interests and Policies in the Far 
East, p.36. 
to mortar New Zealand more firmly than ever 
before into the Imperial trading system. 5 
JAPANESE IMPORTS - TEXTILES 
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New Zealand reduced tariffs on imported British 
clothing, hosiery and silk, artificial silk textiles (all 
of which were in competition with imported Japanese 
textiles) and other goods. 6 Later, in 1934, the tariff on 
British textiles was completely removed.' The other 
Dominions, adopting similar changes in their tariffs gave 
ammunition to the military propagandists of Japan as 
expressed at the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference 
held in 1933. 
In New Zealand's case, contrary to this Japanese 
propaganda, the Ottawa Conference did not lead to new 
discrimination against Japanese goods, especially textiles; 
it merely returned the tariff situation to what it had b~en 
before New Zealand had introduced its revenue raising 
tariffs in 1930 and 1931. The tariffs on silk and 
artificial silk, which were Japan's single largest exports 
to New Zealand are a case in point. 
5 Grattan, The Southwest Pacific Since 1900, p.277. 
NZOY 1934, p.238. 
NZOY 1935, p.227. 
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Table 5 New Zealand Tariffs on Silk and 
Artificial Silk, 1926-19368 
General British Preferential 
~ 0 ~ 0 
1926 15 10 
1927 15 10 
1928 15 Free 
1929 15 Free 
1930 15 Free 
1931 25 10 
1932 15 10; Free 
1933 15 Free 
1934 15 Free 
1935 15 Free 
1936 15 Free 
The situation in 1933 was thus the same as in 1930 for 
imported Japanese silk. Although British imports still had 
an advantage this was not a new phenomenon, and that Japan 
was no longer required to overcome the 25% tariff required 
in 1931 was a quantitative improvement. The most common 
Japanese silk was 'Fuji Silk', which was sold as cloth or 
made up garments such as shirts. 
Despite the Ottawa Agreements Japanese goods were 
certainly not being shut out of the New Zealand market. It 
was more a case of 'having their cake and eating it too', 
as the tariff barriers about which they complained did not 
prevent Japan from also increasing exports of textiles. In 
Australia where, unlike· New Zealand, statistics are 
available for the quantities of textiles imported, Japan 
increased her share of the market greatly. In the case of 
Compiled from annual statistical reports on Trade and 
Shipping for these years. 
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cotton textiles, Australia imported a total of 222 million 
square yards (m.s.y.) in 1926. Of this Japan supplied 
about 24 m.s.y. or about 11%. Irt 1932 of a total of 210 
m.s.y. Japan supplied 36 m.s.y. or 17%. In 1935 of a total 
of 210 m.s.y. Japan supplied 87 m.s.y. or 41%. Japan had, 
in fact, displaced Britain as the largest supplier of 
textiles to Australia in 1934. 9 It was accompanied, as 
elsewhere with complaints of Japanese 'dumping' and 
commercial methods. Although quantitative statistics are 
not available for New Zealand, statistics based on values 
show a similar story. 
Graph 2 New Zealand Imports of Japanese Textiles 
1928-194110 
7 6 5 
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East, pp.27-33. Wigmore, L., The Japanese Thrust 
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This graph shows the value of textiles, as with all 
other Japanese imports, reaching a low in 1931 and then 
climbing steadily to a peak in 1937. In 1938 statistics 
were first collected for the quantities of textiles 
imported into New Zealand. They show the main source of 
imports being Britain and Japan. In the cotton, linen and 
canvas group, (woven), imports from Britain were 18. 7 
m.s.y.; from Japan 9.5 m.s.y. The British cotton, linen 
and canvas textiles were valued at £1m; the Japanese at 
£200,000. The British goods were therefore over twice the 
price of the Japanese, but the latter had not overtaken 
British imports in quantity. The story was quite 
different, however, for silk imports from Japan (700,000 
square yards) , which had overtaken imports from Britain 
(500 1 000 square yards). The Japanese silk was valued at 
£34,000, the British silk at £46,500. Again the British 
silk was nearly twice the price of the Japanese. But the 
biggest difference in prices was in the case of artificial 
silk, where imports from Britain of 2.1 m.s.y. at £175,000 
were in competition to 8.9 m.s.y. from Japan at £273,000. 
The Japanese had completely overtaken this market with 
goods at about one third of the price of British ones 
despite the inequalities in tariff .u 
Although it is tempting to use these figures as a base 
to calculate earlier quantities of imports, this requires 
11 Annual statistical report on Trade and Shipping, 1938, 
pp.203-206. see also Trotter, Britain and East Asia 
1933-1937, pp.27-31 for Japanese competition. 
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an assumption that the price of Japanese textiles remained 
fairly constant over a long period of time, which is 
unlikely considering Japan devalued in 1930. What can be 
said with certainty is that at some stage in the early 
1930's Japan exported sufficient quantities of textiles to 
New Zealand to rival Britain and that by 1938 the supply of 
these Japanese textiles (19.1 m.s.y.) was nearly equal to 
that of British textiles (21.3 m.s.y.), and in artificial 
silk had won the lion's share of the market. It is also 
worthy of note that the supply of Japanese textile$ was by 
1938 already in decline. 
Although it is difficult to quantify Japanese textile 
imports before 1938, it is apparent that the boom took 
place after the collapse of the Yen in 1931. Japan enjoyed 
a world-wide trade boom from 1932 to 1937." The collapse 
of the yen and New Zealand's reduction of her General 
tariff on silk and artificial silk from 25% to the usual 
15% led, despite the Ottawa Conference, to an increase in 
Japanese imports of textiles. 
JAPANESE IMPORTS - FOOTWEAR 
As with textiles, the importation of Japanese footwear 
caused consternation as to the affect on British 
12 Lockwood, W.W. , The Economic Development of Japan; 
Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938 (Oxford 
University Press, London, 1955) p.314. See also Lasker 
& Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1933, p.2. 
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manufacturers. The further possibility was, however; that 
unlike textiles the importation of Japanese boots and shoes 
was having a direct effect on New Zealand manufacturers. 
This arose as even though Japanese imported footwear was 
almost completely rubber or rubber and canvas, the fact 
that they were cheaper than New Zealand made leather 
sandals with rubber soles supposedly meant that 'this 
manufacture will either have to be restricted or abolished 
· al together' . 13 The (Labour) Minister who contended this 
also asserted t.hat New Zealand workers were 'forced to buy' 
Japanese shoes: 
I have seen men on relief works wearing these 
white gymnastic shoes. They did not buy them 
because they were comfortable or suited to the 
work, but because they could not afford to buy 
anything else. 14 
That leather sandals would have been more comfortable 
or 'suited to the work' seems unlikely. The view that 
cheap Japanese goods were actually beneficial to poor 
people was not expressed at all, in contrast to Australia 
(see below). 
If the pressure caused by sales of Japanese sboes was 
noticeable in 1932, it must have been even more so in 1'933 
and 1934. Japan exported three types of footwear to New 
Zealand; children's footwear of all types (though probably 
not leather), adults gumboots, and adults canvas and rubber 
·galoshes. These were in competition with British made 
13 NZPD Vol.233, p.731. 
14 NZPD Vol.233, p.732. 
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rubber footwear and, supposedly, locally made leather 
footwear as well. The following table gives the number of 
pairs of these types of shoes and boots imported into New 
Zealand for the period 1930-1940: 
Table 6 Imports of Japanese Footwear; 


















































The above figures show that the rise in imports of 
Japanese footwear took place from 1930 to 1933; earlier 
rather than in the middle or late 1930's. This was similar 
to the trend for textiles too, but in the case of footwear, 
the peak years were from 1933 to 1936, when nearly two-
thirds of imported rubber footwear (and thus also retailed 
footwear as none was manufactured locally) was of Japanese 
origin. This truly was an 'inf:J_ux' at the expense of 
·British and Canadian goods, and undoubtedly these were 
15 Compiled from annual statistical reports on Trade and 
Shippin9 for these years. 
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shoes and boots bought by poor people during the Depression 
years. 
AUSTRALIA 
Attitudes in Australia, both for and against trade 
with Japah, were more extreme than in New Zealand. When 
Japan entered Manchuria in 1931, for example, the 
Unemployed Workers' Movement demonstrated outside the 
Japanese Embassy and marched every week with the slogan 
'Boycott Jap Goods' . 16 There was no such similar action in 
New Zealand. On the other hand the Australian Labour Party 
appreciated that cheap Japanese goods helped people on 
lower incomes. 11 
There were calls to stop 'dumping', but at least it 
was recognized in Australia that some benefit could accrue 
socially by having cheap goods available during the 
Depression. By contrast, New Zealand politicians and 
especially the Labour Party were obsessed with the danger 
to trade relations with Britain by importing cheap Japanese 
goods. 
Not only were the benefits of trade with Japan 
recognized in Australia, the value of trade with Britain 
16 
17 
Lowenstein, K. W. , Weevils in the Flour: An Oral Record 
of the 1930s Depression in Australia (Hyland House, 
Melbourne, 1978), pp.211-212. 
Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust. Australia in the War of 
1939-1945, p.5. 
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was being questioned. In a Bank of New South Wales report 
of 1934, the wi::;dom of trying to maintain the British 
Empire as a contained economic trade unit was questioned, 
and the desirability of expanding trade with Japan was 
described as a difficult conclusion to resist if looking at 
the 'rational ends of Australia's trade policy' . 18 The 
following year the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs published a survey of relations with the Far East 
with similar conclusions. 19 In New Zealand the British 
Trade Commissioner said that Japan was not a good market 
for meat or dairy products.a It was repeatedly noted that 
Australia, in contrast to New Zealand, was actively 
promoting trade with Japan. 21 A permanent Australian Trade 
Commissioner was appointed in Japan in 1935, and 
negotiations initiated for a trade treaty. 22 In many ways 
opinions on trade with Japan were thus much more clearly 
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THE COALITION AND TRADE 
As with Britain and the United States, the importation 
of cheap Japanese textiles brought political problems to 
New Zealand. In Britain and the u.s., manufacturers lobbied 
against these imports from 1933-4 and 1934-5 respectively. 23 
Compared to this New Zealand manufacturers were early 
starters. Al though the Ottawa Conference focused attention 
on New Zealand's trade problem, it is also clear that a 
considerable part of the Parliamentary Debates about 
Japanese imports in 1932 can be attributed to lobbying by 
manufacturers. A deputation met Forbes to complain about 
shoes24 ; the United Kingdom manufacturers' and New Zealand 
Representatives Association sent a letter to Members of 
Parliament complaining about the effect on British 
industries, and New Zealand firms were also writing letters 
to Harry Holland and presumably other M.P.s.~ 
What is remarkable about this is that, in value terms, 
the importation of Japanese goods remained lower in 1932 
than in any of the three years 1928-30. We c;:an only 
surmise that either the Depression focussed unfair 
criticism on Japanese imports, or that for the same value 
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imported compared to before 1931, and they were thus 
significantly cheaper. The fact that Japan had devalued 
its currency drastically, and that the Debates in 
Parliament often contained references to the 'cheap' nature 
of Japanese imports would suggest the latter. 
What is also remarkable is that the debates on 
Japanese imports coincided so exactly with those on the 
ottawa·Conference. This was not only a coincidence due to 
the Japanese currency devaluation, but also that trade with 
Japan could not now be treated in isolation to the much 
greater issue that the Conference had made explicit: New 
Zealand's trade relations with Britain. Since the first 
debates after the Ottawa Conference it was realized that 
Britain was no longer the guaranteed market for New Zealand 
dairy products it had been. The report brought back by the 
New Zealand representatives at Ottawa was to the effect 
that New Zealand had 'to look out for other markets'. 
'Saturation' would be reached in the 'Old Country' . 26 
Labour considered it dismal news, for as Savage said 
(paraphrasing Nash's comments in 1929) if New Zealand 
traded with the East (meaning exports), it had to 'take the 
products of the East, either d~rectly or indirectly'. He 
also attacked the Ottawa Agreement for continuing New 
Zealand's dependence on exports of primary products at the 
expense of developing secondary (manufacturing) industries; 
in effect making New Zealand 'less dependent on the 
26 NZPD Vol.233, p.730. 
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internal market and more dependent on the external market' . 
Yet this was completely at odds with his remark a little 
later that there was 'still further room for development of 
our trade with Britain'. Either way, trade with Japan did 
not fit into Labour's scheme, either for imports: 
I want British products to come in where it is 
not possible to produce such goods in New 
Zealand, and I do not want Japanese products to 
be substituted for them. 
Or exports: 
... to the extent that we develop our trade with 
the Eastern countries(,) to that extent we must 
weaken our position on the British market.n 
Thus Labour's attack on Trade with Japan was all 
embracing, and Savage was quick to point out the apparent 
inconsistency of the Coalition in urging private enterprise 
to develop trade with Japan so soon after entering into a 
system of Imperial preference. It was a valid point 
insofar as it was obvious that a policy of Imperial 
preference enacted through tariffs was not an effective 
means to protect either New Zealand or British Industry. 
Extremely low wage rates in Japan (which Labour also 
criticised) meant exports could overcome even high tariffs 
and still be cheaper than locally made or British 
manufactured goods. The question was if stronger controls 
on Japanese imports should be adopted. 
Although the Labour Opposition was having a field-day 
attacking the Ottawa Agrement and the 'dumping' of Japanese 
imports, they too had to define a policy to repair the 
27 NZPD Vol.233, pp.627-628. 
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situation. This was where they were uncertain, firstly 
advocating an embargo in imports, 20 later admitting that an 
embargo would be interpreted in Japan as hostile, and as 
such was unacceptable." This was the view also taken by 
the Coalition; an embargo 'might' lead to the 'danger of 
war'. But given this, the coalition could only suggest 
that as 'high a duty as possible' be put on Japanese goods, 
and a plea made to the patriotism of New Zealanders. 30 In 
the event, tariffs were not raised against Japanese goods, 
and a plea to be self-sacrificing would certainly have 
fallen on deaf ears during some of the worst years of the 
Depressiqn. Labour reduced its proposed measures to a 
licensing of Japanese imports.n 
The fact tnat the tariff rates were not raised against 
Japanese goods probably owes a great deal to the pressure 
that farmers, upon whose support the Coalition depended, 
brought upon the Government. Farmers enjoyed and benefited 
from the availability of cheap Japanese goods as much as 
urban workers. 32 The Coalition Government passed a great 
many measures to help farmers, whom they considered to be 
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after all, as far as the Coalition was concerned an attempt 
to assure farmers' incomes. But on top of this 
'innumerable grants and subsidies' were created to help 
them. 34 The devaluation in January 1933 was also intended 
to aid farmers 1 35 and even though it raised the price of 
imports overall, Japanese imports still retained their 
relative price advantage. 
Thus as far as cheap Japanese imports were concerned, 
the coalition in effect did nothing. As for exports, the 
Labour party was already attacking the Government's policy 
of promoting private enterprise to develop markets in Asia. 
But there was a big difference between suggesting others do 
it, and doing it themselves. With no Trade Representatives 
in Asia, no serious attempt to control the shipping, and no 
Government involvement with exports to Asia, the Coalition 
Government could hardly have been accused of actively 
promoting exports to Japan. Forbes might say that the 
subject would 'receive further careful consideration by the 
Government' 1
36 but it was a politician's answer. A leading 
article in the Press in April 1933 lamented New Zealand's 
lack of interest and knowledge about expanding trade with 
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According to one commentator, 1933 was the year that: 
•.. the mutterings of Japan's commercial 
competitors agaihst the expansion of her trade 
swelled into clamour. 39 
Although New Zealand was not a commercial competitor, 
the last months of this year saw renewed debate on Japanese 
imports. The issues were predictable; the threat to 
British imports, New Zealand manufacturers, and living 
standards in general. ·Nash said of Japan that it was: 
... probably creating more controversy throughout 
the world in regard to trade than any other 
nation. 39 
Not only for trade, but also for its military 
aggression, was concern now being voiced over Japan. That 
a trade war might actually lead to a real war was expressed 
both by Government and Opposition (see above). Forbes was 
asked twice about exports of scrap metal to Japan, in 
March40 and November. 41 There was also a 'modest' programme 
of rearmament after the low point of the previous year 
which was partly a response to Japan's military 
aggression. 42 But compared to the complaints over the 
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of Japan as a miliary threat. 43 The perceived threat was 
from Japanese commodities rather than military aggression. 
If the coalition was regularly castigated for doing 
nothing about trade with Japan, it did at least facilitate 
the entry of Japanese businessmen into New Zealand in 1932. 
In this year an arrangement was concluded between Forbes 
and the Consul-General in Japan which allowed Japanese 
businessmen to enter, and live permanently in New Zealand 
without having to comply with the procedure required under 
the Immigration Restrictions Act, 1920. The Agreement 
appears to have been concluded to allow Japanese 
businessmen to live in New Zealand longer than the maximum 
six months under the 1920 Act - an inconveniently short 
time. This Agreement, though not opening any door to 
immigration on a wide scale (permission to live in New 
Zealand was revoked if the businessmen changed their 
occupation) is nonetheless notable in view of the previous 
fear of Japanese immigration both in Seddon' s time and 
supposedly during the negotiations for the 1928 Trade 
Treaty. The Agreement was revoked in 1941 with New 
Zealand's denunciation of the Trade Treaty. 44 
Writing in 1940, Professor Wood said of the Ottawa 
Agreements that they: 
43 
44 
•.. did not entirely remove the main threat to New 
Zealand's future which had been emphasised by the 
See Lissington, New Zealand and Japan, 1900-1941, 
Chapter 5, for the gradual recognition of Japan as a 
potential threat. 
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depression: namely, the possibility that the 
British market for her products might not remain 
permanently free and unlimited. The possibility 
of restrictions or taxes on her exports to 
Britain has remained a nightmare for New Zealand 
ministers, and a reminder that the old secure (if 
fluctuating) prosperity within the Empire might 
be overthrown at a moment / s notice. 46 
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But the Depression, al though illustrating the 
vulnerability engendered by reliance on a single market, 
did not stimulate a desire on behalf of the coalition 
Government to seek new markets in Asia. The Coalition 
Government has been described as bordering on 'laissez~ 
faire liberalism' in its economic policies during the 
Depression. 46 Certainly on trade with Japan, in which they 
neither attempted to curb imports nor expand exports, this 
is true. The coalition was asking others to do the things 
that it would not: to be patriotic and self sacrificing to 
reduce imports of Japanese goods (by buying the more 
expensive locally made or British goods), and to attempt to 
find new export markets in Japan. New Zealand's trade 
relations with Japan were being determined by local 
consumers and entrepreneurs. 
45 
46 
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'GOODWILL' MISSION 
In New Zealand, in August 1935, an official 'goodwill' 
mission from Japan headed by Katsuji Debuchi arrived. Its 
task was simple: to put as good a view on New Zealand-
Japan trade relations as possible. With trade now reaching 
higher than pre-Depression levels, Debuchi could easily 
suggest that Japan was becoming a promising market for New 
Zealand wool, tallow, and meat. In statements utterly 
contrary to those of Japanese delegates at previous IPR 
Conferences, he now painted a picture of 'co-prosperity' in 
the Pacific involving New Zealand. Debuchi referred to: 
... the new era of Pacific trade, and expressed 
the hope that Japan and New Zealand would work 
hand in hand for peace and prosperity in the 
future. 47 
This was a far cry from the complaints of British 
colonialism and tariff barriers usually associated with 
Japan's view of Pacific Trade. But as a propaganda 
mission, it met with some success; the Press gave the 
visit a resounding endorsement. 48 Debuchi himself admitted 
that he had no proposals for an agreement to facilitate 
this 'new era of Pacific Trade', and after having praised 
trade relations to their fullest possibility, left without 
addressing the real issue of the low cost of Japanese 
goods. For all the hype, the Japanese visit was merely a 
sideshow to the main events of the period. New Zealand was 
47 Press August 24, 1935. 
48 Press August 21, 1935. 
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to face an election in November in which more important 
issues were at stake than trade with Japan. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
LABOUR AND THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR 1936-1938 
~ .. the Government will take whatever steps are 
considered necessary and practicable to assist 
the development of trade in those markets 
wherever opportunities for the sale of the 
Dominion's products are found to exist. 
Walter Nash, 19381 
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LABOUR AND TRADE 
In the December 1935 elections the continuing economic 
crisis in New Zealand led the Labour Party under Michael 
Savage to a landslide victory over the Coalition. Part of 
Labour's economic reforms lay in an attempt to protect 
manufacturers from overseas competition by introducin_g new, 
and supposedly stricter, import controls. The Coalition's 
exchange rate manipulations and concern with protective 
tariffs were replaced by exchange control and import 
licensing. 2 The new measures were not effective, leading to 
a balance of payments crisis in 1938, but the origins of 
Labour's reasoning in changing the methods of controlling 
l NZPD Vol.251 p.576. 
Sutch, W. B. The Policy of Import Selection (Wellington 
Co-operative Book Society, Wellington, 1939) p.3. 
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imports can be found back in the debates on how to control 
cheap imported goods. This was to a large degree aimed at 
Japan, though also trade with Asia in general. 
When Labour came to power neither Savage nor Nash had 
any desire to increase imports from Japan, and effectively 
nor did they have any desire to seek new markets in Japan 
or Asia. If anything the reverse is true: they were 
looking for a way to reduce trade with countries that had 
low standards of living and incomes. Embargoes had been 
dismissed as too hostile, and protective tariffs and 
exchange rate fluctuations had been shown to be 
ineffective. Japanese rubber goods and textiles had come 
into New Zealand in increasing quantities since the Ottawa 
Agreements. Labour thus chose the control of exchange 
funds as its first major act as Government, 3 but the problem 
remained how to alter the pattern of New Zealand's trade 
without being seen to be discriminating against trade with 
Japan in particular. Thus imports from Japan were not 
immediately reduced. Instead, true to Savage's idea that 
there was still further room for development of trade with 
Britain (at the expense of Japan and Asia), Nash soon 
embarked on a mission to London for a further bilateral 
trade agreem~nt beyond that already established at Ottawa. 
It would have given Britain a 'full' or 'complete' market 
~n New Zealand to the extent th~t New Zealand could pay 




... struggling to achieve a vision of imperial 
trade which might have provided a high standard 
of living, but which would have confirmed New 
Zealand's colonial economic status. 5 
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But he met with little support for his radical plan in 
London. 
While Nash was in London a curious exchange took place 
in the New Zealand Parliament. The previous Coalition 
Government had done very 1 i ttle to promote trade with 
Japan. It was not without some irony then that when cast 
into Opposition Forbes asserted (falsely) that his 
Government had given an 'undertaking' that after the 
establishment of a direct shipping service to Japan they 
would follow up 'by some system of trade representation in 
th~ East ••• '. Osaka Shosen Kaisha had, coincidentally, 
started a direct service to Japan in May 1936. Forbes then 
went on to cite the example of Australia which had spent a 
'good deal' of money on developing trade in Asia. That his 
own Government had been widely criticised for not following 
Australia's example makes these assertions all the more 
extraordinary. Sullivan, the Labour Minister of Industries 
and Commerce, was not surprisingly taken aback and Forbes 
quickly changed his position to state that the Coalition 
had said they would 'do what [they] could in the promotion 
of trade'. This was perhaps not an entire untruth, but if 
this was Forbes' attempt to disguise the Coalition's 
inaction it was hardly effective, and if it was simply an 
Sinclair, Walter Nash, p.141. 
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attempt to get Labour to state their policy on trade with 
Japan it was completely unsuccessful. Labour's policy on 
trad~ with Asia was, said Sullivan, to be settled after 
Nash's visit to Britain. 6 
Sullivan's statement inqicates that the Government was 
waiting for the outcome of Nash's negotiations in London 
before moving to drastically alter trade with Japan. It 
was perfectly clear that action obviously directed solely 
at Japan would have been provocative. On the other hand 
a trade agreement with Britain in which trade with Japan, 
and other 'foreign' countries, suffered as an unavoidable 
side-effect would foreseeably have met with as much 
opposition from Japan as the Ottawa Agreements had (as 
another example of the 'White' Empire shutting Japan out of 
her 'rightful' trade), but still would have been much less 
provocative than an immediate restriction on trade. In May . 
1936 savage had already been forced to deny that New 
Zealand had been invited to join an 'anti-Japanese.front' 
with Australia during their trade dispute. Trade relations 
with Japan would be discussed, as Savage had diplomatically 
put it, 'on their merits'. 1 But it is also obvious that 
Nash's failure in London saved New Zealand's trade with 
Japan, for if he had been successful British textiles and 
other goods would have been imported in place of Japanese 
goods even if they were much more expensive. 
6 NZPD Vol.247 pp.41-42. 
NZPD Vol.247 pp.124-125. 
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The irony of Nash attempting to extend the Ottawa 
Agreement was that while he was negotiating in London for 
a scheme that would have virtually dumped Japan as a 
trading partner, Japan was greatly increasing her purchases 
of New Zealand wool. Japan was, in fact, becoming a 
valuable market. The coming to power of the Labour 
Government at the end of 1935 had coincided with Japan 
becoming 100% dependent on imports for her supply of wool. 
Of the aggregate value of wool imported by Japan prior to 
the Australian-Japanese trade dispute (May to December, 
1936), 94% was Australian, 2% New Zealand, and 1% South 
African. South America and Korea supplied small 
quantities, and the Japanese Government had no intention of 
increasing domestic production, which was tiny. 0 The trade 
dispute diverted Japanese markets for wool away from an 
almost sole reliance on Australia. This remained true even 
after the settlement at the end of 1936. New Zealand 
supplied about 6% of Japan's wool imports for the first 
half of 1936, but also over 15% for the first half of 1937. 9 
Thus the change of government in New Zealand also largely 
coincided with increased purchases by Japan of New Zealand 
wool. In 1937 Japan ranked third as an export market 
behind Britain and the U.S., but was still only taking 
Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, p.75. 
Shepherd, Australia's Interests, pp.134-136. (Quoting 
Mitsubishi Monthly Circular, No.169, November 1937, 
p.19). 
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about 5% of all New Zeal~nd's exports. 10 One commentator 
states of this period that: 
New Zealand, therefore, unlike Australia, had 
little economic inducement to maintain friendly 
relations with Japan, a fact not without 
importance in 1937.u 
It is tempting to regard this as an overstatement; 
that Nash's continued frustration in London and Japan's 
increased wool buying would naturally have led, albeit for 
a brief time, to the realization that a new market in Japan 
could substitute for the already saturated British market. 
Unfortunately there is little evidence to support this. 
The Japanese market was still by volume too small, and only 
really interested in wool. Without substantial purchases 
of New Zealand dairy products there was little likelihood 
of Japan rivalling Britain seriously as an export market. 
Trade with Japan was still receiving criticism for the 
cheapness of Japanese goods, 12 and there were calls for 
collective sanctions against Japan for her aggression even 
before the Sino-Japanese war had commenced. 13 Increased 
imports of Japanese goods in 1937 were accused of being in 
competition with New Zealand industry, 14 and even greater 
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the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war) would almost 
certainly have been equalled by more imports. New Zealand 
was still very much a colonial economy despite Britain's 
rebuff. 
The mixed blessings of trade with Japan were thus 
beginning to be illustrated at quantitatively higher levels 
as a result, primarily, of Nash's failure in London, but 
also of Japan's increased purchases of wool. Labour's 
policy on trade with Asia had relied on its policy on trade 
with Britain. When the latter failed Labour was in a 
quandary as to establishing a policy on trade with Asia. In 
1938 Nash, as Minister of Marketing, was asked in 
Parliament about Labour's policy on trade with Asia. He 
gave a reply (see above) worthy of the previous Coalition 
Government in that he had had no intention of actively 
seeking new markets in Asia but was now on the defensive as 
the boom in wool exports had shown that such markets could 
be profitably exploited. For political reasons Nash had to 
assert that Labour was interested in markets in Asia, and 
thus in two short years Labour's plans for changing New 
Zealand's trade patterns had almost completely backfired. 
JAPAN AND TRADE 
At the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference in 
1936, Japan was still complaining about the ottaw~ 
Agreements: 
In view of the fact that the countries 
constituting the British Empire have become 
important markets for Japan's exports, the 
growing tendency throughout the Empire to apply 
a preferential tariff in favour of British goods 
has proved a particularly serious blow to Japan . 15 
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The conference took place during the Australian-
Japanese trade dispute, but these comments were not 
particularly aimed at Australia; both South African and 
Canadian tariffs earned outspoken criticism too. Though 
New Zealand had the lowest tariff on British goods, it was 
not a fact that particularly worried the Japanese. As far 
as New Zealand's tariff inequalities were concerned, it 
would have seemed reasonable to expect Japan to complain 
about the barriers to its main export, textiles, or even 
·shoes and boots. But this was not the case. Of the many 
countries listed for the imposition of import quotas and 
tariff increases on Japanese cotton, silk and rayon 
'tissues', New Zealand was not mentioned. Technically, it 
could not have been included either. The tariff on silk 
and artificial silk for e~ample had remained at 15% since 
the Ottawa Conference (see above, Table 5). The Japanese 
delegates were forced to list New Zealand's tariff increase 
on paper, of which only about $1000 was being imported 
annually from Japan. Interestingly, the statistics given by 
the Japanese at this Conference show an increase of New 
Zealand imports of Japanese goods, in index figures, of 
574.7 for 1935 taking 1931 as a base year (i.e. 1931 = 
15 Holland, W.L. & Mitchell, K.L. eds. Problems of the 
Pacific, 1936 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1937) p.73. 
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100). 16 This was the highest of all the countries listed as 
Japan's export markets, but quantitatively New Zealand 
still took the smallest volume of Japanese exports. It was 
an ideal situation: Japan could hardly assert that New 
Zealand was stifling her exports as she was Japan's single 
fas test growing market. The quantities were so small 
however that New Zealand was not a focal point in Japan'~ 
policies on trade at all. New Zealand was perhaps in the 
best position to impose further restrictions on Japanese 
imports without retaliation. Further to this, Japan was 
itself the target of criticism at the Conference for its 
policy of seriously undercutting competition in 
international trade . 17 
But trade was not all tariffs and competition: in 
1936 a representative of the Osaka Mainichi Co., a 
newspaper publishing company, came to New Zealand to 
organise exhibits for a display of Australian and New 
Zealand goods which was held in Osaka in September and 
October. 10 Goodwill, or at least the pretence of goodwill, 
was still very much in evidence. (It might have been even 
more so in evidence if the Coalition Government, supported 
by farmers, had won the 1935 election to remain in office 
at the time of Japan's increased purchases of wool.) It 





Ibid., p.62 ff. 
IC Annual Report, 1936, p.15. 
77 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry wrote to savage requesting 
him to station a Trade Commissioner in Osaka. 19 The reply 
from Sullivan was predictably evasive. 20 Imports of cheap 
Japanese goods were again being accused of harming local 
industry at about this time, and the prospect of officially 
sanctioned increases of imports would hardly have made for 
good relations with local manufacturers. As it was Japan 
was about to embark down a road that would severely affect 
both trade and goodwill. 
TRADE AND FOREIGN POLICY 
In the September 1937 issue of 'International 
Affairs', Dr. Sutch of the Department of Industries and 
Commerce, gave a brief summary of New Zealand's trade 




Cheap Japanese goods have brought a small amount 
of inspired anti-Japanese propaganda. But this 
has not engendered a real fear of aggression by 
Japan. 
There has not been any 
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respectively, and trade has developed quietly to 
the mutual advantage of each country. 21 
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This downplayed the criticism of cheap Japanese 
textiles and shoes which had been vociferous in 1932 and 
1933, and which could still be heard regularly. In the 
same month as this was published the Dominion Federation of 
Boot Traders' Associations was actively protesting against 
'cheap and shoddy' imported footwear, 22 which was ip effect 
against Japanese shoes and boots. Sutch was probably more 
accurate with his political observations, as borne out by 
the regular meetings of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 
The interesting observation was, however, probably 
unintended, for by denying fear of military aggression by 
Japan, Sutch drew the link to the importance of commercial 
relations. It was a link that had been more explicitly 
stated during the Parliamentary Debates on the Ottawa 
Agreement and trade with Japan in the early 1930's, but it 
had not been forgotten. Savage believed that trade was a 
way to keep international peace, 23 but the big question was 
if trade with Japan really gave New Zealanders less to fear 
from military aggression. Up to the election of Labour 
trade relations with Japan had virtually been non-existent 
as far as Government to Government relations existed. (The 
22 
23 
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Japanese Consulate was established in Wellington only in 
1938.) Even Labour only looked at trade relations with 
Japan as a 'spin-off' effect of securing an extended 
imperial agreement on trade. But because of that failure 
and a 'transformation of the country's foreign policy' 24 by 
way of being elected to the Council of the League of 
Nations in 1936, New Zealand's trade relations with Japan 
suddenly became potentially extremely complicated. It was 
obvious now that trade with Japan would continue and even 
grow, but Labour differed from the Coalition in that it 
rejected appeasement as a suitable policy to protect the 
Commonwealth. In this it differed from Britain as well, 
and now had the means to express this opinion at the 
League. 25 For the moment there was no crisis caused by 
trade relations with Japan, but it was only a moment. 
The link between trade and foreign policy was not only 
exhibited by events at the League: both savage and Lyons, 
the A.ustralian Prime Minister, had attended the Imperial 
Conference of May 1937. Savage had stressed support for 
the League of Nations against 'any form of aggression'. 26 
(Later in September 1938, New Zealand and the Soviet Union 
would be the only two countries to support China's appeal 





Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, p.277. 
Lissington, New Zealand and Japan, p.92. 
Ibid., p.93. Lissington cover$ ~any of the political 
aspects in her chapter 'The Sino-Japanese Conflict'. 
Mcintyre, New Zealand Prepares for War, p.167. 
80 
Lyons at the Imperial Conference had, however, stressed 
'economic appeasement and the revival of world trade. 20 
Certainly Australia had more to gain by continuing trade 
with Japan, and the trade dispute had possibly made the 
commonwealth Government aware of the difficulties of 
interfering with trade. The Australian Government was thus 
more interested in restoring trade than boycotting it. 29 
Unlike ·New Zealand, the Australian Gbvernment broke a 
watersiders strike on exporting scrap iron to Japan in both 
May and November 1938. Whether Australia's trade relations 
with Japan were primarily conducted on principles of 
appeasement or commerce seems to be a matter of 
interp+etation. It has been suggested that fear of Japan's 
militarism formed only the 'emotional background' of 
official and public opinion, and that trade negotiations 
were not initiated because Japan was viewed as a potential 
enemy, but rather for 'purely commercial reasons' . 30 Other 
commentators have laid more emphasis on the political 
aspects of Australia's trade relations with Japan. 31 One 
factor that supports the former view was that Australia, as 
with New Zealand, had attempted and failed in negotiations 
with Britain in 1938 for a more extensive bilateral trade 
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had an extensive trade with Japan, and the failure of 
negotiations with Britain served to emphasise to the 
Commonweal th Government the importance of the Japanese 
market. 32 New Zealand was in no such similar position. The 
relaxation of Japan's import restrictions on Australian 
wool in September 1937 also serves to illustrate that the 
different position of New Zealand and Austraiia was also 
appreciated by Japan. 
Thus not only did New Zealand have a foreign policy, 
it was one that was potentially at odds with the rest of 
the Commonwealth. Of course the protection of New Zealand 
had an overriding concern, as it had with the Coalition, 
and there was no doubt that the Commonwealth would unite in 
the face o~ danger. But Labour was now unexpectedly having 
to deal with the relationship between foreign policy and 
trade relations with a country which was increasingly 
exhibiting her militaristic ambitions. This was without 
precedent. 
SINO-JAPANESE WAR 
The decline of trade between New Zealand and Japan can 
be traced directly to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war 
in July 1937, which also coincided with a balance of 
32 Ibid., pp.144-145. See also Shepherd, Australia's 
Interests, p.154-15~. 
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payments crisis in Japan. 33 The value of Japanese imports, 
which had risen consistently from 1931, declined for the 
first time in 1938. The value of New Zealand exports to 
Japan also plummeted with the rapid decline of wool sales 
to Japan. 34 The war and economic crisis affected Japan's 
trade with New Zealand in two ways. New Zealand, unlike 
many other countries with which Japan was trading, was not 
a major supplier of materials useful for military purposes; 
the only such thing being scrap metal. (Even if Forbes 
really did have reason to believe that New Zealand's scrap 
metal was not being used for military purposes in 1932, the 
fact that Japan's purchases rose sharply in 1937 makes it 
very unlikely that this was still the case.) The value of 
~crap metal bought by Japan was very small when compared to 
that of wool, and was even much less than the value of 
casein bought by Japan. Under the Foreign Trade control 
Law enacted in an emergency session of the Diet in 
September 1937, four classes of commodities for trade 
purposes were defined. The importation of goods in class 
'A', which included wool and other essentially 'civilian' 
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Australian wool to some extent escaped these import 
restrictions. 36 
New Zealand wool, even if it had been used for miliary 
uniforms or blankets, was no longer needed now that the 
fighting had begun. Japanese wool buyers announced in 
November 1937 they wouid take less than half of the 
quantity they had purchased in the 1936-37 season. 37 The 
value of New Zealand exports to Japan fell in total from 
£3 1 124, 638 in 1937 to £587, 724 in 1938. Although these 
restrictions were eased somewhat in August 1938, the value 
of New Zealand exports continued to decline with no wool 
being exported to Japan in 1940. The abolition of class 
'A' restrictions in favour of exchange control to regulate 
imports was in recognition of the damage being done to 
Japan's civilian industries and exports. Jap~n's exports 
declined by about 15% between 1937 and 1938. 38 It has been 
said that Japan's military leaders 'probably grossly 
misunderstood' economic considerations after 1937. 39 
Exports to New Zealand declined from £1,560,537 in 1937 to 
£1,168,183 in 1938, and as with imports from New Zealand, 
continued to decline. 
The other way in which the Sino-Japanese war affected 
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the geographical distribution of Japan's trading partners 
that occurred from July 1937. This 'striking' shift saw 
trade with areas under Japanese domination increase rapidly 
at the expense of true foreign trade. 40 As such the decline 
in trade with New Zealand was part of a much wider trend. 
The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war caused the 
Labour Government its first crisis in dealing with 
commercial relations with Japan as an aspect of foreign 
policy; the Waterside Workers, Railwaymen, and Timber 
Workers announced action against trade with Japan in 
retaliation for her aggression in China. The major 
consequence of this was that the export of scrap iron wa$ 
to be embargoed. 41 The action had started on September 28th 
with the arrival ot two Japanese ships: the Chifuku Maru 
and Melbourne Maru in Auckland and Dunedin. The 
possibility of an embargo had been reported, but with 
confirmation that Watersiders would neither unload nor load 
the ships there was swift reaction from both importers and 
exporters. A meeting of importers in Auckland on the 29th 
' sent a message to Savage which not only complained of the 
financial losses, but also pointed to more strategic 
issues: 
We f eei that your Government will not allow these 
watersiders to jeopardise the present goodwill 
between New Zealand and Japan. 
And more so: 
40 Farley, The Problem of Japanese Trade Expansion, p.21. 
41 Press September 30, 1937. 
We further feel that you personally know the 
value of reciprocal trade, which is, after all, 
the corner-stone of security among nations 
today. 42 
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Just how sincere these 'strategic' concerns were is 
difficult to say, but in a similar telegram sent by the 
Canterbury Chamber of Commerce to Savage the motive was 
very much clearer: 
Importers' section of Canterbury Chamber of 
Commerce views with alarm action of waterside 
workers in refusing to work ~apanese ships in New 
Zealand ports. such action calculated to inflict 
hardship and loss on New Zealand importers and 
manufacturers. It is urged that suitable steps 
be taken by the government to prevent a 
recurrence of such action. 43 
The waterside workers' strike was completely 
misinterpreted as a vendetta against private enterprise. 
Exporters' representatives also met in Auckland on the 29th 
and sent a message to Nash with similar complaints." The 
Melbourne Maru did finally sail with 40 tons of scrap metal 
while the Chifuku Maru was held up in Auckland. 45 Al though 
the watersiders' action was taken independently of the 
Watersiders' Union or Federation, and the Federation of 
Labour, these did later give their support. 
Although press reaction to the watersiders' strike was 
generally sympathetic to their motives, it was critical of 
42 Press October 1, 1937. 
43 Ibid. 
Press September 30, 1937. 
45 Press October 1, 1937. 
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their actions. 46 one example which was probably typical was 
that of the Press, which was critical in a leading article, 
suggesting that it was not the place of a non-Government 
organisation to dictate national policy. 47 savage' s earlier 
response was along similar lines, and somewhat less 
restrained: 
We are not going to have five or six differing 
organisations standing up and telling us with 
which countries we are going to trade. 48 
In Parliament on October 5th Savage was asked if he 
was aware of the 'serious complications' th.at could arise 
from the poycott, to which he answered that he was. 49 But 
fortunately, it was a dilemma to which there was an easy 
solution. A Government embargo on the export of all scrap 
metal was imposed on October 8th; the result of a meeting 
between the Federation of Labour and Cabinet members. The 
excuse given by Savage was that the Gov~rnment wanted to 
develop the iron indu~try in New Zea:).and. so 
If the excuse had appeared lame then at least Labour 
had found an easy solution to the crisis. Under the total 
prohibition of exports of scrap metal the Watersiders could 
be satisfied that Japan was not getting materials for war 
purposes from New Zealand. The lost revenue was minor, 
46 Lissington, New Zealand and Sapan, p.118. 
47 Press October 5, 1937. 
48 Press October 1, 1937. 
49 NZPD Vol.248, p.574. 
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wool exports were protected, and there was a hint of 
industrial development. Although Japan was not the only 
market for scrap metal as exports had also gone to Britain, 
Australia, Western Samoa, Belgium, and Germany as well, by 
far the bulk (213,874 cwt. of a total 238,534 cwt. in 1936, 
or 90%), had been going to Japan. Of New Zealand's total 
exports to Japan in 1937, the value of scrap metal made up 
less than 2%, while that of wool was nearly 87%. What the 
Government probably hoped it had achieved was not only a 
solution that let waterside workers have their way, but 
also one that did not appear hostile to Japan and thus 
protected wool exports. Failure to secure the latter would 
have invited retaliation - of what sort could only be 
guessed and given the farmer supported Coalition 
'ammunition' as well. Later, Savage was twice asked in 
Parliament about the danger to wool sales, to which he 
could innocently reply that he had no reason to see a 
connection between wool sales to Japan and the embargoing 
of scrap metal. 0 In any case, it had already been noted 
generally that sales of wool to Japan were expected to drop 
off because of Japanese import restrictions, for which the 
Government could hardly be blamed. 52 
Labour's solution to the crisis had its counterpart at 
the League of Nations. In September 1937 China appealed to 
the League and the divergent attitudes that Savage and 
51 
52 
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Lyons had displayed at the Imperial Conference in May again 
surfaced. Jordan, New Zealand's representative at the 
League, took a stance condemning Japan's action but he 
received support only from China and the Soviet Union. New 
Zealand was alone in the Commonwealth in denigrating 
appeasement as a viable foreign policy, and Jordan's 
position was 'entirely supported by Labour. 53 But because 
the Government had ostensibly stopped exports of scrap 
metal to Japan for the sake of building a steel industry it 
could not suggest that that it had taken a major actioh as 
~n illustration of its rejection of appeasement. Nor would 
this have been true; Labour stopped scrap metal exports to 
solve a crisis at home, not as an example of its foreign 
policy. Nevertheless New Zealand was now at odds with 
Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth, and her attitude 
soon made her a source of attention by Japan regarding 
trade relations. The relationship between trade relations 
and foreign policy was becoming even more complicated, the 
result of Nash's failure to confirm New Zealand's 'colonial 
economic status' and Labour's willingness to even openly 
disagree with British policy. 
53 Lissington, New Zealand and Japan, p.98. 
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JAPANESE 'DIPLOMACY' 
Despite Japan's aggression in China there was little 
evidence of a widespread consumer boycott of Japanese 
goods. This was true in Australia. as wel 1 , 54 despite 
numerous calls for such a boycott in both countries. Thus 
New Zealand and Australia were unusual in the Pacific as 
boycotts in South-East Asian countries and the U.S.A. 
measurably affected trade with Japan. 55 Yet the embargo on 
scrap metal and threats of a boycott on Japanese goods were 
quickly noted in Japan. A Japanese journalist, reported as 
being managing editor of the Asahi Shimbun, was despatched 
to New Zealand in October i937. The mission of Mr. Suzuki 
was undoubtedly as a propagandist for the Japanese 
Government. His message was half threat: 
Australia and New Zealand must not expect that if 
they declare a boycott against Japan they will 
continue to sell their products to Japan. 
And half promise of a: 
.•. boundless market in the Far East and 
especially Japan for New Zealand goods.~ 
Suzuki was careful to mention that it was not only the 
promise of more wool purchases, but also butter and cheese. 
This was the promise of a market like Britain on New 
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sophisticated: to stop critic ism of Japanese actions in 
China. The purpose of Suzuki's visit was quickly 
recognized, and Savage was quick to distance himself from 
a personal visit by the journalist. Suzuki probably did 
not help himself by referring to New Zealand as being 
'selfish' for shutting out Japanese. 57 These were comments 
that were echoes of Japanese attacks on British colonialism 
at meetings of the Institute of Pacific Relations nearly 
ten years earlier. Coincidentally (perhaps), a leading 
article in the Press at the same time as Suzuki's visit was 
suggesting that New Zealanders were beginning to reassess 
their place in the world; that: 
... there is a growing feeling among New 
Zealanders that the destiny of their country is 
intimately bound up with the destinies of other 
Pacific peoples and that the cultivation of 
friendly relations with these peoples should be 
a cardinal point in New Zealand policy.~ 
If this was true, the news had not reached the 
Federation of Labour, which as well as its embargo on scrap 
metal for Japan further recommended a personal boycott of 
Japanese goods by trade unionists. 59 Suzuki had failed to 
gain support from either the Government or the main 
instigators of the boycott sentiment. 
57 Press October 14, 1937. 
58 Press October 26, 1937. 
59 Press oct0ber 29, 1937. 
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BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISIS 
The problems of trade relations with Japan were 
overtaken by a financial crisis in New Zealand. From August 
to October 1938, during the election campaign and just a 
year after Japan's economic crisis, New Zealand too faced 
a crisis in h~r overseas funds. The Labour Government 
reacted by imposing exchange control. and import licensing 
(the mechanisms for which had been established in 1936) for 
the first time in December 1938. 60 These controls gave 
priority to raw materials and equipment for manufacturing 
and farming, 'with a transfer of import trade to the United 
Kingdom as far as possible'. 61 Thus, much as the attempt to 
extend the Ottawa Agreement would have done, the effect was 
to further reduce imports from Japan, especially of 'fancy 
goods and toys', i.e. what could be classed as non-
essential i terns. Labour had thus finally achieved the 
reduction of cheap imports through a 'viable' reason, an 
economic crisis, but in quantitative terms it was only a 
small reduction. As a result of the Government's action 
the New Zealand manager of Mitsui & Co. suggested that 
there would be retaliation if the cuts in imports were not 
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Japan's actions had led to a massive decline in trade 
already it was hardly a serious threat. 
The decline in trade between Japan and New Zealand in 
the period after July 1937 and up to the beginning of the 
Pacific War can thus be linked to import controls by both 
Japan and New Zealand. These were themselves the result of 
military and/or economic crises. 
In Japan's case exchange controls had been in place 
since 1932, but right down to the beginning of 1937 had not 
hindered trade. 63 In New Zealand's case the Labour 
Government had taken control of overseas exchange funds 
through the Reserve Bank in 1936, but only imposed controls 
towards the end of 1938. 
There has been the suggestion that trade with Japan 
declined at this time due to the Labour Government's policy 
of encouraging local industry. 64 This seems questionable 
for two reasons. Firstly, for three years from the 
election of the Labour Government to the balance of 
payments crisis there were no effective restriction on 
imports from Japan. The increased tariffs on some foreign 
goods imposed by the Labour Government early in 1938 did 
little to reduce imports from Japan. 65 Secondly, this was 
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at Nash's attempts to extend trade with Britain. 66 This 
calls into question whether the Labour Government was 
actually encouraging industrial development at the expense 
of British trade. 
overall, it is apparent that war and economic problems 
were the main reasons for the demise of trade between New 
Zealand and Japan prior to World War II, rather than a 
policy decision by the Labour Government to sacrifice trade 
with Japan for the benefit of local industry. 
How far Labour would have gone to restrict imports, 
albeit belatedly, is problematic. Nash's statement in July 
1938 to the effect that Labour wanted to expand trade with 
Asian countries was not traditional Labour policy. Even 
during the War Nash pointed out the necessity of taking 
Japanese goods in a post-war world (see Chapter 7) , but 
once th,e War had finished he returned to a traditional 
Labour view. 
The decline in trade with Japan turned the question of 
trade relations into a theoretical one. In a sense Labour 
was saved from developing a significant trading 
relationship with Japan, albeit reluctantly, by the Sino-
Japanese war and econom~c crises in both countries. Thus 
on the eve of the Pacific war when the Commonwealth and the 
u. s. moved to revoke trade agreements with Japan New 
Zealand / s trade with Japan was in severe decline, and 
66 Press September 30, 1937. 
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Labour's actions were therefore more a signal of foreign 
policy than any attempt to alter trade itself. 
CHAPTER SIX 
EMBARGOES AND INVITATIONS 1939-1941 
Should it be decided, therefore, to give notice 
of denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty ... His Majesty's Government in New Zealand 
would be prepared simultaneously to give the 
requisite notice of denunciation of the 
arrangement concluded by their exchange of notes 
with Japan on the 24th July, 1928. 
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Telegram. Governor General to 
Secretary of State, Dominion 
Affairs, August 21, 1939. 1 
TOKYO AGREEMENT AND APPEASEMENT 
Events in 1939 indicated a lack of full consultation 
by Britain in Imperial relations with Japan, illustrated by 
the Tokyo Agreement si<jned between Britain an·d Japan on 
July 24th. This cast the New Zealand Government onto the 
defensive as it was concluded without prior consultation. 
Indeed the Government found out about it the day after it 
was signed. The Tokyo Agreement, reluctantly signed by 
Britain, recognized the right of the Japanese army to 
safeguard its own security and maintain order in areas of 
1 GG to SSDA. August 21, 1939. EA 58/12/2 (pt.la). 
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China under its control. All British officials and 
subjects were also directed not to interfere with Japanese 
forces in China. The Agreement was, in other words, an act 
of appeasement which even though distasteful still 
highlighted the difference of opinion that the New Zealand 
Government held on this question: the Agreement led to 
severe criticism by the press and even some Labour 
Ministers. In the row that followed in Parliament over the 
Agreement's conciliatory nature to Japan Nordmeyer called 
it the 'Eastern Munich', and National called Labour 
disloyal. 2 
But the situation was transformed when the U.S. served 
notice to Japan on July 26th of her intention to terminate 
the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (effective from 
January 26th 1940). Anxious to align itself with the U.S. 
in resisting aggression the British Government reconsid~red 
its attitude, and immediately investigated the possibility 
of denouncing the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911. 
Notice of the possibility of this, and the promise o.f a 
further telegram outlining what the British Government 
considered were important points in deciding on this action 
was cabled to Wellington on August 8th, 1939. 3 This was 
receive,d in Wellington the following day, and it appears 
that Fraser (as acting Prime Minister) then requested to 
See Milner, New Zealand's Interests, pp.90-91, and 
Lissington, New Zealand and Japan, pp.122-124, for a 
summary of these events. 
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see a copy of New Zealand's 1928 Treaty with Japan. 4 This 
was sent from the Customs Depart1t1ent on the 10th. A 
further telegram was received on August 16th which now 
indicated that Britain was likely to denounce the 1911 
Treaty. 5 This led to a report being prepared by the customs 
Department on Trade with Japan for a meeting of Cabinet 
Ministers on the 18th. 
That the British did not request New Zealand's opinion 
on denouncing the 1911 Treaty is perhaps not surprising 
considering that New Zealand had never become a signatory, 
but the point remained that Britain was not consulting with 
New Zealand; it was informing the Government of her 
intention and requesting support. Considering New 
Zealand's position on Japan's acts in China, Britain had 
every reason to expect such support, but nevertheless it 
remains another example of a full lack of consultation. 
The Customs report was wide-ranging and practical. 
The loss of wool exports 'would not be a serious factor' 
and overall a restriction of imports would not involve 'any 
very serious difficulty'. But the report also noted: 
4 
5 
If action were taken by New Zealand to terminate 
the agreement of 1928 it would doubtless be 
construed by Japan as discriminatory and may 
result immediately in some reduction of our 
export trade to Japan, some of which may be 
transferred to Australia unless a .. similar 
attitude to that adopted by New Zealand is taken 
by Australia. 
Memo. Comptroller of Customs to P.M.'s Department. 
August 10, 1939. EA 58/12/2 (pt.la). 




Thus New Zealand would only agree to a united 
commonwealth move that ensured equality of sacrifice. 6 
Another real difficulty was apparent in that as New Zealand 
had not acceded to the 1911 Treaty, there would be a 
difference . in the termination dates even if notice of 
denunciation was conveyed simultaneously: Britain's 1911 
Treaty required twelve months notice, New Zealand's 1928 
Treaty only three months. Given the serious decline in 
trade which reduced the practical effects of this move, and 
thus made the denunciation a signal of foreign policy (of 
commonwealth solidarity), it is not surprising that the New 
Zealand Government signified on the 21st its willingness to 
denounce the 1928 Treaty should Britain denounce the 1911 
Treaty. After noting that New Zealand's Treaty would 
effectively terminate nine months eariier than the British 
one, the Government added the proviso that New Zealand's 
denunciation was to be contingent upon trade rivals 
Australia and Canada taking identical actiort. 7 Both 
politically and commercially a united front was nee.ded to 
preserve New Zealand's interests and minimise the threat 
of retaliation. 
There seems little doubt that the New Zealand 
Government would have been willing to denounce the 1928 
Treaty anytime from the end of August 1939 onwards. In the 
7 
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I 
event Britain delayed denouncing the 1911 Treaty fearing 
reprisals from Japan, 0 but the important point is that New 
Zealand's trading relations with Japan were again being 
controlled by initiatives from another quarter. 
EMERGENCY REGULATIONS 
In response to the outbreak of the European war early 
in September Emergency regulations were enacted. The Enemy 
Trading Emergency Regulation enacted and gazetted (No.91) 
on September 4th 1939 prohibited trade with Germany or 
German occupied territories. D.G. Sullivan, who supervised 
the regulations, could declare either individuals or 
businesses as 'enemy traders' through the Gazette. The 
first extensive list of 'enemy traders' appeared in tne 
Gazette of December 7th. 9 on this schedule thirteen 
Japanese companies were listed, but all were either German 
or joint German-Japanese companies. The regulations were 
not, thus, specifically aimed at Japanese firms trading in 
New Zealand. The latter, includi;ng such firms as F. 
Kanematsu (N.Z.) Ltd., Mitsui (N.Z.) Ltd. and Banno Bros. 
(N. z.) Ltd. were not listed. On June 11th 1940 the 
Regulations were amended and broadened to include 'any 
state with which His Majesty is for the time being at 
9 
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Affairs; War History Branch, Wellington, 1952) p.8. 
Gazette No.143 December 7, 1939, pp.3459-3465. 
100 
war' . 10 Thus a trade embargo could be imposed immediately 
with any such country. Although the number of these 'enemy 
traders' listed in the Gazette as being 'Japanese' grew 
steadily to 153 on the eve of Pearl Harbour, the Japanese 
trading companies in New Zealand were never listed, perhaps 
because this action was considered too provocative. 11 
It is doubtful to what extent the Emergenqy 
Regulations actually hindered what little trade with Japan 
existed. Even though many large Japanese firms, such as 
Yokohama Rubber Co. Ltd. were blacklisted, without control 
of the trading companies it was still possible for trade to 
continue. Even when New Zealand declared herself at war 
with Japan on December 8th 1941, only Mitsui and co. (N.Z.) 
Ltd. was blacklisted as an Enemy Trader and a Public 
Trustee appointed over its affairs (on December 15th12 ). 
Banno Bros. (N.Z.) Ltd. and F. Kanematsu (N.Z.) Ltd. were 
not, however, declared as Enemy Traders. The reason for 
the former company's exclusion remains unclear, but 
presumably Mr. Banno, or Messrs. Banno, had already ·left 
New Zealand and thus effectively already ceased operation. 
In the case of F. Kanematsu (N.Z.) Ltd. the July 1941 
restrictions had already brought the company into loss by 
December. Immediately after the Pearl Harbour attack, on 
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Meeting at which it changed its name to J. Gunton (N.Z.) 
Ltd. 13 Thus like F. Kanematsu & Co. (Aust. ) , which was not 
blacklisted because of its part-Australian equity , 14 the New 
Zealand company avoided being blacklisted by Mr. Gunton's 
involvement as a shareholder and its connections to F. 
Kanematsu & co. (Aust.). Although J. Gunton (N.Z.) Ltd. 
continued to operate through the war, early in 1942 its 
Wellington office was closed. The main form of business 
came from wool orders from the U.S., and later the 
importation of some textiles . 15 Thus F. Kanematsu (N. z.) 
Ltd. survived in another guise to resurface after World war 
II. 
INVITATION TO JAPAN 
In May 1940 Japan tried to take another initiative in 
her trade relations with New Zealand. on May 14th the 
Japanese Consular-General, Fukuma, sent a confidential 
invi ta ti on to Peter Fraser for New Zealand to send an 
Economic Mission to Japan. The object of this visit which 
was to be made up of both Government and private 
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... find an opportunity to inspect the actual condition 
economic and otherwise in Japan, thereby to contribute 
to the development of the trade between the two 
countries . 16 
As all expenses were to be paid by the Japanese 
Government it was designed to be a tempting offer. The 
Japanese Government had no way of knowing, however, that 
New Zealand had been on the brink of denouncing the 1928 
Treaty less than a year earlier. Considering that trade 
had, for unavoidable reasons in both countries, been 
severely reduced in the preceding two years, it was 
apparent that the propaganda value of such a trip was the 
main motive. Fukuma' s move had been badly timed, too. 
Less than two weeks earlier Savage had notified Britain 
that if Japan's trade with Germany proved to be assisting 
their war effort, New Zealand would be willing to support 
action against Japan. This telegram noted: 
If, as His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom now suggest may be possible, the 
potential assistance to Germany resulting from a 
continuation of the trade under consideration may 
attain such proportions as to outweigh the 
possible disadvantages of interception, then His 
Majesty's Government in New Zealand would of 
course agree that preventive action would be 
justified . 11 
Besides again showing New Zealand's willingness to 
follow a British lead, this made an official New Zealand 
visit to Japan at this time virtually impossible. This 
telegram is also notable for its reference to the desire 
16 
17 
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for the 'full knowledge and consent' of the United States 
Government in any negotiations that might take place 
between Britain and Japan about trade with Germany. 
In reply to Fukuma's invitation Fraser wrote a hasty 
message for earl Berendson to draw up as an official 
response. This handwritten note, as found at National 
Archives, contains some illegible words: 
{or 'willing' to accept.) Friendly reply 
indicating acceptance but not possible to arrange 
for Minister or high Government official at the 
moment to visit Japan and no mission would be 
adequate without such leadership. Minister of 
Industries and Commerce to explore possibilities 
with Industrial, Commercial, Trade Union, and 
cultural circles. Reference to past missions 
from Japan to N.Z. 
British Government to be consulted before 
decision to 'accept??' ????? ????18 
The tenor of the note and apostrophising of the word 
'willing' make it clear that nothing was further from 
Fraser's intentions. Berendson then drew up the 
confidential reply along these lines, including reference 
to the New Zealand Government having: 
.•. the happiest recollections of the visit to New 
Zealand of a Japanese Mission under the 
distinguished leadership of Ambassador Debuchi, 
warmly appreciate this suggestion, to which they 
are giving sympathetic consideration. 19 
The thrust had been parried, but Fukuma was 
persistent. He visited Fraser on the 23rd of May, 
apparently not for the first time. on this occasion he left 
18 
19 
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a short note containing the suggestion that the Mission 
arrive in Japan in September, and that its members were to 
be selected from among 'first class New Zealanders'. 20 
Perhaps he was hoping that Fraser himself might go. 
New Zealand of course consulted Britain about the 
approach. London naturally consulted its Ambassador in 
Tokyo, whose reply, in part was then passed through the 
British High Commissioner in Wellington on June 1st. (The 
British High Commission had only been established in New 
Zealand the previous year.n) Japan's invitation to New 
Zealand had been along similar lines as those to a number 
of south American countries and Spain. The British 
Ambassador noted that: 
... such missions have come and gone, but without 
important results, and it is difficult to 
understand what the Japanese expect to gain from 
this heavy expenditure. 
To this the High Commissioner added that the British 
Government would not object to a mission composed of 
businessmen, but certainly would to one with an 'official 
complexion'. It predictably warned: 
Japan would hardly 
invitation of this 
ulterior motive. 




This ulterior motive, it was suggested, could be to: 
20 
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It was because of the importance of cultivating U.S. 
relations, as well as maintaining the 'status guo in the 
Pacific', that the New Zealand Government was warned 
against official involvement. This was especially so as 
negotiations were then taking place with Japan about trade 
with Germany. 22 
Ironically, Fukuma's next attempt to persuade Fraser, 
on June 27th, contained referende to an Economic Mission by 
Argentina by way of illustrating how such a group was made 
up. As one of the group was a 'wool expert', perhaps this 
was an early attempt to add some pressure tb the 
invitation, 23 but the real thrust came with a memo from 
Fukuma dated July 5th. Fukuma himself had obviously come 
under pressure from Tokyo, having received a message that 
the Japanese Government: 
•.. should be greatly obliged if the Government of 
New Zealand would kindly accept the above 
suggestion (and accordingly the invitation that 
follows) and select about ten persons including 
ladies as members of the Mission in due course of 
time, because the necessary preparations and 
arrangements in Japan will require at least one 
and a half months prior to the arrival of the 
Mission. 24 
The reference to 'ladies' is undoubtedly to wives of 
the members. Fukuma also detailed all the travel 
arrangements to Japan; the Canberra Maru tQ convey the 
22 High Commissioner to P.M. June 1, 1940. EA 58/12/1 
(pt. 1) . 
23 Consul-General to P.M. June 27, 1940. EA 58/12/1 
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Mission to Japan to arrive in Kobe on September 28th. 
There is more than just a hint of desperation on this 
message, and although Fraser's reply has not survived, it 
seems to have been along much the same lines as the initial 
reply as first set out in the note to Berendson. This was 
sent to .Fukuma on July 22nd, after which he immediately 
visited Fraser again. Fukuma's official reply on July 27th 
both speaks of and fairly exudes his own disappointment at 
finally being turned down. 25 
Whether the ulterior motive in all of this was to 
embarrass British relations with Japan remains open to 
speculation. Perhaps the Japanese Government hoped that 
the New Zealand Parliament would not realize the full 
consequenoes of an official visit. It is interesting to 
observe, anyway, that the real pressure to make Fraser 
accept the invitation came only days after the U.S. 
embargoed exports of some war materials to Japan on July 
2nd.a It is difficult to say if this is coincidence or 
otherwise but it is certain that there were still some 
Members of Parliament, such as Eliot Davis, once an 
honorary Consul to Japan, who were still very· much in 
25 
26 
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favour of increasing trade with Japan, and who probably 
would have been happy to head such a Mission. 27 
DENUNCIATION OF THE TRADE TREATY 
On July 14th, 1941, discussions were held between the 
U.S. and British Governments about the possibility of a 
widespread embargo on Japanese goods. 20 On July 26th the 
u. s. froze all Japanese assets, effectively embargoing 
trade, notably exports of oil to Japan. 29 The British 
Government froze all Japanese assets on the same day, and 
gave notice denouncing the 1911 Trade Treaty. New Zealand 
followed suit on the 27th, strictly controlling exchange 
transactions and denouncing the 1928 Trade Treaty. Within 
a week all trade in the British Empire and Commonweal th 
with Japan was effectively regulated. 30 
Thus nearly two years after the initial suggestion by 
Britain that it would terminate its Trade Treaty, and 
almost ex~ctly two years after the U.S. had denounced her 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, New Zealand had taken 
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impose controls on trade. Perhaps not surprisingly, in 
view of the greater scale of these measures, the New 
Zealand Government sought (unsuccessfully) through Britain 
some assurance of U.S. protection should Japan retaliate. 31 
The decision to act on trade had been straightforward 
enough. The groundwork had already been laid two years 
earlier and the July 1941 action, being not only of the 
entire commonwealth but also the U.S., satisfied New 
Zealand's only proviso to following the British lead. 
Britain had been considering since April 1941 some acti0n 
on trade if Japan moved further southward. After learning 
that Japan intended to do so early in July, Britain 
informed New Zealand on about the 12th that it intended to 
denounce the 1911 Treaty, if supported by the Dominions. 
The New Zealand Government had replied on the 16th that it 
would follow suit. 32 
One of the problems that arose from this intention was 
that of Japanese businessmen in New Zealand. By an 
arrangement in 1932 with the Consul-General in Sydney, 
Japanese businessmen could reside permanently in New 
Zealand without complying to the Immigration Restrictions 
Act 1920. 33 The Government now wished to terminate this 
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Wellington of this at the same time as news of the 
denunciation of the Treaty. This did not affect the 
continued residence of Japanese businessmen already in New 
Zealand, but future applications to enter New Zealand were 
now subject to the Immigration Restriction Act. 34 
Notice denouncing the 1928 Treaty was given to the 
Japanese Consulate in Wellington on Sunday, the 27th, 
followed by a press statement from Nash which outlined the 
reasons behind the Government's support of Britain. It gave 
an indication that exchange controls would be the primary 
mechanism by which trade would be regulated. Nash then 
somewhat confusingly suggested that while exchange 
transactions would not necessarily cease completely, that 
the effect 'may be an almost complete stoppage of trade 
with Japan at least for the time being .•. '. That the 1928 
Treaty had also been denounced was actually of secondary 
importance. Nash added it to news of the restriction on 
trade, and then somewhat disarmingly added that the effect 
would be a period of tension. 35 
The denunciation of the Trade Treaty ended a period of 
diplomacy involving Japan that had only really begun with 
the election of the Labour Government. Despite Britain's 
tardiness in consulting New Zealand the growing hostility 
in Anglo-Japanese relations and the determination of the 
U.S. to denounce her Trade Treaty with Japan set Britain on 
34 
35 
P.M. (acting) to SSDA July 31, 1941. 
(pt.la). 
Press July 28, 1941. 
EA 58/12/2 
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a path that New Zealand was quite willing to follow. 
Japan's attempt to dent Commonwealth unity by inviting a 
New Zealand mission to Japan was an example of her 
underestimation of Commonwealth solidarity and ultimately 
clumsy diplomatic tactics. New Zealand, on the other hand, 
was anxious to support British diplomacy in any way that 
involved collective sanctions. 
THE YAMAGIKU MARU 
In fact the major problem arising out of the 
restrictions on trade was not one of militaristic 
proportions. It arrived in the form of the Yamagiku Maru, 
a YKK ship with a cargo of timber and general merchandise 
due in Auckland on the 29th. After being delayed by bad 
weather it was suggested that the new trade restrictions 
would lead to a cancellation of its arrival. This was 
denied by the agents, but nevertheless importers were not 
sure they would receive the consignment, and even if they 
did, how they were to pay for it. 36 Nor was Fukuma sure 
what would become of the Yamagiku Maru's cargo, requesting 
information from the Government on the 31st of July. 
Fraser advised him that financial arrangements would follow 
the procedure of payment for the cargo into a New Zealand 
account and then remittance to London, with payment for a 
Press July 29, 1941. 
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return cargo in sterling. By this arrangement, then, a 
return cargo was agreed upon, to be paid from the imported 
cargo's credits. 37 The Yamagiku Maru arrived in Auckland on 
August 1st, and after two weeks left Lyttelton with 1700 
sheep for Japan. 39 
The action against trade also affected the few 
Japanese trading companies in New Zealand. Even though 
they had not been blacklisted by Emergency Regulations, and 
still held import/export licences, Control on exchange 
transactions effectively stopped business. The exit ot 
Japanese businessmen from New Zealand was blamed on the new 
controls, with the Japanese Consulate denying any other 
significance, presumably sinister. 39 The Press regarded the 
new controls in a remarkably detached manner, neither 
commenting on the effect, nor possible threat, to New 
Zealand. It instead suggested that Japan's trade with the 
West would not be cut off completely unless Japan committed 
further aggression. 40 Trade with New Zealand had, however, 
all but ceased completely. 
The Yamagiku Maru was the last Japanese ship to visit 
New Zealand before the Pearl Harbour attack. Wllat few 
items were recorded as being imported from Japan after this 
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only exception to the 'general Empire policy to take all 
possible steps to dispense with imports from Japan' lay in 
the importation of items which could help New Zealand's war 
effort. Ih these cases transactions would be by a 'barter' 
arrangement and the initiative left with the Japanese to 
organise them. 41 But without Japanese shipping it was an 
academic arrangement, soon to be overtaken by the events of 
December 7th. 
41 P.M. to SSDA. September 26, 1941. EA 58/12/2 (pt la). 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
NEW ZEALAND TRADE AND SCAP 1946 - SEPTEMBER 1951 
.•• the seeds of another war would most certainly 
be sown if other nations said they would neither 
accept the Japanese nor let their goods flow to 
them. 
Walter Nash, 1943. 1 
WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 
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The Pacific war stopped all normal trade, of course, 
between New Zealand and Japan. The Allied countries moved 
to blockade trade between Japan and her allies in E~rope 
and between Japan and neutral countries as well. Despite 
the war the problem of international trade in a post-war 
world, and even Japan's place in it, had not been 
forgotten. At a general level the Bret ton Woods Conference 
of July 1944 was an attempt to prevent another depression 
.by international co-operation on monetary policy. This led 
to the founding of the IMF. Japan's trade situation was 
considered at an Institute of Pacific Relations Conference 
1 Quoted in Sinclair, Walter Nash, pp.232-233. 
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in 1945, which advocated 'no special case for tariffs 
against low income nations as they would stimulate 
exports'. 2 This had been an obvious sore point at pre-war 
Institute of Pacific Relations Conferenc~s where Japan had 
attacked tariff barriers. The Conference also considered 
there was an 'underlying gravity in Japan's trade situation 
(that) could hardly be denied'. 3 
·Despite these attempts to give direction to trade, the 
immediate post-war situation was one of confusion. This 
was true of New Zealand as well as war-ravaged Japan. The 
period from August 1945 to March 1952 was one during which 
Japan's trade was controlled by the occupying forces; more 
specifically the Far Eastern Commission in 1946-1947 and 
then SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) after 
this period. 4 The occupation authorities had more urgent 
priorities than considering Japan's long-term economic and 
trade situation: the trial of war criminals, reparations, 
'pacification', and the many political questions of 
security and Japan's future role in international relations 
were to the fore. 
The Zaibatsu had been an integral part of Japan's war 
economy, and the program to break them up was initiated by 
legislation in 1946 and 1947. That there was some concern 
2 Institute of Pacific Relations. Security in the 
Pacific (International Secretariat, Institute of 
Pacific Relations, New York, 1945) p.67. 
Ibid.'· p. 48. 
Fearey, R.A. The Occupation of Japan; Second Phase: 
1948-50 (Macmillan, New York, 1950) p.7. 
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over Japan's economic future is illustrated by the 
tempering of this program by the realization that it might 
impede Japan's recovery through restricting legitimate 
business interests. 5 Nevertheless, as a result of initial 
neglect with the day-to-day economy the lack of almost any 
exports in 1946 brought no foreign exchange into Japan. 
The situation deepened into crisis in 1947 and SCAP was 
forced to reconsider economic priorities. 6 
Japan's trading organisations (sogo sosha) were also 
dismembered by SCAP and exporters deprived of offices and 
branches abroad, adding to the problems of low industrial 
production. 7 Thus SCAP effectively controlled Japan's trade 
despite the establishment of a Board of Trade by the 
Japanese Government, and not surprisingly it was td the 
U.S. that Japan turned for her supplies and new markets. 
Japan's trade thus through necessity changed patterns after 
World War II. It was a reversal of the shift brought about 
by the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 and was marked by a 
dramatic decline in Asian trade. Interestingly enough New 
Zealand was a stable element: when trade did resume 
between Japan and New Zealand it was in proportion and 
commodities very similar to the 1930's. 
New Zealand was, however, suffering from confusion in 
her political and economic situation as well. The problems 
5 
6 
Ibid. , pp. 60-61. 
Allen, Japan's Economic Expansion, pp.16-17. 
Ibid., p.229. 
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of New Zealand were of course markedly different to those 
of Japan, but as there was a pre-occupation in the 
international arena on political questions concerning 
Japan, so too was there in New Zealand a pre-occupation 
with political questions surrounding Japan. These 
necessarily dominated and influenced the economic ones, but 
what is more is that New Zealand was shaping her policies 
to a post-war world 'virtually from scratch'. 0 There were 
formidable issues that New Zealand had to deal with: 'the 
first session of the United Nations, the peace treaties 
with the Axis satellites, the Berlin crisis, the cold war, 
Korea, and the Palestine problem' . 9 But none of the~e 
problems, however: 
... could match the problem of Japan in the degree 
to which it dominated. our attention, nor ln its 
consequences for our political outlook and our 
security arrangements.~ 
The major political issue was security, and the 
imposition of the 'most rigorous security control upon 
Japan'.u To this end New Zealand was constantly involved 
with Allied and Commonwealth consultation on policy towards 
Japan; consultations that were marred during and after the 
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feeling that New Zealand was not being adequately consulted 
by Britain. 12 Most apparent were the differences in policy 
displayed at the Far Eastern Commission (which represented 
the major powers involved in the war against Japan) between 
Labour's desired policy and that of the U.S., which was 
carried out. 
The economic problems facing New Zealand did not 
immediately, and for obvious reasons, involve trade with 
Japan. But there was still economic confusion caused by 
wartime problems; the shipping shortages, dollar 
shortages, and supply shortages continued. The original 
reasons for the imposition of import controls in 1938 - low 
overseas funds, a trading imbalance, and fear of 
unemployment - had been replaced by the need tQ protect 
newly established industry and the requirements of the 
Sterling Area. The supporters and critics of continued 
import controls were equally vociferous." 
Arguments also centred on a White Paper Agreement 
between New Zealand and Britain by which New Zealand 
undertook to remove all controls relating to Britain as 
soon as possible. Britain was obviously keen to re-
establish lost markets and importers in New Zealand argued 
that she was 'morally' bound to help Britain achieve this. 
They were aided by Britain's promise to accept for the 
12 
13 
Sinclair, Walter Nash, pp.234 & 247. 
Lane, P.A. 'An Examination of the Methods and Effects 
of Restricting External Trade with Particular Reference 
to the New Zealand Experience' (Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Massey University, 1974) p.208. 
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years 1946-1949 all food exports New Zealand cbuld supply. 14 
It was thus in this background of economic confusion and 
pre-occupation with political issues that the problem of 
re-establishing a trade relationship with Japan lay. 
LABOUR AND TRADE 
Walter Nash was by now the 'chief architect' of 
Labour's economic policy.~ It now fell to Labour and Nash 
in particular to develop a policy on economic matters in 
general, and also on Japan specifically as trade gradually 
began to increase again. But Labour had trouble grasping 
the significance of the changes that had taken place. The 
war had made Fraser and Nash 'Commonwealth' men: 
... they thought in British commonweal th terms. 
After the war they did everything possible to 
help Great Britain, which was, after all, New 
Zealand's chief market." 
New Zealand was now more Commonweal th minded than 
other Commonweal th countries. 17 But Labour was unsure of 
the international trading situation •18 Nash and Labour 






... conceive of the country's general economic 
position as likely to be fundamentally different 
Ibid. I p. 209. 
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from what it had been prewar, however different 
postwar it might appear on the surface . 19 
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Labour still clung to the necessity for import 
controls despite building up a surplus (according to Nash) 
of £250 million because of the shortage of imports. 20 In 
1948 Nash revalued the New Zealand pound to parity with 
sterling, but he feared a run on New Zealand's overseas 
funds and refused to ease import restrictions; a policy 
which did not meet with British or U.S. approval as they 
considered the quantitative restriction of imports 
unacceptable except during temporary difficulties. The 
negotiations in Geneva leading to the establishment of GATT 
in 1947 reduced levels of tariffs but British Commonwealth 
preferences were excluded from the preferences. 21 
Imperial preference, which Japan had so vociferously 
condemned, thus survived through into the post-war 
situation. But it was part of a much wider agreement that 
was not imperialistically based. Japan thus had potential 
access to GATT, a possibility the Labour Government did not 
see at the time, 2 2 which caused increased difficulties in 
trading relations with New Zealand in the mid 1950's. 
The problem of re-establishing trading relations with 
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was at first confused: in 1946 he issued a contradictory 
statement on the Government's intention to ease import 
licences. 23 Labour did not, however, ease imports of goods, 
a factor which led to its downfall in 1949. With specific 
regard to Japan Nash was of course primarily concerned with 
the political issues, but he could not escape the prospect 
of renewed trade with Japan. Nash had been more concerned 
with the problem of migration than trading relations when 
speaking on the issue in 1943 (see above) but for 
expounding what seems an obvious truth he was criticised. 
This criticism was perhaps misdirected. The question that 
might have been asked was rather if Nash was not being 
hypocritical after years of criticising the importation of 
cheap Japanese goods. 
As far.as barriers to trade with Japan, or indeed any 
other country, were concerned the perennial issue of 
protective tariffs was inescapable. Labour continued to use 
licensing as a direct control but was also on the defensive 
about lowering tariffs. As with the Australian and New 
Zealand Coalition Governments of the 1930's, conservative 
parties were attacking high tariffs as a protection against 
cheap imports because they raised costs, both directly and 
indirectly, to farmers. But Labour was keen to protect New 
Zealand's new industries; a highly unpopular policy to 
farmers. The Mercantile Gazette, for example, put the case 
for farmers in 1944: 
23 Lane, 'An Examination of the Methods', pp.209-210. 
Forcing upon the country protected secondary 
industries disturbs seriously our agricultural 
economies by raising the costs to the primary 
producers.u · 
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Thus upon the conclusion of the war Nash and Labour 
faced a potential dilemma over Japan: how to reconcile the 
need to accept Japanese goods for Japan's sake with the 
need to protect New Zealand :j_ndustry. The Mercantile 
Gazette condemned proposals in the U.S. to reduce Japan to 
a pastoral economy as 'vicious': 
Both Germany and Japan cannot exist without the 
trade of other countries. Both countries must 
import, and how are they to import unless they 
are able to export? Both are highly industrial 
countries and the other nations want the 
manufactures of Germany and Japan. 25 
Thus both Nash and National had supposedly reached a 
political consensus on the need to re~integrate Japan into 
the international economy; a consensus buttressed by the 
political need to create a non-Communist, non-Fascist 
state. The problem that gradually arose for Labour in its 
policy of import restrictions was how it would affect 
Japan. It is clear that Labour placed the protection of 
local industry over strategic consideration of trade as it 
affected security; indeed the existence of the occupation 
forces guaranteed security at least in the short-term. 
Labour continued import control, commonly known as 
24 
25 
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'selective import control', to protect local industries 
until it was defeated in 1949. 26 
Part of Labour's downfall in 1949 was its excessive 
import controls: an 'army' of inspectors was needed to 
police the regulation on imports, as well as all the other 
controls (land sales controls, price controls, and building 
controls), that Labour continued after World War II. But 
also the Soviet Union's brutality in Eastern Europe and the 
threat of Communism in New Zealand (indicated by the 
waterfront disruptions in 1948 and 1949) were contributing 
factors. 21 Labour went out of office before it could: 
... undertake that redefinition of foreign 
political relations which the postwar power 
situation ever more urgently required. 28 
By becoming 'Commonwealth men' Fraser and Nash tied 
New Zealand to a pre-war world in which relations with 
Japan, despite the rhetoric on her need to trade, were 
doomed. With the election of National the redefinition of 
foreign policy towards Japan at last gave some hope to the 
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TRADE COMMISSIONER 
Prior to 1941 New Zealand had never established a 
Trade Commissioner in Japan despite an open invitation to 
do so. Now, despite the Labour Government's concerns over 
developing New Zealand industry, a Trade Commissioner was 
sent to Japan. The policy probably originated in a 
suggestion by Brigadier Quilliam, the New Zealand 
Prosecutor of War criminals in Tokyo. He urged Prime 
Minister Fraser in July 1946 to act as: 
Australia and India, as well as the United 
Kingdom and Canada, appear to be well 
represented, and from all one can hear there are 
bound to be economic and trade missions to Japan 
from those countries .. • 
The problem was again, as it had been at the time of 
the denunciation of the 1928 Trade Treaty, that New Zealand 
might lose markets in Japan to Allies, such as Australia. 
That New Zealand should have a trade representative in 
Japan was reinforced by J. c. Pollock, Special Returning 
Officer for Japan. In November 1946, while in Tokyo 
Pollock met S.F. Lynch, Leader Of the Australian Economic 
Mission to Japan. Reporting this encounter to the Prime 
Minister's Department the following February, Pollock said 
of Lynch that: 
29 
He considers that after his inspection of the 
trade position, New Zealand should be represented 
in that area and that some person competent to 
discuss the requirements of our country should 
proceed to Japan for the purpose of reporting to 
Quoted in memo. 
July 29, 1946. 
P.M.'s Department to Secretary of IC. 
IC 114/9. 




He intimated that Australia would have a strong 
representation there in the future, and no doubt 
he feels that as New Zealand also is vi tally 
interested in the future of the Pacific area, it 
should be represented also in order that we may 
have first hand information on the policy which 
is being laid down. 30 
There were also suggestions in Parliament that the 
U.S. appeared to have a monopoly on Japan's trade, which 
led to questions as to when a permanent Trade Commission 
would be established there. 31 
Whatever the cause, the Government did appoint a Trade 
Representative in Tokyo in 1947. Reuben Challis was given 
several responsibilities; one was reparations but clearly 
trade was ultimately important. Before private trading 
with Japan was allowed (from September 1st, 1947) his role 
regarding trade was to advise the Department of Industries 
and Commerce: 
... on the availability of goods from Japan, on 
the prospects of sales of New Zealand products to 
Japan, and on trading procedure. 32 
Nordmeyer, the Minister of Industries and Commerce, 
was nevertheless sceptical as to the value of having a 
Trade Commissioner in Tokyo, pointing out that there was 
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near future (in 19 4 7) to a stage where trade would be 
worthwhile. 33 This sentiment seems to have been shared by 
the business community as even when private trade with 
Japan was reopened from September 1947 there was no rush to 
renew old business contacts, (see below). Challis was thus 
mostly occupied with official business. 
After the change of Government Challis was ordered to 
undertake a survey of Asian markets beyond Japan; an 
indication of National's positive attitude to trade 
relations with Asia. Challis travelled throughout South-
East Asia between February and April 1951. This was the 
first comprehensive research done on behalf of the 
Government on trade possibilities in Asia since Belshaw's 
visit in 1929, and the first directly instigated by the 
Department of Industries and Commerce. His report on trade 
possibilities with Japan, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Indo-
China, Thailand, Burma, Singapore, and Indonesia was 
comprehensive. The conclusion was, however, simple: of 
all these countries the possibilities of trade were greater 
by far with Japan: 
The scope for expansion of New Zealand's trade 
with Japan is vast, the limits being largely 
those of Government policy on the subject, 34 
No other country received such an endorsement. In a 
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In a disorderly Far East, Japan is perhaps the 
most stable country both politically and 
economically, and there seems a good chance that 
she will remain so, if for no other reason than 
that the policy of the western democracies is 
clearly to keep her that way as a counter to the 
frightening spread of Communism in the East. 35 
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At the same time Challis was also indicating that 
Australian interests were far ahead in cultivating the 
market for wool in Japan. While acknowledging that 
shipping was a major problem, he castigated the New Zealand 
wool industry for not showing greater interest in the 
Japanese market. 36 
With the recovery of trade between New Zealand and 
Japan Challis proved to be a tireless worker for New 
Zealand's interests in Japan (see Chapter 8) . T -\.-..-,.'9-.LJCU..IV 1 .. U. I 
despite its own retrospective economic policies, had 
despatched to Japan a Trade Representative whose ambitions 
would have been increasingly at odds with Labour policy had 
it continued into the 1950's. Labour did National a good 
service by establishing Challis in Tokyo ready for a 
Government that was more willing to take trade relations 
with Japan seriously. 
35 
36 
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At the same time as Challis was taking up his 
appointment in Tokyo legal prohibition to trading with 
Japan was being removed. This appeared in the Gazette as 
the Enemy Trading (Japan) notices of May and July 194 7. 37 
This did not completely free trade with Japan, however, as 
trade at this time was being conducted on a 'Government to 
Government' basis. Even when private trade was reopened 
from September 1947, and SCAP allowed four hundred 
businesses to enter Japan with Government sponsorship, of 
New Zealand's quota of six places, only five were taken up 
by businessmen.~ 
Of the eight initial applications to enter Japan by 
businesses in New Zealand received in June and July by the 
Department of Industries and Commerce, most contain the 
reference to an interest in importing timber, and various 
timber products, for furniture. 39 Each application was 
supported by a number of other companies in a 'pooling' of 
interests so that each businessman who went to Japan 
actually represented a number of companies. one 
application was from Distributors Association Ltd. , in 
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of Banno Bros. (N.Z.) Ltd. to Japan to re-establish contact 
with the parent company, Banno Bros. Ltd. in Osaka. 
Another was from Farmers Trading Co. Ltd. in Auckland, 
which was noted as having 'dealt extensively in Japanese 
goods pre-war' . Some of these applications were then 
withdrawn to give the five applications noted above. It is 
also worth noting that F. Kanematsu ( N. z. ) Ltd. in the 
guise of J. Gunton (N.Z.) Ltd. was still operating at this 
time. 
statistics of trade indicate that there was no 
resumption of normal trade, even by private businesses, 
after September 1st 1947. Trade appears to have genuinely 
re-started only in 1948, despite Challis's presence in 
Tokyo and the legality of private trade before this time. 
Private businessmen continued to travel to Japan 
during 1948, as the quota of six businessmen was a 
'revolving' one in which after one returned another could 
go. contact was established :Py a new Japanese C011\pany, 
Sanshin Textile Trading Co. Ltd. with Bing Harris & Co. in 
New Zealand in 1948. The Japanese company was apparently 
made up of the former staff of the textile department of 
Mi tsu.j_, the now broken up Zaibatsu. This prompted Bing 
Harris & Co. to send a representative to Japan. 40 What 
became of this is unknown, but it does show that elements 
of Mitsui Zaibatsu were stili oper~ting as separate 
40 Letter (author unknown) to Challis. November 12, 1948. 
IC 114/1/10. 
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departments and that contact was made directly from Japan 
rather than through Australia. 
There was one outstanding example of business 
enterprise at this time, that of Mr Douglas Kenrick. 
Kenrick went to Japan in November 1947 and set up his own 
company, Douglas M. Kenrick and Associates in April 1949 
which imported and exported a wide range of goods, notably 
scrap metal from New Zealand in return for cement and metal 
commodities from Japan. 41 These goods were transported by 
his own shipping company the Ken Line (see Chapter 7) . 
This was thus the beginning of a determined bid to increase 
trade between Japan and New Zealand, and will be further 
examined later on. 
THE STERLING AREA AND KOREAN WAR 
New Zealand operated financially as part of the 
sterling Country Area as opposed to the Dollar Area. Until 
September 1st 1947 all agreements for trade with New 
Zealand were conducted with SCAP. Negotiations between the 
New Zealand Government and SCAP to allow some two-way 
trading extended into 1948, 42 but the problem was payment. 
Representatives of the Sterling Country Area and SCAP 
negotiated on trade with Ja:pan and an Interim Sterling 
41 
42 
Correspondence: Douglas Kenrick. 12/3/90. 
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Payments Agreement was signed in November 1947. SCAP could 
not, however, finance initial purchases from Sterling Area 
countries and an exchange rate of the yen had yet to be 
fixed. Furthermore, this agreement only applied to private 
traders, not Government, until an overall sterling Payments 
Agreement became effective from May 31st, 1948, which 
covered Government transactions as well. 43 Thus direct 
Government to Government trade was delayed. 
Negotiations still continued from May to November 9th, 
1948, about Japan's trade and payments problem. SCAP and 
the Sterling Area countries negotiated expanding Japan's 
trade.« The first Trade Arrangement, for the period July 
1st 1948 to June 30th 1949, covered both Government and 
private trading. It was agreed that Japan was to export 
mainly textiles and import essential raw materials. A 
level of stg£30 million was set on imports to Japan with 
exports to match this value. It was also agreed that trade 
would be conducted in Sterling with settlement every six 
months in U.S. dollars, called 'dollar convertibility'. 
Though these were not bilateral arrangements with 
individual countries but rather with the Sterling Area 
Countries as a whole, New Zealand proposed to import some 
essential items such as furniture timber an~ some types of 
textiles, and to export wool, hides, casein, and seeds. 
This was essentially the same as pre-war trade. 
43 
44 
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In New Zealand the apparatus of trade with Japan had 
two key elements: the Reserve Bank sanctioned exchange in 
conjunction with the Customs Department. All applications 
for exchange transactions had to be made to the customs 
Department, of which Walter Nash was Minister. Thus Nash 
played another vital role in New Zealand-Japan trade 
relations. After asserting that the world must take 
Japanese goods in 1943, he was now in a position to let New 
Zealand take more Japanese goods. This he did, but they 
were only essential goods that could not be supplied from 
anywhere else. 
In New Zealand's import restrictions 'soft' and 'hard' 
currency countries were differentiated. Though Japan dealt 
in Sterling it did not fall into the sterling Area, and 
hence it was a 'hard' currency country; Japan was a 
'scheduled' country and did not, therefore, get the benefit 
of import licences to the extent of non-scheduled 
currencies until 1951 when restrictions on hard currency 
sources for imports were eased. 45 
These problems, and Japan's shatter~d state, somewhat 
tempered the need to accept unessential Japanese goods. 
Imports from Japan totalled £60,000 in 1948, exports about 
£46,000. In 1949 control of foreign exchange dealings was 
transferred from SCAP to the Foreign Exchange Control 
45 Bryan, New Zealand, pp.142-143. 
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Board, established by the Japanese Government, followed by 
an easing of controls over private trading in 1950. 46 
Starting in June 1950 the Korean war transformed the 
Japanese economy, with new implications for New Zealand. 
Exports of wool to Japan increased greatly; by 1951 over 
£3m of wool was exported, the price itself having risen 
over 250% of that in 1948. 47 Japan / s ability to export also 
improved, 48 much to the alarm of Dr. Sutch who towed the 
Labour line and revived the supposed threat to local 
manufacturers. 49 By 1951 trade had significantly improved, 
but was largely sustained by the Korean war and proved to 
be only temporary. 
The Korean war by no means solved the problems of 
trade. The problem of payments was exacerbated from 
September 1951 when a new Sterling Payments Agreement came 
into force which cancelled the dollar-convertibility clause 
of tne 1948 Agreement. Because an accumulation of Sterling 
could now not be converted into U.S. dollars every six 
months it was essential to maintain a balance of payments, 
which almost immediately went in Japan's favour. New 
Zealand along with other Sterling Area countries had to 
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Nevertheless imports increased in value 
between 1951 and 1952 although exports dropped slightly. 
Trade figures were now at the £4m level, much higher than 
at any time pre-World War II, but the percentage of New 
Zealand's trade that Japan held was still only about 1.5% 
at the peak of the Korean war boom. 
The problem of payment obviously played tpe underlying 
role in trade in the immediate post-war period. Neither 
Government policy nor private enterprise were immune to the 
constraints, sometimes severe, that were placed on them by 
payment difficulties. Nor could a change of Government 
materially alter this premise. It was only when order was 
again obtained in the international economy, which did not 
occur until much later, could Government policy be said to 
be again playing the underlying role in trade relations. 
Meanwhile this was only the beginning of the booms and 
slumps that trade with Japan went through in the 1950's. 
NATIONAL AND TllAOE 
Events in 1949 had begun to focus attention on trade 
with Japan once more. Imports 9f Japanese goods, though 
not yet large, had once again caused murmurings in 
Pariiatnent. National, unusually, noted that the 
availability of cheap Japanese goods was beneficial to the 
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public. 50 (Usual arguments had rested on the benefit to 
primary producers only.) But events in China, the 
formation of a Central People's Government in Peking in 
September (i.e. the loss to communism), also focused 
attention on strategic issues concerning Japan. 
It has been said of National that compared to the 
previous Labour Government they: 
... in fact showed no disposition to develop any 
strong particulf:lristic line of their own. 51 
n_ .wf ... ~---1 
-j·'(• 
National did, however, significantly differ.:t6Labour 
on its policy of imports and in general on its attitudes to 
trade with Japan. In 1950 it began to dismantle import 
controls because of the high price of wool brought about by 
the Korean war . At the beginning of the year about 950 
types of goods required import licences, but during 1950 
about 420 were released; mostly machinery and raw 
materials. 52 In fact the Government went too far in easing 
imports, and had to re-introduce restrictions later in 
1952. 
Imports from Japan increased, but National, despite 
its rhetoric on freer trade, was oautious of adverse public 
reaction to trade with Japan. In a draft policy statement 
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... may receive some further publicity leading to 
the stirring up of controversy amongst those who 
may not be fully in agreement with the 
Government's policy. For example, watersiders 
might decide to take a hand in the matter, or 
manufacturers might start getting alarmed that 
the eventual result of this policy will be 
increased imports from Japan. 
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It was also noted that the Government should be aware 
of the consequences of adopting a policy that promoted 
exports, however sensible, as: 
... it must lead eventually to pressure from the 
Japanese or American end for sending more imports 
into New zealand. At the moment we have sound 
enough arguments to support the present import 
restriction, but the situation may change, e.g. 
if Japan becomes entitled to be treated as a soft 
currency source and, in this case, our 
restrictive policy on imports might take a bit of 
explaining. 53 
The Minister of Industries and Commerce, c.M. Bowden, 
was also alive to the potential controversy: 
... any public statements should not give undue 
prominence to Japan as a market for our produce. 54 
In fact there was very little public controversy over 
trade with Japan at this time as attention centred on 
political issues; the signing of the Peace Treaty and the 
formation of ANZUS. There was probably more reported about 
Australian trade with Japan than New Zealand's trade with 
Japan. 55 Nevertheless, it appears that Labour, and Nash 
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Japanese imports. But levels of imports, though they had 
increased, were still relatively low and were of raw 
materials. Labour, trying to make an issue of a non-issue, 
had to exaggerate the situation and were rightly taken to 
task for the inaccuracies of their statements both by the 
Government and business journals.~ 
The constraints imposed by payments affected National 
policy as much as it had Labour, and National had yet to 
show that it was genuinely more sympathetic to trade with 
Japan than its predecessor. By all indications National 
would be more sympathetic, as long as there was not a 
public reaction to such a policy. But the need to 
formulate a definite policy, and then the test of whether 
it could be implemented, largely depended on the political 
issues, and specifically, the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 
56 Anonymous, 'Trade with Japan' , in New Zealand Economist 
and Taxpayer, September 26, 1951, p.131. See also Press 
August 29, 1951, and NZPD Vol.295, p.245. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
POST-WAR SHIPPING 
Shipping between New Zealand and the East is by 
no means satisfactory at present, and this is a 
most important factor preventing an expansion of 
trade with that area. 
BACKGROUND 
Department of Industries and 
-Commerce Annual Report, 
1951. 1 
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When the Yamagiku Maru left New Zealand in August 1941 
there began a ten year period that illustrated how New 
Zealand was insuperably tied to British markets by 
shipping. It was a situation that completely reinforced 
Labour's (and Nash's) concept of New Zealand's ideal 
trading patterns. The Conf erenqe Lines serviced New 
Zealand during the War, and despite shortages of tonnage 
that continued after the War, their $ervice was 
appreciated. Few people (if any) questioned the suitability 
of this arrangement; there was little alternative even if 
they did. The Department of Industries and Commerce might 
l IC Annual Report, 1951, p.15. 
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lament the problem of shipping to Asia much as it had over 
twenty years earlier, but the question was whether it would 
do anything this time, or wait for others to fill the gap 
as it had done before. 
Inevitably, the Department did nothing. New Zealand's 
concept of the Pacific, and the political aspects of 
security in a post-war world may have changed, but the 
concept of trade was reinforced by the War. Trade with 
Asia remained an 'aside' until regular services resumed 
with the return of Japanese shipping, which was signalled 
by the arrival of the Nachisan Maru at the end of July 
1952. 2 
At the outset of World War II, Japan's mercantile 
fleet had a gross tonnage of over 6 million, but what 
survived the War was unsuitable for ocean-going commerce. 
Japan had thus lost her enterprise in shipping. SCAP 
restricted Japan's shipbuilding industry and only in 1950 
could work be started freely on re-establishing a 
mercantile fleet. At this time Japan still possessed very 
few ocean-going vessels, but the number quickly grew as 
previous routes, such as Australia and New Zealand, were 
re-established. Despite this ra.pid growth, a much higher 
proportion of Japan's trade was now carried by foreign 
ships (including those chartered by Japan), than before 
World War II. 3 Unlike the original establishment of these 
Press August 13 1 1952. 
Allen, Japan's Economic Expansion, pp.224-225. 
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services, sailings to Australia and New Zealand started 
again at approximately the same time. It would seem 
reasonable to expect then that unlike the 1930's when 
Japanese shipping to New Zealand grew out of, and continued 
to be influenced by, the Australian service, that there 
would now be a new independence in the shipping service to 
New Zealand. This however, does not appear to be the case, 
as will be shown below. 
THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICE 
In the period after the War to the beginning of the 
Japanese shipping service to New Zealand only tramp ships 
operated for the bulk of goods traded with Japan. New 
Zealand's exports to Japan were mainly of wool until 1952, 
and imports of metal. For these, large bulk carrying 
trampers were ideal. The ships used were mostly, however, 
those of the Eastern and Australian Steamship Co., for 
which the Union Steamship Co. were agents in New Zealand. 
The Palikonda sailed for Sydney and Japan in March 1947 
carrying clothing and other goods. 4 In 1948 the Eastern and 
the Nankip carried the first real cargoes. 5 Late in 1948 
the Westralia also apparently sailed for Japan. In 1949 
the Nellore, Nankin, and Eastern operated. These were all 
5 
Shipping Gazette March 29, 1947. 
Shipping Gazette March 10, 1948. 
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Eastern and Australian Steamship Co. vessels, plus 
occasionally the Yunnan of the Australian and Oriental 
Line. These two companies, the Eastern and Australian 
steamship Co., and the Australian and Oriental Line 
operated in con junction with a third company, the Indo-
china Steam Navigation Co. to service Australia's Asian 
routes. It was these companies that were also servicing 
New Zealand's trade with Japan when there was a demand. 6 
They also apparently started a regular service between New 
Zealand and Japan soon after World War II which was 
cancelled after a year because of a lack of cargo. In any 
event, before Japan again started a service to New Zealand 
the only competition lay in the 'Ken Line' I a snipping 
company formed by Douglas Kenrick in Tokyo to provide a 
service to New Zealand. 7 
THE KEN LINE 
Kenrick started Ken Line as the Conference lines that 
serv~ced New Zealand's trade with Britain were not 
operating to Japan. The Ken Line was, of course, run in 
association with Douglas M. Kenrick and Associates. 
Kenrick chartered ships from all over the world through a 
japanese company located in the same off ice building in 
6 Farquhar Collection 14/6/52 & 9/7/49. 
Correspondence: Douglas Kenrick, 12/3/90. 
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Tokyo. 0 Some of these ships were actually Japanese, such as 
the Yuho Maru, 9 many were China Union Line ships, such as 
the Union Mariner and Union Trader. 10 These were run as 
direct tramper services between New Zealand and Japan 
carrying scrap metal and cement. These ships had to carry 
at least 10,000 tons of cement to be profitable and for the 
most part were sent to New Zealand and theh released from 
the charter. Only occasionally did the same ship return 
with scrap metal. 11 Much of this scrap metal was supplied 
by R.C. MacDonald Ltd. which had been exporting scrap to 
Japan prior to World War II on the Japanese Liner services. 
After World War II ships were also chartered by R.C. 
MacDonald Ltd. itself, but exports to Japan increased after 
1952 when Nitto commenced a regular service . 12 Whether 
exports of scrap metal, although transported on ships of 
co;mpanies that operated regular services, were actually 
loaded onto ships that were scheduled seems doubtful 
though. OSK and Nitto (wb.ich commenced advertised services 
to New Zealand in 1952) also operated tramper ships at the 
same time. Scrap metal, which included tramlines, old farm 
equipment, cut up boilers, and once a whole shipment of 
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ships that had to run to a schedule . 13 Ships that took 
scrap metal to Japan, and often then returned with steel, 
were tramper ships operated either by Douglas M. Kenrick 
and Associates, companies exporting scrap metal that 
chartered ships themselves, or by the Japanese operating 
tramper ships to supplement their scheduled sailings. 
Kenrick started off with exports of New Zealand 
butter, then cheese, skim milk powder, linseed, grass 
seeds, coal, scrap iron, manganese ore, hides,. cattle, 
horses, barley, and tallow. He exported to New Zealand 
cement, timber, canned salmon, smoked oysters, textiles, 
cameras, binoculars, scientific equipment, sporting goods, 
household goods; and a multitude of other sundry goods. 
Kenrick also had his own subsidiary in New Zeal~nd, Douglas 
Kenrick ( N. Z. ) Ltd. , but also dealt directly with 
Amalgamated Dairies, and such companies as Fletchers and 
various cement importers . 14 One of these was the Tasman 
Steamship Co. , formed by ex-servicemen, which acted as 
agents for Kenrick' s consignments of cement . 15 Kenrick, as 
well as operating a fleet of chartered ships also bought 
his own ship, the Ken Waihi. None of these Ken Line ships 
were operating in a shipping conference. Ken Line was 
independent but could survive, at least temporarily, by the 
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the abundance of scrap metal. Nitto, for example, did not 
care if Ken Line took a share of this trade in competition 
because there was still a surplus.u Kenrick did, however, 
have to overcome some prejudice against Japanese goods 
', 
until early shipments of cement and steel were proven to be 
of high quality •17 
As the operator of New Zealand's only trading concern 
in Japan, Kenrick was a staunch advocate of expanding 
imports of Japanese goods into New Zealand and held the 
view that many of these goods were not in competition with 
New Zealand manufactured goods. This was obviously very 
much along the lines of National's arguments for expanding 
imports .. Kenrick cited binoculars, cameras, and 
microscopes as examples of excessive import controls. The 
situation was often so bad that some ships came 'in 
ballast' (i.e. empty) to New Zealand in order to take New 
Z~aland exports." This would have ~een the case in 1953 
especially, when trade was severely unbalanced. The Ken 
Line, however, ultimately succumbed to competition from 
Australian shipping, thus ending the only 'independent' 
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Although Kenrick had close contact with Reuben Challis 
over business matters, 20 it appears that this did not extend 
to shipping. 21 While it is easy to point to a lack of 
interest by the Government (justifiably), it must also be 
remembered that the Department of Industries and Commerce 
considered a regular service to be essential to build up 
exports. Chartered ships operating irregularly and usually 
only for bulk cargoes such as scrap metal and logs were no 
substitute. Wool, traditionally the major export to Japan, 
was a liner cargo. The development of a satisfactory 
shipping service between New Zealand and Japan depended on 
a regular service, and the best hope for that actually lay 
again with the Japanese. 
THE RETURN OF JAPANESE SHIPPING 
Of the three Japanese companies that operated to New 
Zealand before World War II, i.e. NYK, OSK, and YKK, only 
OSK returned with Nitto in 1952 to run a regular service. 
NYK did send the occasional ship, such as the Mantetsu Maru 
III. 22 Representatives of both NYK and O$K had been among 
the first Japanese businessmen to be given visas to enter 
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consec~tive passport numbers and had applied on the same 
day must indicate a degree of collusion between the 
shipping companies. 23 Even though NYK did not reinstigate 
a service, that there was a 'friendly' competition between 
Nitto and OSK has been indicated, 24 The first Japanese ship 
to arrive after World War l:I, the Nachisan Maru, was 
actually a Taiyo Kogyo Kisen ship. 0 Nitto then started a 
semi-regular service with the Chowa Maru. 26 OSK followed 
with the Osaka Maru, which had also started their service 
to Australia. 21 Neither Nitto nor OSK were keen on coming 
to New Zealand until trade picked up; Nitto considered 
cancelling its service but when trade later recovered 
profits picked up for both companies. 20 
For the establishment of Nitto in New Zealand there 
was a personal input as well in the form of Captain Geoff 
Hardy. Hardy was apparently very keen on developing Nitto 
in New Zealand and to this end helped Nitto. He was also 
Managing Director of Northern Steamship Co., and not 
surprisingly Nitto appointed Northern Steamship as its 
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Japan. 29 OSK had no such advantage, and in fact the agency 
was transferred from the New Zealand Shipping Co. to G.H. 
Scales because of a conflict with Pacific and Oriental. 30 
Nitto started advertising in the Shipping Gazette in March 
1953 and OSK quickly followed suit in July. 31 It was not 
until September 1955, however, that Nitto applied to the 
Japanese Transport Ministry to open a regular service to 
New Zealand. 32 Thus while 1952 appears as a crucial date 
for the return of a normalized Japanese service to New 
Zealand, no such clear distinction can be made; Nitto 
seems to have operated as an 'advertised' tramper service; 
goods were still being transhipped in Australia 1
33 and 
arriving in Japan the worse for it; and even Ken Line was 
only listed in the Shipping Gazette from July 1953 to 
September 1954. 34 While the state of shipping did become 
more regular and orderly after 1952, it did not happen 
immediately. 
One of the most haphazard ways in which shipping 
developed can be seen in the export of meat to Japan. The 
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was sent to Japan in a variety of boats. Nitto fitted 
refrigerated lockers into some of its ships to carry meat 
but as each locker could only carry about 40 tons they were 
still insufficient to carry the quantity demanded. 36 Nitto 
also had two refrigerated ships, the Chowa Maru and Takuwa 
Maru 37 which came down 'in ballast' to New Zealand to take 
back meat, almost all of which was supplied by C.S. Stevens 
and Co. ·Ltd. 38 
THE 'HAM BOATS' 
Despite the availability of these ships there was 
still insufficient space for meat. Stevens overcame this 
by chartering refrigerated vessels that serviced the 
Japanese whaling vessels in the Ross Sea. The whaling 
season ceased when the killing season for sheep began so 
·he could charter these vessels in their off-season; i.e. 
from September to March. Another way in which meat went to 
Japan was by the boats owned or chartered by the big 
Japanese ham manufacturers such as Nippon Ham, Snow Brand, 
and Ito Ham. The last company, for example, used the Ito 
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These vessels were variously known as 'Ham boats'. 
The Ham boats were known by this name from the ultimate 
destination of their product - Japanese ham. The export of 
beef to Japan, first tried in 1957 with a shipment on the 
Timaru Star I had failed. The meat was suitable for 
hamburgers, but was not in demand in Japan. Even worse, it 
angered Japanese beef farmers and imports were then 
restrictect. 39 At this time New Zealand was faced with the 
possibility of Britain entering the EEC, and, as Mr. 
Stevens puts it, 'the heat was on' to find an alternative 
mark,et for mutton to the extent of about 100, ooo tons 
annually. 4° From the beginning of World War II to October 
1, 1954, all meat for export from New Zealand had been sold 
by the Government by way of the Bulk Purchase Contracts. 
As early as 1950 the Departments of Industries and Commerce 
had considered these Contracts to be a limiting factor on 
the expansion of exports of meat to Japan. 41 In 1954 the 
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however, as far as the Meat Produce.rs Board was concerned. 42 
This was soon to change, not only because of the EEC but 
also because increased Westernization in Japan had 
(finally) led to a change in diet. This was no 'golden-
age' as envisaged in pre-war days but Westernization had 
led many manufacturers of traditional processed fish foods 
to change to the processing of ham and sausage. 43 Some 
sample· carcasses were sent to Ito Ham in 1958, which 
(secretly) experimented with them to de-bone and de-
odouri ze the meat, then blend it with other ingredients 
such as pork fat, whale and rabbit meat, to turn it into 
'pressed hams'. 44 
CRUSADER 
Another way in which meat was sent to Japan was by the 
newly formed Crusader Shipping Co. Ltd. In November 1957 
the Conference Lines (i.e. the four British shipping 
companies Shaw Savill and Albion Co. Ltd., the New Zealand 
Shipping co. Ltd., the Port Line Ltd., and the Blue star 
Line (N.Z.) Ltd.) formed a subsidiary company, the Crusader 
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Two ships, the Crusader and the Saracen were purchased from 
a Swedish shipyard. The Crusader arrived in New Zealand in 
January 1958, sailing with the first shipment of 
refrigerated meat for Yokohama and Kobe in February. The 
Saracen sailed later in 1958. 45 The Crusader had some 
200,000 cubic feet of refrigerated space, as opposed to 
7,000 and 5,700 for the Chowa Maru and Takuwa Maru. In 
addition to all the above ships, the Indo China Steam 
Navigation co. had two refrigerated ships with some 16,000 
cubic feet capacity, the Eastern Argosy and Eastern Star, 
which operated occasionally to New Zealand. OSK did not 
have any refrigerated space. 46 
The major shipping endeavour was, then, the crusader 
Shipping co. Ltd. which was actually B+itish owned. The 
company was set up to run a regular service, and in fact 
was set up +n competition to the charter of Japanese 
whaling ves$els by c.s. Stevens. Butterfield and Swire 
Ltd., the agents for Crusader in New Zealand, were not 
interested with the Nitto ships, but were 'concerned' about 
the charter of the Japanese whaling vessels. 47 This was 
their major competition in a form that liner companies 
distrust anyway, a rival charter service. The 




Waters, s.o. Shaw Savill Line; 
Trading ( Whi tcombe and Tombs , 
pp.146-147. 
One Hundred Years of 
Christchurch, 1961) 
'Notes for P.M.'s Visit'. IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.l). 
Ibid. 
151 
the tramper ships, and the answer to this problem came in 
the form of the Meat Board. Unlike the Wool Board, the 
Meat Board took on the responsibility of negotiating 
shipping freight contracts and the regulation and 
inspection of meat shipments at the conclusion of the Bulk 
Purchase Contracts. 48 Thus the Meat Board became involved 
in the problem of shipping meat to Japan. It was the Meat 
Board that 'goaded' and 'exhorted' Stevens to find a market 
for New Zealand meat in Japan originally, but now they were 
being 'pressurized' by the traditional shipping companies 
of New Zealand's trade with Britain to organise an 
'orderly' (i.e. liner) shipping service. Stevens reduced 
the freight rates, which he at that time controlled, but 
ultimately the Meat Board moved to restrict chartered 
ships. 49 
THE CONFERENCE AND 'ORDERLY' SHIPPING 
The development of 'orderly' shipping had thus once 
again fallen to the New Zealand Gonference Lines. While 
this happened at the expense of New Zealand 
entrepreneurship, Crusader's later entry to the Australian 
and Eastern Shipping Conference at least put it into a 
position to challenge the much larger threat to New Zealand 
48 
49 
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shipping, that of Australian interests. Prior to World War 
II Japanese shipping lines dominated the Conference that 
operated sailings between Australia and Japan, out of which 
t~e services of OSK and Yamashita (and supposedly NYK as 
well) for the trade between New Zealand and Japan had 
grown. 
It has therefore been suggested ( C:).bove, Chapter 2) 
that Australia was in a weak position to influence New 
Zealand's interests in the 1930's, even if perhaps this had 
not been the c,ase earlier. After World War II, however, 
from 1945 to 1951, no Japanese lines were in a position to 
resume this trade, and thus the pre-war Conference was 
• ..:I reorganizeu based in Sydney . 50 Of the old Confe:rience 
members, only the E.& A. Line had not been Japanese, and 
now it along with the Australian & orient Line, the Indo-
China Steam Navigation co., and the Australia-West Pacific 
Line, reorganized the Conference as the Australia and 
Eastern Shipping Conference. It was the first three of 
these four Conference members that were operating the 
service for New Zealand to Japan. Unlike the 1930' s, 
Australia shipping interests were now in a dominant 
position in the Conference. 
NYK and OSK re-entered the Conference in 1952 and the 
Japan Australia Line, now C(i)mposed of Yamashita ( YKK) , 
50 Manuscript No.3. 
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Kawasaki, and Mitsui (instead of Kokusai), re-entered in 
1954. 0 Nitto rejoined in 1957, and Crusader in 
1958.~ The position of Nitto and Crusader, however, was 
different to the seven members who had joined by 1954, as 
in this year they adopted a 'Conference Constitution' which 
was not disclosed to subsequent members. 53 This is 
apparently still having ramifications in the claims of NYK 
and YKK to having 'latent rights to operate to New 
Zealand. 54 
The Japanese shipping lines thus once again came to 
dominate the Conference and in 1962 it ceased to be based 
in Sydney. The Conference instead moved to Tokyo and was 
renamed the Australia and New Zealand/Eastern Shipping 
Conference. 55 It was shortly after this that at the 
Miyanoshita Meeting in February 1964 that Crusader and 
Nitto were at last able to expound the interests of the New 
Zealand trade despite their 'junior' status in the 
Conference. Both lines were restricted to twelve sailings 
per year between Japan and New Zealand. 56 Nitto was, 
therefore, not a serious rival to Crusader in the meat 
trade. Nor did crusader have rights to trade to 
51 Ibid. 
52 Manuscript No.3. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Interview: Arthur Turnbull, 18/4/90. 
55 Manuscript No.3. 
56 Ibid. 
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Australia, 57 and it seems this was the case with Nitto ships 
servicing New Zealand too. 50 This was not uncommon as even 
OSK did not call at Australian ports after 1954 in return 
for being given a 'free hand' in the New Zealand trade. 59 
This 'free hand', though perhaps not a serious rival to 
crusader, illustrates the different standings within the 
Conference of these shipping lines. crusader and Nitto, 
then, had every reason to champion New Zealand's interests 
independently of those to Australia. 






The history also reveals that the main route in 
this Conference has been Japan/East Australia 
v.v. trade served by Australian Principals, who 
for their unlimited membership had also decided 
all matters for all other trades, including New 
Zealand, irrespective of whether they were 
operating the services between particular areas 
concerned. It was quite logical that under such 
system Australian interests have always 
precedence over New Zealand interests. We are 
impressed that New Zealand ports were outports to 
East Australian ports at least conference-wise 
and thus even matters proper to New Zealand had 
been handled on the premise to protect the 
interests of the Australian interests first. 
This had been the situation at least till 
Miyanoshita Meeting in February 1964 when the 
independency of the New Zealand trade and the 
interests of New Zealand Principals were 
expol,lnded by Nitto and Crusader. This is the 
first time through the long history of this 
Conference that New Zealand was spotlighted at 
the Conference level. 60 
Interview: Arthur Turnbull, 18/4/90. 
Manuscript No.2. 
Press February 18, 1954. 
Manuscript No.3. 
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The Crusader enterprise had at least, then, 
contributed to New Zealand's standing in shipping if even 
at the expense of c.s. Stevens and Co. Ltd. In the final 
analysis it is indicative of the nature of shipping between 
New Zealand and Japan that it took an a~algam of B+itish 
shipping companies co-operating with a Japanese shipping 
company to protect New Zealand shipping interests against 
those of Australia. The New Zealand Government had not 
only done nothing to establish a shipping service to Asia, 
it had also done nothing to help protect the service 
supplied by others. 
CHAPTER NINE 
THE PEACE TREATY S~PTEMBER 1951-1953 
The period of grace for those who must prepare to 
meet Japanese competition is almost over. Japan 
will not in future be content with mere dumping 
of trinkets in Colonial markets. 
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The New Zealand Manufacturer, 1951. 1 
ANZUS AND COMMUNISTS 
The signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty set the 
stage for political and trade relations between New Zealand 
and Japan for the rest of .the 1950's. Not surprisingly it 
was the political aspect of the Peace Treaty that dominated 
over the economic, but there were other political 
distractions as well: ANZUS and the Communist threat. The 
latter thre.at to New Zealand security also led to the 
signing of SEATO in September 1954, but Communism was a 
phenomenum that seemed to be exerting itself within New 
Zealand as well in the form of the 1951 Waterfront Strike. 
All of these political issues, both external and internal, 
Anonymous. 'Threat from Japan' in The New Zealand 
Manufacturer October 15, 1951, p.41. 
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in some ways affected New Zealand's trading relations with 
Japan. 
The signing of ANZUS illustrated how reluctant many 
New Zealanders were to enter an alliance without Britain. 
Fraser and Nash were not the only 'Commonwealth' men in 
politics; National's Sydney Holland was also very much a 
'Commonwealth' man. This led to problems over the signing 
of ANZUS as a tripartite agreement as the U.S. desired;· 
the lack of British involvement was an obstacle not only to 
Labour but also Holland and some of his colleagues. It was 
Thomas Webb, who became Minister of External Affairs in 
September 1951, who convinced the doubters in National to 
agree to a tripartite agreement. Webb himself was 
concerned at the possibility of Japanese resurgence and 
Communism in China. 2 
Thus both ANZUS and later SEATO were a response to the 
threat of Communism, and the link to trade with Japan was 
direct: if Japan could not trade with the West it would 
have to trade with Communist China, and become politically 
influenced by this relationship. This was at the core of 
National's attitudes to economic relations with Japan. But 
not only was a good trading relationship necessary to 
prevent Communist influence, it was also necessary to 
prevent the circumstance arising that Japan had to again 
embark on an expansionist policy for economic reasons. 
2 Gustafson, The First 50 Years, p.66. See also 
Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, pp. 304-306, on 
ANZUS and SEATO. T. c. Webb - Minister of External 
Affairs 1951-1954. 
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Thus whether it was to help defend Japan, or help in the 
defence against a possibly resurgent Japan, the necessity 
to trade with her seemed undeniable. 
This was not a prospect that pleased New Zealand 
manufacturers, but at the time of the signing of the Peace 
Treaty and ANZUS New Zealand was again heading into a 
balance of payments crisis. In 1952 the Government had to 
again reduce imports after its spree in 1950 and 1951. It 
introduced exchange allocation; as effective as import 
licensing. Restrictions were only eased again in 1954 - an 
election year. Thus whatever the Government might consider 
politic~lly and strategically desirable, and wnatever 
effect political alliances might have on economic 




THE PEACE TREATY 
in determining foreign economic 
In the preamble to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, 
signed on September 8th, 1951, Japan undertook to follow 
generally accepted practices on fair trading and labelling 
of goods. l?re-war Japanese trade practices, which had also 
been criticised in New Zealand, had thus found their sequel 
in the Peace Treaty. Article 12 of the Treaty covered 
trading, maritime, and other commercial activities. 
Permanent trade relations were to be settled between Japan 
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and other nations individually in bilateral trade 
agreements, but as a temporary measure (for four years) 
Japan undertook to extend Most Favoured Nation treatment to 
any country on the basis of reciprocity. 3 But New Zealand 
did not take up this offer. 
As in 1932 when the Ottawa Conference sparked debate 
about trade with Japan in Parliament, so now in 1951 the 
signing of the Peace Treaty did the same. In 1932 the issue 
had been the importation of cheap Japanese goods. Now, 
nearly twenty years later, this was still a major concern. 
The real issue, however, in 1951 was Japan's place in a 
post-war world and the possible affiliation with Communism. 
It was this problem that now concerned both National and 
Labour politicians rather than the possibility of military 
expansion again by Japan, and around this problem arose the 
question of trade. Even though it had been Nash who had 
pointed out in 1943 the necessity of accepting Japanese 
goods after the war had concluded, it was now the National 
Government that advocated trade with Japan for strategic 
reasons and Labour led by Nash himself (having returned to 
a traditional Labour hostility towards trade with Japan) 
that criticised cheap Japanese imports. National's 
Minister of Industries and Commerce put his party's case in 
Parliament: 
The economic state of Japan and t:l)e economic 
necessities of that country were the major causes 
of war there. 
If Japan could n,ot trade with the West then: 
AJHR 1951, A13 - 'Japanese Peace Settlement', pp. 21-22. 
.. ~there is only one alternative, and that is 
that she must trade with Communist China and the 
soviet Union. If she is forced to do that her 
economy will be tied to that of the Soviet 
countries, and by force of economic 
circumstances, she will become a satellite of the 
countries allied to the Soviet Union. 
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This was not a consequence divorced from the affairs 
of the South Pacific either: 
We can only keep peace in the Pacific by trade 
with Japan and by placing her in a sound economic 
position. 4 
But National was still very much aware of public 
sentiment over trade with Japan. John Marshall, then 
Minister of Publicity and Information, had weekly meetings 
at whidh he was submitted collected press cuttings on the 
subject. After these became notably adverse towards trade 
with Japan in November 1951 (which he partially attributed 
to a Communist plan to 'drive a wedge between British 
countries and the U.S.A.') he suggested to Watts a 
campaign to somehow counteract this criticism. 5 Watts 
pointed out the difficulties of giving good publicity to 
raw materials which the public never saw in their final 
state. He did suggest, however: 
5 
An interview with a farmer doing fencing with 
Japanese wire, 
A story on silk stockings, made in New Zealand from 
Japanese silk, 
Progress on a building job, using Japanese cement. 
NZPD Vol.295, p.244. 
Memo. Minister of Publicity and Information to 
Minister of IC. November 13, 1951. IC 114/1 (pt.l). 
J.R. Marshall - Minister of Publicity and Information 
1951-1957, etc. 
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All of which gave employment to New Zealanders. 
Watts, however, also cited the widely publicised case of an 
importation of Japanese salmon which was 'snapped up very 
quickly, and few shoppers appeared to know or care if it 
was Japanese', to suggest that perhaps it was not such a 
big problem after all. 6 
Labour was in a difficult position. It could not be 
seen to be outwardly advocating a ban on trade with Japan, 
but in the political aspects of relations with Japan it was 
definitely hostile. Japan, Labour politicians said, had 
won a 'soft peace 17 and the Peace Treaty a 'colossal 
mistake'. 0 As far as trade was concerned Labour was asking: 
... the worrying question: with whom is Japan 
going to trade in order to survive?s 
With any hope, it was not going to be New Zealand. 
Labour predicted an 'inundation' of cheap Japanese goods 
after the signing of the Treaty . 10 Allegations that 
absurdly cheap Japanese goods were already available were 
repeated much as twenty years before. Labour had thus 
found its elf once again championing the need to protect 
local manufacturers, but it was indeed a weak position. It 





Meino. Ministel;' of IC to Minister of Publicity and 
Information. December 10, 1951. IC 114/1 (pt.l). 
See e.g. NZPD Vol.295, p.250. 
NZPD Vol.295, p.254. 
NZPD Vol.295, p.289. 
NZPD Vol.295, pp.288-289. 
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with New Zealand again, and Labour admitted that Japan 
needed to trade to survive. In playing this unlikely game 
Labour actually strengthened National's defence of the need 
to trade with Japan. Al though watts admitted that the 
National Government did not yet have an official policy on 
trade with Japan, 11 it was obvious that the Government was 
taking a more realistic approach to the problem. Moreover, 
the Government did have an unofficial policy document from 
which to work. This undated, unsigned document, as found 
at the National Archives, gives indications of beihg 
prepared by the Department Of External Affairs soon after 
the signing of the Peace Treaty. The document, entitled 
'New Zealand's Trading Relationship with Japan' starts off 
with the observation that since the signing of the Peace 
Treaty: 
... many interested parties have expressed alarm 
at the prospect of a resumption of the flow of 
cheap Japanese industrial products on to the 
world's markets. 
In discussing the attitude that the ,-New- Zealand 
Government should take to the resumption of Japanese Trade, 
it goes on to say: 
11 
In formulating its policy on this matter, the 
Government has given, and will continue to give, 
fuli weight to the need to protect both New 
Zealand's industries and the interests of other 
regular exporters to the New Zealand market, 
especially United Kingdom exporters. It is, of 
course, a primary objective of this Government's 
policy to uphold our own vital economic 
interests, to maintain full employment and to pay 
close attention to the interests of our main 
market and source of imports. Consequently, the 
Government has no intention of entering into any 
NZPD Vol.295, p.240. 
agreement with Japan which will tie our hands in 
pursuing this policy. 
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This could equally have been a leaf from the policy of 
the Labour Party, so far, but now came the consideration of 
trade as a strategic problem: 
Of course, if we refuse to trade with Japan or if 
we impose such severe restrictions as to m&ke 
impossible a high level of industrial and trading 
activity, she has the alternative of seeking 
closer economic relations with the Communist 
countries. 
With its political implications: 
... the balance of power in the world would be 
completely changed. 
After pointing out that Japan was already a v~luable 
customer for wool, and that there were many commercial 
transactions which would not harm either New Zealand 
industry or other (British) interests, the Document 
concluded with the summary: 
We cannot base our commercial policy towards 
Japan on prejudice. We cannot refuse to trade 
with Japan on principle. 
This was a direct attack on Labour P,arty policy. 
Finally included was a quotation fr/n<John Foster Dulles, 
who had been one of the main architects of the Treaty, to 
the effect that the Treaty was to bring the Japanese people 
to live with the West as good neighbo~rs on the basis of 
trust. National's policy was following the ideological 
f.ootsteps of the u. s .12 
12 'New Zealand's Trading -Relations with Japan'. EA(?) 
report. (Undated) IC 114/1 (pt.1). 
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BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISIS 
One of the 'what if' questions that arises from this 
period is the degree to which National would have 
sacrificed British, or even New Zealand interests, to help 
keep Japan in the 'Western Camp' if the Communist threat 
had been perceived to be increasing. This went untested 
for the moment, however, as the bogy of Communism was one 
that was soon overtaken in importance by an economic crisis 
closer to home: the crisis of the Sterling Area's balance 
of payments. Despite National's good intentions, recent 
changes in dollar convertibility of Sterling surpluses put 
the focus of attention once more onto economic matters, 
with Holland attending a commonwealth Finance Ministers' 
Conference in January 1952 to discuss the problem. 
The problem of imports was one that affected the whole 
Sterling Area, and it was not only Japanese imported goods 
that were affected. Speculation was rife in New Zealand 
that import licensing would be re-imposed, but Watts denied 
this. 13 Nevertheless Holland soon(announced restrictions on 
imports from all scheduled countries, with all import 
licences being cancelled and new ones issued. 14 Holland 
regarded this as the third and worst financial crisis for 
New Zealand since the end of the war. 15 Thus despite the 
13 Press, February 26, 1952. 
14 Press, March 12, 1952. 
15 Press, February 25, 1952. 
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fact that import licensing for goods from Japan generally 
eased from 1950 onwards, and that the Government at least 
still professed the need to trade with Japan, exports to 
Japan continued to decline in 1952, and although imports 
nearly reached ~4m in 1952, they fell to about a tenth of 
this in 1953 . 16 
BUSINESSMEN AND WOOL 
Despite the economic difficulties of this period, the 
signing of the Peace Treaty did at least signal a 
normalisation of trade for Japanese businessmen. Between 
the beginning of October 1951 and the end of February 1952, 
nineteen Japanese businessmen applied for visas to enter 
New Zealand. Almost all of these were woolbuyers; two were 
representatives of shipping companies. 11 One of the only 
two people definitely refused entry was the first to apply, 
Yasunobu Banno, who ran Banno Bros (N.Z.) Ltd. before World 
War II. The reasons why ChaLlis was instructed to refuse 
Banno a visa remain unclear, but seem eonnected to the 
activities of his pre-war company in New Zealand. These 
may not have been sinister activities, but nevertheless it 
was noted there were 'special circumstances' as to the 
refusal to grant him a visa. The other businessman refused 
16 
17 
Annual report 9n External Trade Statistics, 1954. 
'Consular Register of Persons Wishing to Enter New 
Zealand', (Undated) IC 114/9. 
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entry was the Managing Director of East Japan Kaiser Frazer 
Ltd. He wished to survey the market for Kaiser Frazer 
cars, but was refused entry simply because New Zealand's 
b~nce of payments problems were such that the possibility 
of import licences being granted for them was slight. 10 
In granting visas there was a clear discrimination in 
favour of woolbuyers, who were allowed entry 'more or less 
automatically'. Applications for other reasons were always 
considered carefully. 19 The obvious desire was to increase 
Japan's purchases of wool, which had started again in 1948 
and had increased to over £3m in 1951." This was before a 
regular shipping service had been established. These sales 
had been conducted by business companies such as Kreglinger 
(actually a Belgian trading corporation), in New Zealand. 
Up to November 1946 the sale of wool had been controlled by 
the 'U.K.-Dominion Wool Disposals Ltd', commonly referred 
to the Joint Organisation or simply J. o. Al though the 
Joint Organisation and its New Zealand subsidiary, the New 
Zealand Wool Disposal Commission, were not wound up until 
January 22, 1952, and December 31, 1951 respectively, 
auction sales of wool commenced in November 1946 allowing 
Kreglinger to sell directly to Japan. Kreglinger sold wool 
to Japan in the 1948/49 season and thereafter to the Japan 




Memo for Secretary of IC. 
114/1/10 (pt .1) . 
Ibid. 
February 14, 1952. IC 
Annual report on External Tra~e statistics, 1953. 
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Kreglinger's selling agent for wool in Japan and is now 
'Nichinan'. 21 
The New Zealand Wool Board, unlike other Producer 
Boards was not act~ vely involved in selling activities. 
Even the promotion of wool sales in Japan in general was 
left to the International Wool Secretariat, founded in 1937 
by Australian, New Zealand, and South African wool-growers. 
A branch of the International Wool Secretariat was opened 
in Tokyo in 1953 , 22 with promotion sometimes done in 
conjunction with wholesalers' organisations in Tokyo. 23 The 
result of this was that up to 1953 there was very little 
promotion of New Zealand wool in Japan and the 'more or 
less automatic' granting of visas to Japanese wool-buyers 
was seen as the only way to re-establish a permanent market 
for New Zealand wool in Japan. As the Wool Board did not 
oversee wool sales to Japan, Kreglinger and other firms 
were free to sell to whom t~ey wished. In Japan, however, 
buyers of wool h~d to have the approval of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), which gave an 
import number guaranteeing payment. 
Despite the open invitation to Japanese wool-buyers 
and subsequent founding of a branch of the International 




Interview: Harold Albertson, 15/5/90. 
New Zealand Wool Board Annual Re~ort, 1959, p.5. 
See e.g. New Zealand Wool Board Annual Re~ort, 1956, 
p.38. 
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generally fell from 1952 to 1954.M The only good news was 
that Japanese wool-buyers reported to Challis that they had 
found the atmosphere in New Zealand 'rather easier' than in 
A~stralia after returning from the 1951-1952 selling 
season. De~pite this Japan's increasing economic problems 
and high stocks of wool meant the open invitation to wool-
buyers had little result. 25 
CHALLIS AND DIPLOMACY 
Along with the wool-buyers, a visa was also given to 
a Japanese livestock attendant early in 1952 to take care 
of a shipment of horses from New Zealand. 26 This venture 
was the result of Challis' effort to interest Japanese 
businessmen and Government officials in purchasing New 
Zealand livestock. The purchases were made through D.M. 
Kenrick and Associates I which gives an example of the 
contact that Kenrick as a businessmen, ana Challis as 
Government Trade Representative, had with each other. 
Challis thus acted as a focal point for trade relations 
with Japan at this time and was, by all indications, a very 




Annual report on External Trade Statistics for these 
years. 
Memo. Challis to EA. April 18, 1952. IC 114/1/10 
(pt .1) . 
'Consular Register of Persons Wishing to Enter New 
Zealand'. (Undated) IC 114/9. 
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go-between for the Government in its dealing with SCAP and 
then the Japanese Government, but also as a source of 
information for private businessmen in New Zealand and 
Japan. Challis thus covered the whole range of trade 
problems, from visas for businessmen, to who dealt in 
Bridgestone tyres in Japan, (it was Daiichi Trading Co. 
Ltd. since the dissolution of Mitsui Bussan21 ), and even to 
who had rights to sell Japanese chicken-sexing machines in 
New Zealand (it was D.M. Kenrick (N.Z.) Ltd.~). Challis 
fielded all these queries as well as continuing to write 
reports, invariably optimistic, 0n the prospects of trade. 
The Government had, therefore, not only the urgent heed to 
expand exports to Japan to ease the balance of payments 
situation, it also had Challis in Tokyo to assist in the 
establishment of new markets, and even Kenrick to help on 
the business side. 
With the signing of the Peace Treaty, however, came 
the problem of re-establishing diplomatic relations with 
the Japanese Government. The New Zealand Legation in Japan 
was given diplomatic status in January 1952,~ and with the 
technical cessation of the state of war with Japan that 






Challis to Ashby, Bergh & co. Ltd. February 
IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.l). 
Letter. Challis to o.v. Garland Ltd. October 8, 1953. 
IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.l). 
Wevers, M. Japan, Its Future and New Zealand (Victoria 
University Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 
Wellington, 1988) p.114. 
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28th, 1952, Challis became the Consul-General and Charged-
Af fa ires. 30 Japan was thus the first country of non-
European people in which New Zealand established a full 
diplomatic mission. With the normalization of relations it 
was noted that the continuation of a policy of 
discrimination against certain types of Japanese 
businessmen 'could hardly be justified' . 31 This did not, 
however; present any great problem as import licensing 
still enabled the Government to control the flow of 
Japanese goods without being observed to'be discriminatory. 
The status guo regarding trade would effectively continue 
out with New Zealand in a safe diplomatic position: 
If we maintain a restrictive policy against entry 
of Japanese businessmen to New Zealand, they, for 
their part, may make it difficult for New 
Zealanders to go to Japan on business visits 
which would be advantageous to New Zealand. 32 
It can thus be seen that the Government was eager not 
to take any risks in developing an export market in Japan. 
This extended even to considering that Japanese businessmen 
should be allowed into New Zealand even if they were on an 
obviously 'fruitless' mission (much as the Managing 
Director of East Japan Kaiser Frazer Ltd. would have been) 
in the hope they might become interested in some New 
30 
32 
Kay, ed. The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with 
Japan (Historical Publications Branch, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1985) pp.1237-1238. 
Memo (draft). Secretary of EA to Secretary to Labour 
and Director of Employment. May 1952. IC 114/1/10 
(pt .1) . 
Ibid. 
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Zealand product. 33 Every opportunity, no matter how 
unlikely, was to be taken to increase Japanese purchases of 
New Zealand goods. 
POST KOREAN WAR SLUMP 
Despite the Government's desire to increase exports of 
wool and other goods to Japan, the boom created by the 
Korean war was now passing. Japan's reserves of Sterling 
reached a peak in June, 1952, and then declined steadily. 34 
At the same time traditional sources of steel for New 
Zealand improved and imports of steel from Japan (which had 
raised the ire of some local Communists35 ) began to fall. 36 
Japan's position was now looking increasingly worse and for 
the next two years, 1953 and 1954, there was a recession. 
The causes of this recession were found by the Economic 
counsel Board of the Japanese Government to lie in the non-
conclusion of trade and navigation treaties, exclusion 
from GATT, import restrictions, and the intensification 
of international competition. These problems, as well as 
the lack of overseas branches of Japanese trading companies 
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IC Annual Report, 1956 p.33. 
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dissolution of Mitsui and Mitsubishi, were observed to be 
hindering Japan's exports. 37 This was in reference to 
Japan's trading relations in general, but there were some 
common factors to trade with New Zealand. 
The decline in the number of overseas branches of 
trading companies and the demise of Mitsui and Mitsubishi 
had little effect on trade with New Zealand. Contact had 
already ·been· made with several of the now separate 
departments of Mitsui (e.g. Sanshin Textile Trading Co. 
Ltd. 39 and Ocean Trading Co. Ltd. 39 ), and Mitsubishi did not 
have a pre-war branch in New Zealand- anyway. 40 In some 
respects there had even been an improvement in trading 
relations over the 1930's 1 as witnessed by the Diplomatic 
Missiqn and the existence of a New Zealand trading company 
in Japan. With the resumption of Japanese shipping to New 
Zealand in 1952 transport was no longer a major problem 
either. There were, however, major concerns in New Zealand 
as to the conclusion of a trade agreement with Japan, 
Japan's entry into GATT, and the restrictions (or lack of 
them) on Japanese goods. These were the problems that 





Japan Times Economic Survey .of Japan, 1952-1953. 
(Japan Times for the Economic Planning Agency, Japanese 
Government, Tokyo, 1953) pp.24-25. 
Letter. Author unknown to Challis. November 12, 1948. 
IC 114/1/10. 
Letter. J.R. Hallam Ltd. to IC. February 1, 1951. IC 
114/1 ( pt . i. ) . 
Purcell, 'The Development of Japan's Trading company 
Network in Australia 1890-1941', p.120. 
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a rather different point of view. These were also issues 
that became manifest in 1953 and 1954. 
The simplest and most apparent factor controlling 
levels of trade was import restrictions. Al though the 
National Government had increaped the numlDer of import 
licences available for Japanese goods in 1950, even in June 
1952 it was defending the policy of allowing imports of 
these goods on the basis that they were things for which 
New Zealand was 'in dire need'.u Trade was still being 
conducted by New Zealand on the basis of necessity and 
convenience. This had been mutually beneficial in 1952 
when exports had balanced imports at about £4m, but during 
1953 the massive reduction in imports of Japanese steel 
could be seen to be leading to an imbalance in New 
Zealand's favour. Under ordinary circumstances a surplus 
of a few million pounds wquld not have been worthy of 
comment, much as in 1937, but obviously this surplus for 
New Zealand meant a deficit for Japan and it was a 
situation common throughout the sterling Area. 
In March 1953 the British Government offered Japan the 
chance to export 20% more to Colonial Governments than 1952 
levels. 42 In July Australia eased import restrictions in 
order to help Japan increase its earnings of Sterling. 43 In 
New Zealand the Government policy on trade with Japan was 
42 
43_ 
NZPD Vol.297, p.27. 
Memo. EA. March 17, 1953. IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.1). 
Nicholson, Australia's Trade Relations, p.252. 
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already being reviewed when a representative of the British 
High Commission's Off ice, a Miss Haydon, called at the 
Department of External Affairs. Regarding Britain's offer 
to Japan, Haydon: 
... had been instructed to say that the United 
Kingdom Government hoped that, if New Zealand 
decided to liberalise their import policies, they 
would have regard to the needs of U.K. industries 
for developir:l.g export markets. 44 
We can only wonder if the irony escaped the British 
that after turning down New Zealand's requests for 
assurances of protection in British markets in the past 
they were now requesting the same from New Zealand. In any 
event, Haydon was hardly a high ranking official of the 
British Government! and not surprisingly met with little 
success. After being told that it was necessary to 
maintain a reasonable level of trade with Japan on 
'political and strategic grounds', she was sent away with 
a quote by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, R.A. 
Butler, to the effect that Britain 'could meet Japanese 
competition provided they had fair tariff and trading 
conditions'. 45 This was definitely a rebuke, but it would 
be unwarranted to place too much significance on this 
single incident. Britain was still, in the 1950's, New 
Zealand's single largest trading partner. Nor is it clear 
with whom Haydon met, and most significantly, when the 
Cabinet did meet on March 17th, apparently only a few days 
44 
45 
Memo. EA. March 17, 1953. IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.1). 
Ibid. 
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after Haydon's visit, in order to decide an official policy 
on economic relations with Japan, the policy statement 
belied the notion that New Zealand would take significantly 
more Japanese imports at Britain's expense. 
'OFFICIAL' POLICY ON TRADE 
Though the decisions of the Cabinet, which formed a 
one page document entitled 'Japan - Trade and Economic 
Policy', started off promisingly in that it declared: 
That restrictions on imports from Japan be eased 
sufficiently to allow Japan a greater share of 
New Zealand's import trade. 
Yet following this was the conditioning clause that: 
This should be done within the existing sterling 
area policy of confining purchases to essentials 
and near-essentials. 
This was really only prescribing a continuation of the 
status guo: from 1950 to 1952 import controls nad been 
eased but the importation of non-essential goods was very 
rare. Though the Government was now to give consideration 
to easing restrictions on some less essential consumer 
goods, it was obviously being extremely cautious. 
Furthermore, the possibility that these restrictions would 
now be eased seems (from this document) to have been partly 
due to the influence of the British Government, which makes 
Haydon's visit something of an enigma. 
As far as an 'overall' policy was concerned, the 
Cabinet decided: 
That New Zealand's trade policy towards Japan 
should aim at the broad policy of assisting Japan 
to live and trade on reasonable terms with the 
free world. 
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But there was the condition: 
That in carrying out this policy the interests of 
New Zealand industries be protected." 
This, then, was the (bottom=line'. If it came to a 
choice between helping Japan at the expense of local 
industries, or watching Japan become Communist influenced 
but with local industries protected, the latter would 
prevail. There were also indications that this protection 
might even extend to commonweal th suppliers. 47 
Though the National Government had not returned to the 
'Laissez-faire liberalism' of the Coalition Government, it 
had not lived up to the rhetoric of two years earlier on 
the need to re-establish trade relations at the very moment 
of recession in Japan. In some respects the Government was 




..• we must consider the feelings of those who had 
personal experiences of the Japanese in the last 
war and those who remember Japan's trading 
practices of earlier years. Japan is a country 
with Eastern Continental standards, and 
widespread importation from her could be 
embarrassing to those nations which now supply 
similar goods to us. 40 
Memo. 'Japan - Trade and Economic ~olicy C.M. (53) 
11'. P.M.'s Office to Minister of IC. March 19, 1953. 
IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.l). 
Memo. 'Trade with Japan'. Minister of !C to Chairman, 
Board of Trade. March 27, 1953. IC ( 2006) 114/1/4 
(pt. 1) . 
NZPD Vol.299, p.183. 
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The same step backwards can also be seen on . the 
question of Japan's accession to GATT, which the Economic 
Counsel Board had listed as a contributing factor to the 
1953-54 recession. The policy statement of the Cabinet 
deferred the problem: 
Cabinet observed that the question of Japan's 
accession to GATT would require further 
examination when more information had been 
received. They invited the Cabinet Committee on 
Economic Policy to report to them later on this 
general question. 0 
Even though some countries conducted trade relations 
with Japan in terms of GATT in 1953, despite the fact that 
she was not yet a member, it is obvious that the Government 
had not even briefly considered this possibility at the 
time of the Cabinet meeting. Even as late as October, just 
before a special meeting in Geneva to decide on Japan's 
application, there were calls in New Zealand for the 
Government to disclose its policy and indicate which way it 
would be voting. 50 As it turned out, New Zealand and the 
co~monwealth followed Britain, which had opposed Japan's 
entry, and abstained from voting. Japan was, however, 
admitted as an associate member of GATT. The Japan Charge 
d' Affaires in New Zealand expressed his regret at the 
Government's decision and hoped trade talks would soon 
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Commonwealth Governments was the fear of an inundation of 
cheap Japanese goods. 52 
National could not live up to its rhetoric on trade 
with Japan. Though there were some aspects to Japan's 
economic problems that the Government could do little 
about, such as the dissolution of the Zaibatsu and 
reduction in branches of trading companies, for at least 
two of · the factors contributing to the recession the 
Government obviously had other priori ties. For easing 
import restrictions there was local opposition by 
manufacturers to contend with, and for Japan's accession to 
GATT there was the desire to keep in step with Britain and 
the Commonwealth, Only one final possibility remained, 
that of a bilateral trade agreement, that would have gone 
some way to helping Jap~n stay in the 'Western camp' and 
fulfil some of the rhetoric. This is dealt with in the 
next chapter. 
52 Press October 27, 1953. 
CHAPTER TEN 
TRADE AGREEMENT? 1954-1956 
The importance of keeping Japan aligned with the 
West cannot be overemphasised. If the 
difficulties being experienced by the Japanese, 
especially in the field of trade are not 
successfully overcome, it is inevitable that the 
Japanese will be forced to ·come closer to the 
Communists. New Zealand has attempted to do what 
she can to help this situation by easing trade 
restrictions. 
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Department of External Affairs 
Annual Report, 1955. 1 
SEATO AND TRADE 
The mid 1950's was an important period for New Zealand 
foreign policy. The formation of SEATO in 1954 signalled 
the continuing fear of Communism. Though only a 
continuation of a theme established by ANZUS it did at 
least include Britain. Focus was shifted, however, to the 
Middle East until · 1955 · when New Zealand -.gave up her 
interest there and turned instead to Malaya. New 
Zealand's: 
1 EA Annual Report, 1955, pp.15-16. 
•.. treaty and defence commitments now were all 
re:iated to South-East Asia. There followed a 
period of South-East Asia mania. 2 
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Yet of all Asian countries Japan was the one foremost 
in the issues of trade. Most of the official information 
and public debate about trade with Japan in the mid 1950's 
continued to be on cheap imported goods and the 
restrictions on them. The National Government began to 
ease impose licensing in 1954 again, even allowing an 
increase in textile and garment imports though not to a 
level that worried local manufacturers. 3 When Watts 
announced the intention to ease import restrictions in 
October 1953, it was already obvious that for a year 
Japan's purchases of wool! hides and skins, and other New 
Zealand goods had been far greater than exports to New 
Zealand. 4 Japan had been in recession in 1953 and her 
reserves of Sterling had dropped while the Sterling Area's 
reserves of gold and dollar funds had improved. 5 
By the beginning of 1954 Japan was reported to be 
putting diplomatic pressure on Australia to balance trade 
further, 6 . and to be eager to do the same to New Zealand 
4 
5 
Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, p.306. 
Press January 14, 1955. 
External Affairs Review Vol. 3, No. 11. November 1953, 
p.2. 
External Affairs Review Vol.4, Nos.1 
January/February 1954 (ohe volume) p.3. 
Press January 21, 1954. 
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after completing negotiations with Britain. 7 As it was the 
Government was planning on easing import restrictions 
anyway, but the Agreement reached between Britain and Japan 
on January 29th 1954, which allowed Japan to further 
increase her exports to the British Empire ,8 did have 
another kind of effect in New Zealand; it suggested the 
idea of a trade agreement witp Japan. 
TRADE AGREEMENT? 
The initiative for a trade treaty came from the New 
Zealand Government. It was prompted, partially, by a desire 
to mitigate feelings over GATT, 9 but more directly by the 
agreement between Japan and Britain. 10 It was perhaps, 
also, a move to forestall added diplomatic pressure from 
Japan, as the Government soon announced, on February 3rd 
that it was willing to discuss trade relations with Japan. 11 
It was a move which National was later to regret through 
the circumstances of its outcome, but at the same time one 
which was a natural continuation of its policy to cultivate 
trade relations as much as possible while staying within a 
10 
11 
Press January 28, 1954. 
Press February 1, 1954. 
Press February 3, 1954. 
External Affairs Review Vol.4 Nos. 1 
January/February 1954 (one volume) pp.3-4. 
Press February 3, 1954. 
& 2. 
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Commonwealth framework. National also had every incentive 
to initiate talks with Japan over trade. Not only did 
Watts accept the need to balance trade to a certain degree 
to put it on a 'sound basis / 1 12 the bogy of Communism had 
not gone away even if debates in Parliament had thrashed 
the topic nearly to death. Japan was still seen to be 
'standing like a bastion against the forces of Communism' . 13 
As long as National could show that imports from Japan were 
not competing with local manufacturers, even if Labour and 
Nash himself often asserted otherwise, it was on safe 
ground. The allocation of import licences meant the 
Government could def end the policy of importing from Japan 
secure in the knowledge that it had a good idea of what was 
being brought into the country. Even more ~mportant, 
however, was Labour's apparent support of a reciprocal 
trade agreement with Japan, albeit one that protected local 
industries. 14 Even this was a move away from the previous, 
·vitriolic, hostility of the Labour party towards Japan. 
Unlike Britain, where the Agreement of January 1954 to 
allow an increase of Japanese imports into the British 
Empire had met with a great deal of opposition, 15 the New 
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agreement that had little effect on the Government's policy 
of restricting imports, which was an obvious priority. 
Negotiations between New Zealand and Japanese 
officials took place in February/March and June/July 1954. 
Unfortunately there is little record of the discussion that 
took place. Neither the p~ess nor the Labour Opposition 
were given much indication of the nature of the talks. 
Even when Labour pressed the Government for some indication 
of the likely outcome nothing was given. 16 No immediate 
agreement was reached and the discussions lapsed with the 
only official announcement being that a decision would be 
forthcoming after both the Commonwealth meeting in October 
and GATT Assembly talks had finished.H The same 
pronouncement indicated the talks had been about 'tariff 
and general conditio.ns' of trade, which was not giving much 
away. Only a little more was revealed afterwards when 
Halstead said the Japanese were keen on establishing M.ost 
Friendly Nation status, supposedly on all commodities, but 
had 'never ... suggested that New Zealand should forego its 
right to exercise import control over goods from Japan'.u 
A later, confidential, Industries and Commerce Paper does 
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of 1954 which states that Most Favoured Nation treatment 
was agreed upon for selected Japanese commodities only. 19 
Given the lack of detail revealed about the trade 
negotiations it is not surprising that the true situation 
remained unclear; the Japanese press reported that a trade 
agreement had been concluded and the local press then 
reported likewise. Labour, too, expected the Government to 
soon announce the terms of an agreement. 20 But the 
agreement that existed was not a final one, and the 
Government remained silent with the result that the whole 
event became something of a mystery. National later 
attributed the forthcoming elections in Japan and her lack 
of Sterling as reasons for the collapse in talks. 21 The 
latter reason was an obvious invention; Japan's lack of 
Sterling had been an incentive to negotiate an arrangement 
that balanced trade better. Nor were these the reasons 
given for the delay during the negotiations in 1954, which 
had only concerned New Zealand. It appears that from the 
Japanese side an agreement had been signed but not ratified 
by the New Zealand Government for 'political reasons'. 22 
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policy were given when National was later accused of 
reneguing on the agreement with Japan and virtually 
acknowledged this with the statement that it was a 'change 
in tactics'. 23 That it was due to New Zealand's action that 
nothing came of the 1954 talks was also later suggested by 
the Commercial Secretary of the New Zealand Legation in 
Tokyo. 24 This then, was the common interpretation. 
FAILURE 
The reasons that the 1954 talks failed can be 
attributed to both Japanese and New Zealand actions. 
Though there had been an obvious delay in the negotiations 
in 1954, the Government was still willing to conclude a 
Trade Treaty in April 1955. At a Cabinet meeting on April 
18th the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy submitted a 
report on the possibilities of a 'Tariff Agreement' and 
'Exchange of Letters in respect of import licensing' with 
Japan. This report was obviously in favour of an agreement 
as a memo on the results of the meeting records: 
23 
24 
In view of the importance of establishing trade 
relations with Japan on a sound basis anO. the 
value of an arrangement of the kind proposed to 
the relations between Japan and New Zealand, 
Cabinet -
(~) approved the draft Tariff Agreement and 
Excnange of Letters on import licensing; 
NZPD Vol.316, p.783, also NZPO Vo~.316, p.789. 
Letter. J.S. Scott to IC 'Trade Talks with Japan'. 
March 19, 1958. IC (2006) 114/1. 
(b) invited the Minister of External Affairs to 
communidate this decision to the Japanese 
Government, but before doing so to first 
ascertain whether they are willing now to extend 
more liberal treatment in respect of New Zealand 
exports to Japan than was envisaged would be the 
case immediately upon the exchange of the 
letters, the terms of which were settled in 
August, 1954. 
(If, however, the Japanese Government are 
unwilling to extend more liberal treatment 
immediately, the decision at (a) should 
nevertheless be communicated to them. ) 25 
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Thus even as late as April 1955 the New Zealand 
Government was actually still in favour of signing a trade 
agreement, but now the Japanese Government decided to delay 
ratification. This, it seems, was in the hope that New 
Zealand would grant 'full GATT treatment', 26 even though the 
Government had already indicated it would not. 21 This was 
not an unreasonable hope, however, as the New Zealand 
Government had voted in favour of Japan's request to start 
tariff negotiations which would have ultimately led to 
Japan's ful~ accession to GATT late in 1954. 28 To Japan it 
would have seemed anomalous for New Zealand to do this 
while still intending to invoke Article 35 of GATT to 
withhold GATT relations on a bilateral basis being 
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not concluded until September 10, 1955, and it was during 
the interim period, after Cabinet's approval of a trade 
agreement, that relations between New Zealand and Japan 
soured. 
The direct cause of the non-ratification of the 
Treaty, besides Japan's delaying tactics, was a report in 
the Nihon .Keizai (Japan's Economy) in July or early August 
that the Japanese Government intended to discriminate 
against the countries which invoked Article 35 of GATT. 
This included New Zealand, of course, which created an 
anomalous situation regarding the ratification of the Trade 
Treaty, as Challis reported: 
since the Japanese Government attach importance 
to Japan!s entry into GATT, they will be grateful 
to those countries who support Japan's accession 
to GATT membership. But to those countries who 
invoke Article 35, Japan will not only take 
counter-measures in the field of tariff rates, 
but also assume a less friendly attitude in 
negotiating with such countries for settlement of 
various pending problems in their trade 
relations. 29 
Challis then presented a Note Verbale to the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 18 which pointed out 
the contradiction between Japan's intention to discriminate 
against countries invoking Article 35 and supposed 
intention to ratify the Trade Treaty. The note clearly put 
the onus on Japan to come up with an answer or take the 
responsibility for the failure of the Agreement: 
29 
The New Zealand Government has already taken 
considerable steps towards implementing the 
Memo. Challis to Secretary of EA, 'Proposed Japan-New 
Zealand Trade Agreement'. August 18, 1955. IC (2006) 
114I1/1 (pt . 2 ) . 
intent of the draft agreement, and has the matter 
of its early formalization under active 
consideration. 
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As for Japan's apparent new policy: 
In this connection the New Zealand Government 
desires to point out that at the time the 
agreement was drafted the Japanese 
representatives were fully aware that the New 
Zealand Government intended to invoke Article 35 
of GATT on the admission of Japan and that the 
agreement was drawn up in recognition of this 
fact and the consequent need to place trade 
relations between Japan and New Zealand on as 
mutually advantageous basis as possible. 30 
The note finally requested an indication of the 
Japanese Government's intentions. If there was a reply its 
contents are as yet unknown, but obviously it was at this 
point that the chances of an agreement being concluded 
declined dramatically. A problem remains, however, as to 
why the National Government did not reveal that it was 
largely through Japan's actions that the 'Agreement' had 
failed. When it later transpired that the new Labour 
Government was going to conclude a trade agreement with 
Japan, despite its years of hostility to trading with her, 
National's accusations of hypocracy were severely weakened 
by the accepted interpretation that it, not Japan, had 
renegued on the Agreement. The fact that there was a 
common acceptance, both in the National Party and at a 
diplomatic level that the National Governmetit had had a 
change of policy must raise this possibility. Later, in 
30 Note Verba le. New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
(2006) i14/1/1 (pt.2). 
Legation to Japanese 
August 18, 1955. IC 
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1958, when new proposals for a trade agreement with Japan 
were being conducted, it was noted: 
New Zealand also considered in the light of a 
great improvement in Japan's balance of payments 
position, that the draft agreement with the 
exchange of letters granted Japan concessions too 
great in relation to those received by New 
Zealand. 31 
Evidence of this can be found in Cabinet's proposals 
of April 18th, but this may also indicate that the 
Government had now gone beyond this to actually scuttle the 
possibility of Japan's ratification. If this were so then 
there is the possibility that the objection to Japan's 
apparent threat of discrimination was largely theatrical, 
and taken because of her improved economic conditions. But 
without further knowledge of the nature of the 1954 talks 
or the seriousness of the apparent threat fro~ Japan, this 
problem remains unresolved~ 
BACK TO COMMUNISM 
Thus instead of taking a step forward in establishing 
trade relations on a friendlier basis, the whole public 
debate about trade with Japan reverted in 1955 to that 
concerning Communism. Almost word for word .. with those 
ar,guments in 1951, Labour again reverted to a hostile 
position concerning Japan. National again emphasised the 
31 Draft Cabinet Paper; 'Proposal For Trade and Payments 
Agreement with Japan'. May 15, 1958. IC (2006) 
114/1/1 (pt. 2) . 
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need to trade to protect Japan from Communism. Perhaps 
part of the reason for the resurgence of this familiar 
controversy can be found in the re-organization of pre-war 
Zaibatsu; Mitsubishi, for example, had re-established 
itself in 1954 to become the largest trading company in 
Japan. 32 The major factor, however, seems to be Japan's 
signalled intention to resume trade with China and change 
her policy on re-armament. 33 In May 1955 Japan and China 
signed a bilateral trade agreement in Tokyo for the 
exchange of goods to the value of £30 million. 34 Much of 
the Parliamentary debate about trade with Japan in this 
year concerned Labour's acceptance, even support, of 
Japan's plan to resume trade with China. In its simplest 
form a renewed Japan-China trade would lessen Japan's need 
to trade with New Zealand. This suited Japan's most 
vehement critics in the Labour Party who would have liked 
to rid New Zealand of Japanese imports altogether~ More 
realistically, however, Labour was pointing out the 
futility of trying to isolate Japan from one of her biggest 
pre-war suppliers of raw materials. Japan's plan to resume 
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to National's desire to expand trade with Japan in order to 
prevent China being a major source of influence. 
Politically, the debates about trade with Japan were 
stagnant, caught in the continuing problem of a Communist 
threat. The break in this pattern was made by Japan 
herself finally increasing overall trade levels from 1955 
onwards. In this year Japan experienced a boom after the 
recession· of 1953-1954. 35 Although balance of trade 
inequalities still brought economic problems, 1955 marked 
the beginning of the recovery of Japanese exports. The 
previous year, when the National Government had eased 
import restrictions to help rectify the trade imbalance 
with Japan, the export trade of that country was still less 
than half that of the mid-1930's. By 1957 this figure had 
risen to 90%. 36 The nature of Japan's exports also changed. 
Spurred on by steel shortages Japanese production had 
greatly increased. Exports of textiles increased by volume 
but made up a lesser proportion of total exports as otqer 
goods began to be produced and exported. 37 Many of these 
changes were reflected in the types of imports that New 
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the pattern of trade between New Zealand and Japan that had 
existed since the end of the War, even though exports of 
Dairy products to Japan remained restricted by continuing 
surpluses of U.S. stocks. In 1954 this amounted to 
$100,000,000 and continued into 1955 and 1956, 39 and it was 
widely reported that the u. S. was :ruining any chance of 
increasing sales of Dairy products to Japan in the mid= 
1950's. Despite this the period of Japan's recovery in 
exports coincided with New Zealand's easing of import 
restrictions from hard curre;ncy sources. Until 1955 
imports of anything other than certain machinery, 
chemicals, and raw materials had needed individual import 
licences. In 1956 restrictions were eased not only on raw 
materials but also a range of machinery, and medical and 
scientific equipment. 40 Although most consumer goods were 
still highly restricted, textiles began to make up a 
decreasing percentage of imports from Japan with a 
subsequent increase in the availability of other items. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF IMPORT BUSINESSES 
The relaxation of import restrictions allowed the 
establishment of several small businesses largely devoted 
to. the importation of Japanese goods. An example is that 
39 
40 
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of Mr. Peter Blaxall. Blaxall had answered an 
advertisement by Kenrick in a local newspaper which read 
'Wanted - New Zealand~s Most Able Young Men' to join his 
company in Japan. He worked for Kenrick in Tokyo in 1954 
and r~turned to New Zealand in 1955. Upon returning to 
Christchurch he was soon joined by Mr. Gil Steven who had 
also worked for Kenrick in Tokyo from 1951 to 1953.u Their 
company, Blaxall and Steven Ltd., started importing from 
Japan in 1955, although not in association with Kenrick. 
The first imported lines in 1955 and 1956 were microscopes 
(as 'scientific equipment') and imitation Ronson lighters, 
which both met with a 'bad reception'. Being one of the 
very early importers of Japanese goods, they established 
their 'right' to receive import licences which were then 
renewed by the Government on the basis of the previous 
years' allocations. It was thus harder for other importers 
to later try to break into this business. Blaxall & Steven 
also imported other goods for which import licences were 
being granted as changes in policy took place. This gave 
them a flexibility that other importers who specialized in 
one area of imports, such as eledtronics, did not have. 
Blaxall had to go to Japan once a year as they were dealing 
in the new 'consumer' products which changed style 
annually. Chinaware and woodware were purchased from 
Nagoya, and almost everything else (metal goods, glassware, 
binoculars, etc. ) from Tokyo. One example of how the 
Interview: Gil Steven 27/4/90. 
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National Government was being true to its promise to 
protect local manufacturers was in chinaware. The local 
manufacturers of tableware were Crown Lynn, and in order to 
protect this company Blaxall could not import Japanese 
tableware. 42 
Another importer in Christchurch at that time was Mr. 
Kevin Sheehan, who also imported goods from Japan for which 
import licences tended to be more available. He received 
a sample set of tableware from Nagoya Boeki (Nagoya Trading 
Co.) which Ballantynes wished to retail, but again as that 
range of goods was restricted no other importations were 
allowed. 43 For both Blaxall & Steven and Kevin Sheehan 
there was, however, another type of chinaware that could be 
imported from Japan. Crown Lynn did not make small 
figurines and other decorative chinaware, and thus import 
licences for this range of goods were readily available. 
Another example of this type of distinction was glassware, 
which was made in New Zealand and so protected, and 
crystal, which was not made locally and so could be 
imported. The testimony of several importers during this 
period gives weight to National' s claim of being highly 
selective of imports from Japan in order to protect local 
manufacturers. They also give testimony to the bad 
reception that these new Japanese 'consumer' items 
r~ceived. Sheehan, for example, imported a Brother sewing 
42 
43 
Interview: Peter Blaxall 21/2/90. 
Interview: Kevin Sheehan 1/5/90. 
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machine, but such was the opinion that it would not work 
that he was unable to sell it. He also brought back a 
sample range of Citizen watches from Japan, but after 
taking them around the country ended up by giving them away 
as nobody would buy them. 44 
Another importer who started business with Japan in 
1955 was Mr. Gilbert Glausiuss who, unlike Blaxall & Steven 
and Sheehan, chose to specialize in electronic goods and 
other more expensive items. He obtained the agencies for 
several Japanese ,brands, such as National, and Akai, and 
also imported a range of photographic equipment which was 
sold to Kerridges (later of Kerridge-Odeon) which had a 
chain of camera shops throughout New Zealand. Glausiuss 
also recalls bE;iing 'kicked out of many places' as his 
Japanese goods were accused of being junk or copies of 
other brand names. But in the case of electronics there 
was a bigger problem; the protection of a local industry. 
Television sets, radios, and speakers were being assembled 
in New Zealand (from imported parts), and thus could not be 
imported already assembled. Glausiuss estimates he could 
have sold imported Japanese televisions for up to a third 
of the price of locally assembled ones. Such w~re the 
restrictions, however, that he even had to re-export 
samples sent from Japan. Glausiuss was also typical of 
44 Interview: Kevin Sheehan 1/5/90• 
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many importers who had to travel to Wellington to argue his 
case for more import licences with the Government. 45 
There seems little doubt that the Government's 
protection of local industry was enforced in the mid-
1950 's, but despite this the increase in the number of 
goods for which licences were granted enabled the 
establishment of private businesses to carry out this 
trade'. · This marked the beginning of a real normalization 
in trade between New Zealand and Japan in that the 
importation of consumer goods rather than bulk quantities 
of raw materials was a return to the pre-war situation and 
also the start of the pattern that is still prevalent 
today. The New Zealand Legation in Tokyo, and more 
particularly Challis, ceased to be the only focus of 
trading relations at a practical level. By the mid-1950's 
businessmen other than Kenrick, who remained in Tokyo, were 
conducting the business of trade with Japan and indeed some 
of them still are. With the establishment of C.S. Stevens 
& Co. in 1956 the side of exports to Japan began to improve 
too. 
After the failure of the Trade Agreement negotiations 
in 1954 and 1955, 1956 marked a quiet period diplomatically 
and politically in New Zealand-Japan trade relations. 
Holland travelled to Japan from May 30th to June 6th on his 
way to a Conference of Commonweal th Prime Ministers in 
London and spoke about the need to protect New Zealand 
45 Interview: Gilbert Glausiuss 28/3/90. 
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industries. Japanese Ministers put the case for 
establishing GATT relations, which was all fairly 
predictable. 46 The Government was still having to defend 
its policy of helping to rehabilitate Japan by friendly 
means; a policy that was summarized in Parliament: 
If we trade with Japan there is this 
justification for being friendly: that we can 
hardly conduct trade and hate each other. It is 
better to trade with people who can be friendly 
with us than have them trade with people who are 
unfriendly towards us. 47 
Nevertheless, Holland was severely criticised for even 
visiting Japan as Labour poured on the vitriol over trade 
with her. 48 What is apparent, however, is that Labour was 
no longer so unified in its attack, with some Labour M.P.s 
admitting the need to have some trade with Japan. 49 
surprisingly National was quick to point this out, 50 but 
there were still those in the Labour Party who carri.ed 
their arguments to an extraordinary degree in citing the 
cause of the 1930' s Depression as being that of cheap 
Japanese goods.m Nordmeyer, ever an outspoken· critic of 
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Zealand towards Japan was by restricting trade with her; 52 
Nash had little to say on the subject at all. 
1954 had started out as a year that was leading to an 
improvement in trade relations between New Zealand and 
Japan. 1956 had become the year in which relations had 
reached their post-Peace Treaty nadir redeemed only by the 
improvement of private sector activities. 
52 NZPD Vol.309 p.919. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
TRADE AGREEMENT 1957-1958 
The Labour Government will not be interested in 
a trade agreement with Japan. 
Walter Nash, December 1957. 1 
199 
BACKGROUND 
In the period immediately before the signing of the 
Trade Agreement in September 1958 two lucrative markets for 
New Zealand commodities appeared in Japan. The first of 
these was meat, in 1957, which was largely the enterprise 
of Ces Stevens (see Chapter 7) . The second was timber 
exports, again established through the enterprise of a 
businessman, Mr. Rainger. These new markets illustrated to 
both the National and Labour Governments that more than 
just token opportunities for commodities other than wool 
existed in Japan. Both new markets also illustrated some 
of the effects that a trade agreement would have. 
l Quoted in NZPD Vol.316 p.393. See also Press December 
6, 1957. 
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In March 1958 J.S. Scott, the Commercial Secretary in 
Tokyo, reported that the Japanese Government was under 
considerable pressure from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry to remove all meat (not just beef) from the 
Automatic Approval system. Scott wrote of hearing that the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was being pressurised 
by the Japan Meat Importers' Association, many of whose 
officials were formerly employed by that Ministry. 2 Soon 
after Scott reported this possibility the Japanese 
Government placed beef on the list of commodities requiring 
allocation of foreign exchange, effectively ending any 
prospects of the greater development of this market in 
Japan. 3 This move was reportedly to protect local beef 
production from increased competition, but for whatever 
reason it was apparent that without some agreement on 
trade, any other commodity, including lamb or even wool, 
could be easily restricted by Japan. 
After the development of meat exports to Japan in 1957 
a market started to appear for timber exports in 1958. 
This trade was initiated by the efforts of a Mr. Rainger of 
Snow Rainger & Co. Ltd. , who normally dealt in imported 
Japanese textiles. Rainger worked in association with Toyo 
·. Menka Ltd. in Japan, and organised the buying of timber, 
stevedoring and port facilities in Tauranga. Shipping was 
or.iginally supplied by chartered (tramper) Nitto ships but 
Letter. J.S. Scott to Secretary of IC. 
1958. IC (2006) 114/1 (pt.1). 
Evenin9 Post April 2, 1958. 
March 19, 
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almost immediately the other shipping companies, OSK, NYK, 
Mitsui, and Daiichi, formed a cartel - the 'Radiata Pine 
Transporting Association' - to 'regulate' shipping and put 
pressure on Nitto to join. Snow Rainger & Co. Ltd. was 
soon joined by other firms, including Kenrick (who 
organised the first shipment of pulp logs through Nelson), 
Kanematsu & co. Ltd., Banno & Co., and Marubeni-lida, as 
well as many other smaller firms in New Zealand. 4 
In July 1958 Messrs. J. Gunton (N.Z.) Ltd. reverted to 
its original name, F. Kanematsu (N.Z.) Ltd., and it was 
through this company that the parent company in Japan 
placed the order for timber. 5 It was also late in 1957 or 
early in 1958 that Marubeni-lida established a 
representative in Auckland, marking the beginning of the 
re-establishment (other than ~anematsu) of Japanese trading 
companies in New Zealand. 6 Later in 1959 some of these 
firms in Japan joined to form the New Zealand Timber 
Importers' Association to help improve sales. 7 
Though this enterprise initially received help from 
the New Zealand Legation in Tokyo, official opiniori was 
that the export of logs to Japan was a 'marginal' business. 
Timber exports under the initial arrangement with Snow 
5 
Notes for P.M.'s Visit. IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.1). 
History of Kanematsu. 
Memo. New Zealand Legation to Secretary of IC. 
February 2, 1959. IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.1). 
Sutch, W. B. Selling New Zealand's Exports (Department 
of Industries and Commerce, Wellington, 1962) p.85. 
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Rainger & Co. Ltd. were assisted by the New Zealand 
Government granting import licences for textiles to the 
extent of 50% of log exports. Toyo Menka Kaisha, which 
also supplied the textiles, hiked the price of these 
textiles to offset some of the costs of the log business, 
and thus make it more competitive with the importation of 
Russian logs. 
The signing of the Trade Agreement in September 1958, 
which itself was the product of the desire to protect New 
Zealand's exports (see below) , put the trade with Toyo 
Menka Kaisha at a disadvantage. This arose as the Trade 
Ag~eement allowed more imports of textiles in competition 
to those of Toyo Menka Kaisha, leading to an increase in 
log prices in Japan. on top of this, other problems such 
as freight costs, the l~ck of stevedoring, and poor port 
facilities, led to Nash being advised before his trip to 
Japan in February 1959 that there was 'little possibility' 
of establishing a long term trade, 8 (which of course proved 
to be incorrect). 
Thus both the meat and log trades illustrated how a 
trade ag,reement might or might not be beneficial, but it 
was very apparent that the protection of exports such as 
lamb and wool was of much more importance than the 
anomalous situation that arose with timber exports. 
On tpp of the benefits of pr9tecting exports to Japan 
which were currently booming (exports were just under £8m 
Notes for P.M.'s Visit. IC (2006) 114/1/4 (pt.1). 
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in 1957; the highest of any 'pre-modern' year9 ) , New 
Zealand had also suffered a rebuff from Britain regarding 
trade. The proportion of total exports going to Britain 
had fallen from 65.7% in 1955 to 58.8% in 1957; due in 
part to increased exports to Japan but equally as much to 
an increase in other markets . 10 In April and May 1957 
Holyoake had travelled to Britain to ask for revised quotas 
on foreign meats. After being turned down he asked for a 
revision of the Ottawa tariff preferences, only to be 
turned down again. 11 An agreement was reached whereby 
consul tat ion was ensured in November every year and the 
British Government undertook not to restrict imports of 
some New Zealand commodities for ten years, 12 but it was not 
what Holyoake had wanted. 
New Zealand was also heading into a balance of 
payments crisis during 1957, hidden by National, leading to 
the 'Black Budget' of Nordmeyer in June 1958. The 
deregulation of import licences had continued until the 
beginning of 1958 when the Labour Government re-imposed 
import controls. By this time only about eighty commodities 
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controls. 13 Nordmeyer's 'Black Budget' announced a 
reduction of £82m of imports. The Labour Government also 
had to sell £5m of assets in London, and borrow some £45m 
within a year.N The previous National Government had been 
aware of this problem as well, and thus it was against this 
backdrop of a balance of payments crisis that negotiations 
for a trade agreement with Japan were carried out with the 
aim of protecting an increasingly valuable market. 
NEGOTIATING AGAIN 
In June 1957 Japan initiated talks with the National 
Government aimed .. at concluding a trade treaty. The 
Japanese Minister Ushida, who had just negotiated a trade 
treaty establishing Most Friendly Nation relations with 
Australia, visited New Zealand and with two members of the 
Japanese Legation held informal talks with the Government. 
Ushida pressed hard for full Most Favoured Nation rights 
under GATT. The Government, however, held to the draft 
1954 agreement which gave Japan only partial Most Favoured 
N~tion treatment (a condition the Japanese Government later 
13 
14 
Sutch, W.B. Recent Developments in New Zealand 
Manufacturing (Department of Industries and Commerce, 
Wellington, 1958) p.15. 
Sinclair, Walter Nash, p.308. 
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agreed toll), and the assurance that purchases from Japan 
would be regular rather than sporadic depending on her 
reserves of foreign exchange . 16 Along these lines the 
Government could have concluded an agreement, but as John 
Marshall, who became deputy Prime Minister in 1957, later 
recalled an agreement was delayed because it was a 
'sensitive political issue' in an election year. 11 
Indeed it is di ff icul t to see why the Government 
delayed signing the Agreement in 1957 by pressing for only 
partial Most Favoured Nation rights unles$ there was an 
ulterior motive, such as avoiding public criticism. There 
was no suggestion that an agreement would lead to a flood 
of cheap Japanese goods. Public reaction to the 
announcement in June of trade negotiations had been 
predictable enough. Support came from importers, 
naturally, and farmers . 10 Opposition came from 
manufactur€rs, as it had in Australia in reaction to that 
country's Trade Agreement with Japan. 19 The New Zealand 
Textile & Garment Manufacturers Federation, for example, 
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and Commerce, calling for a restrictive trade agreement. 20 
This kind of activity was obviously having an effect as a 
letter to the New Zealand Trade Commissioner in Montreal 
indicates: 
The Minister has recently made a statement in the 
Press concerning the re-opening of trade talks 
with Japan late this year or early next year and, 
in view of the fact that reports from Australia 
seem to indicate quite considerable opposition to 
the recent Australia/Japan Trade Agreement from 
some sections of the community, this has given 
rise to some disquiet in New Zealand." 
That possible adverse public reaction to the 
settlement of a trade agreement was the overriding concern 
of the Gove]'.'nment is also indicated in a telegram to the 
Tokyo Legation instructing the delay of talks until after 
January 1958 (assuming the Government was re-elected) which 
noted that: 
... press reports from Australia [are] highly 
critical of their agreement .... 22 
The delay worked, however, as when Japan did agree to 
the terms of the 1954 draft agreement, it was already too 
close to the election: the Government could legitimately 
delay further because of the demands that the election was 
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looming economic crisis had taken a back seat to the 
election. 
Japan's change of policy at the last minute was 
probably intended to aid the visit of the Prime Minister, 
Kishi, to New Zealand. Not surprisingly Kishi 's visit 
early in December was part of a trip that included 
Australia. A timely announcement that a trade agreement 
similar to the one signed with Australia had been 
negotiated with New Zealand would have been of great public 
relations value. Unfortunately, not only did Kishi's visit 
coincide with the General Election, it also coincided with 
the change of Government as Labour regained power. 
Both Holyoake an~ Nash met Kishi and exchanged 
pleasantries, but Nash's view on a trade agreement (above) 
was widely reported and it was generally understood, not 
least by the Japanese, that he had given them the 'brush-
off'. 24 Kishi tried to reassure the (next) Government that 
Japan had no intention of 'flooding' New Zealand with cheap 
goods, and also proposed an expansion of trade to £Sm, but 
clearly the change of Government was for the worse as far 
as Japan was concerned. 
Nash had been quiet on trade with Japan in 1956, but 
by August 1957 he was again criticizing trade with Japan in 
words he had used thirty years earlier: 
24 
To the extent that New Zealand bought from Japan 
goods which this country had to import, then the 
NZPD Vol.316 p.393. 
Dominion would have to buy less from the United 
Kingdom. 25 
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Tinged with a little hostility: 
Japan bought in New Zealand because it paid her 
to do so, not because she wanted to be good to 
New Zealand. 26 
Thus it was no surprise that Nash was not interested 
in a trade agreement immediately upon taking power, but nor 
was he fully aware of the balance of payments problem that 
'-------. 
New Zealand would face in the next year. Nash was still 
very much towing the Labour line, a mixture of 
protectionism and underlying hostility to Japan. World War 
II was still occasionally mentioned by Labour M.P.s in 
Parliamentary debates on trade with Japan. 21 
Besides the public reaction to the announcement that 
negotiations were undsr way with Japan, there was also a 
fairly predictable reply from the British. Much as in 1953 
the British Government was keen on defending its interests 
in New Zealand. Instead of sen~ing a representative this 
time (on the previous occasion the representative had had 
a lukewarm response), the High Commissioner in Wellington 




I know you will understand and appreciate the 
interest of the United Kingdom, as New Zealand's 
chief supplier and principal customer, in the 
outcome of the forthcoming negotiations with 
Japan .... My Government recognise that New_ Zealand 
is anxious to develop her export trade and is 
interested in the Japanese market, and we are not 
questioning her sovereign freedom to decide this 
NZPD Vol.312, p.1495. 
NZPD Vol.313, p.1885. 
NZPD Vol.313, p.2224. See also NZPD Vol.314, p.2739. 
matter in whatever way she may choose. But we 
are particularly concerned that no abrupt changes 
should be introduced which might expose our trade 
to disruptive competition. 
I am sure that you will share this concern and 
that in your negotiations you will have due 
regard for our interests. 28 
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At least on this occasion the reply was sympathetic, 
with Halstead assuring that '~very effort' was being made 
to 'secure the least possible disturbance to traditional 
trade'. 29 But British interests seemed secure anyway on 
Labour's election. 
THE NEED TO PROTECT EXPORTS 
If the events of 1957 were fairly predictable, those 
of 1958 finally marked the break with tradition. With the 
country's balance of payments problem, and the rise of 
Japan from tenth to sixth place as an export market, during 
the early days of Labour's tenure the need to rethink their 
traditional antipathy, even hostility, to trade with Japan 
became apparent. 
The first indication that such a reversal was 
necessary came in March, from the Commercial Secretary in 
Tokyo. Scott reported that the Japanese Government wanted 
28 
29 
Letter. Off ice of United Kingdom High Commissioner to 
Minister of IC. September 24, 1957. IC (2006) 114/1/1 
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to send two officials on a trade mission to New Zealand. 
Scott's assessment was that: 
... such talks between officials could be as 
valuable, or more valuable to New Zealand as to 
Japan. It is most important that our expanded 
export trade should be protected, and we believe 
even a verbal understanding would assist in this 
direction. If we show no interest in such talks, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may well be 
unable to withstand pressure from the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of 
Finance to limit imports from New Zealand~ 
Austr~lia now has its interests protected but we 
remain quite vulnerable to Japanese actions on 
import lic'ensing - actions we would find it 
difficult to protest successfully.a 
At the time that Scott sent this report (dated March 
19th), Nash was on an extensive tour of Asia; a tour that 
did not include Japan. The reaction to this omission in 
Tokyo was reported to be 'definitely cool'. The local 
press also noted the restrictions on meat imports to Japan 
for the financial year April 1958 to May 1959 in such a way 
as to definitely hint at a connection to this omission. 31 
The press also had another weapon with which it could 
attack Labour's apparent disregard for Japan. In April a 
trade Mission (without Nash) went to London to discuss a 
revision of the Ottawa Agreement, and the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Jerry Skinner went also to discuss butter 
imports. In June Skinner came home having been rebuffed by 
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talks and an apparent change of heart by Nash who now 
called for a diversificati'on of primary produce for the 
expansion of new markets, and that trade with the most 
promising Asian market, Japan, was now being considered. 33 
The complicating issue for the Mission discussing the 
revision of Ottawa, whose negotiations dragged on for 
months, was that the Government was by June seriously 
considering a trade agreement with Japan. British demands, 
however, would have 'completely' prevented New Zealand 
negotiating any other bilateral agreements, such as the one 
it was now considering witp Japan, in order to establish 
new markets. For this, and other British demands, the 
negotiations failed. Nash sent a message in July to Harold 
Macmillan threatening to terminate Ottawa. 34 It was a 
potentially serious rift just before the Commonwealth Trade 
and Economic Conference scheduled for September in 
Montreal. At the same time, however, the Government Qad 
decided to negotiate a trade agreement with Japan. 
The decision to reverse its policy on a trade 
agreement with Japan had occurred for a specific number of 
reasons. Not only had Scott pointed out that Australia had 
again taken the advantage, negotiations with Britain for 
an improved access to New Zealand's traditional market, the 
one on which she was most dependent, had failed. Now in 
the back-drop of a payments crisis another immediate crisis 
33 
34 
Press June 19, 1958. 
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occurred. This was in May when falling profits from sales 
of milk powder in Britain (which were only just covering 
manufacture costs), led the Dairy Products Marketing 
Commission to ask the Government to 'assist urgently in 
selling milk powder to Japan'. 35 A week later a 
confidential draft Cabinet Paper outlining a proposal for 
a trade and payments agreement with Japan was circulated 
to members of the Cabinet committee on Economic and 
Financial Policy. It is clear from this draft Paper, dated 
May 15th, that protecting exports to Japan now had an 
overwhelming priority: 
In order to safeguard our existing export trade 
in meat, wool, casein and scrap metal, and to 
provide a favourable climate for developing 
exports of other products it is considered 
essential to conclude a formal trade agreement 
with Japan. 36 
The imbalance of trade, although it was in New 
Zealand's favour, was also noted. The Pape'r recommended 
that an invitation be sent to the Japanese Government to 
send a delegation of officials to Wellington at the end of 
July. It was perhaps unfortunate for Labour that as Japan 
had initiated trade talks in 1954 and 1957, the initiative 
now lay with New Zealand. The complicating factor was the 
negotiations also being carried out with the British 
Government on a revised British-New Zea~and Ottawa 
35 
36 
Paraphrase of Cable from Minister of EA to New Zealand 
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Agreement. A compromise 'Heads of Agreement' document was 
being formulated to stymie a conflict at the Montreal 
Conference. According to Professor Sinclair this Heads of 
Agreement document was formulated from a confidential 
minute the New Zealand Government had offered in June. 37 
Yet this Agreement is specifically mentioned in this May 
Paper because of the importance of the timing of the 
approach to Japan: 
.•. the public announcement that an approach is to 
be made to Japan should be def erred at least 
until the Heads of Agreement of the revised 
United Kingdom/New Zealand (Ottawa) Agreement are 
settled. Prior information that New Zealand was 
contemplating a trade agreement with Japan might 
lead to a more intractable attitude on the part 
of the United Kingdom Government. 38 
Thus when the press attacked the Government for not 
having a trade agreement with Japan in June, Labour was 
harbouring the secret that negotiations were about to take 
place in order to protect the talks with Britain. Nor 
would Nash give any hint of these negotiations when 
questioned in Parliament early in July, 39 but on the same 
day Holloway announced that the Government had invited 
official representatives from Japan to discuss a possible 





Sinclair, Walter Nash, pp.316-317. · 
Draft Cabinet Paper 'Proposal for Trade and Payments 
Agreement with Japan'. May 15, 1958. IC (2006) 114/1/1 
(pt.2). 
NZPD Vol.316, p.363. 
NZ£Q Vol.316, p.390. P.N. Holloway - Minister of 
Industries and Commerce 1957-1960. 
214 
obviousiy having an effect on the Government's non-
disclosure policy. The possible threat to the Ottawa 
Agreement negotiations with Britain were now secondary to 
protecting the Government's image of being actively 
interested in finding new markets for exports. This was 
perhaps also a result of Nordmeyer's Black Budget, 
delivered just a few days previously, which had included a 
reduction of imports to the extent of £82 million. 
Although Labour's reaction to the crisis turned out to be 
an over-reaction that materially contributed to their 
downfall in 1960, it is indicative of how serious Labour 
considered the situation to be that it now openly admitted 
the need for a trade agreement. 
TRADE AGREEMENT 
Negotiations continued in Wellington between July and 
September. According to the May Paper the Government would 
seek an agreement on 'similar lines to Japan's 1957 Trade 
Agreement with Australia', and as with that Agreement, 
adequate safeguards for local industry were to be included. 
The main objective which was to be sought in the 
negotiations was the establishment of Most Favoured Nation 
relations on both tariff and import licensing. This was 
the realistic objective though some attempt would be made 
to try for a limited application of Most Favoured Nation 
treatment in the early stages of negotiation. By granting 
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full Most Favoured Nation treatment Japan would gain an 
advantage as her Most Favoured Nation tariff was the same 
as her General tariff for most of the goods that New 
Zealand exported. The incentive for New Zealand to accept 
full Most Favoured Nation treatment was that: 
... New Zealand might expect substantial benefit 
from ~apanese agreement not to discriminate 
against New Zealand goods in allocating exchange 
for imports. 41 
This, in other words, was protection against 
Australian interests having an unfair advantage. 
Nash announced the successful conclusion of the 
negotiations and the signing of the Trade Agreement in 
Parliament on September 9th. 'Almost simultaneously' the 
Heads of Agreement was successfully agreed upon by the New 
Zealand and British Governments, 42 though as Nordmeyer had 
already left for Montreal on September 8th it seems almost 
certain that either by fortunate accident or design the 
accord on the Heads of Agreement was reached before the 
announcement of the Trade Agreement. As the negotiations 
with Japan had concluded on September 3rd it seems that the 
Government delayed the announcement for a week, perhaps to 
reach accord with the British Government. 
It would be tedious to give a full account of the 
negotiations according to the official 'Agreed Minutes of 
41 
42 
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the 1958 Trade Treaty'. 43 This account does not, for 
example, record any attempt by New Zealand to limit Most 
Favoured Nation treatment on Japanese goods in the early 
stages of negotiation as was intended. Therefore its value 
as a true record of negotiations can be questioned. The 
terms of the Agreement show that not only had the 
Government conceded full Most Favoured Nation treatment, it 
had also agreed to hold negotiations with Japan within 
three years with a view to estab~ishing full GATT 
relations. Although this was not specifically included in 
the Proposal formulated in May, it was hardly surprising as 
such a clause had been included in the Australia-Japan 
Agreement. As with the Australia-Japan Trade Agreement, 
although not in words, in effect GATT relations were 
established with Japan. Nash said in Parliament that: 
The Agreement on Commerce between Japan and New 
Zealand ... is a paper which gives us a sound basis· 
for the expansion of trade between Japan and New 
Zealand and I believe it will be advantageous to 
the New Zealand economy. In addition, Sir, I 
believe that the conclusion of this agreement is 
an event of considerable political significance. 
It will lead to closer understanding.between New 
Zealand and Japan and will go a long way towards 
putting our relations with that country on a 
better basis. 44 
The overall effect of the Agreement was that while 
British countries still had an advantage in trade, Japan 
43 
44 
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would now be t.reated at least as well as any other non-
British country. 45 
Holyoake could only welcome the Trade Agreement as 
being consistent with National' s policy; a policy which 
Labour stole from National and used against it. Even if 
National had always advocated increased trade with Japan, 
in the end it had been Labour that had signed the Treaty, 
and wa~ now boasting of its political significance. 
National could only point out the sudden change in Labour's 
policy,but Nash denied that this was so. 46 Nevertheless, if 
the decision had been the result of several months 
consideration, it was still in contradiction to several 
decades of Labour Party hostility to Japan. 
The response to the announcement of the Trade 
Agreement by manufacture was predictable. At the annual 
conference of the New Zealand Manufacturers' Federation it 
was stated that: 
The announcement of the trade agreement between 
New Zealand and Japan had met with a reception 
which, in the most generous terms, could only be 
described as lukewarm.u 
Manufacturers' major concern was that Japan was no 
longer a scheduled country regarding imports. The Press 
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'assured' share of the Japanese market for meat and dairy 
produce. 48 Though it was predictably controversial, the 
signing of the Trade Agreement with Japan marked the end of 
two eras. The first of these was Labour's antipathy to 
Japan, the second that of the whole era of 'pre-modern' 
trade relations between New Zealand and Japan. Although 
apparently distinct, the change of Labour's att;i tud.es and 
the beginnings of much greater trade levels are indicative 
of the priority of economic realities over politics. The 
indications that Japan and New Zealand could develop a 
complementary rather than competitive trade had always 
e,xisted. Now that they had come to fruition in a way that 
was at ;Last seen to be of benefit to New Zealand, the 
beginnings of the 'modern' relationship could develop. 
48 Press September 10, 1958. 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
SUMMARY 
NEW ZE.ALAND'S BRITISHNESS 
In the 1920's New Zealand was a small community: 
... complacent in its Britishness and ignorance of 
the outside world. 1 
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The 1928 Trade Agreement with Japan did little or 
nothing tq alter this situation; it certainly did not 
indicate an acknowledgement of Japan's right to trade with 
an area from which she had been usurped. Nor did it 
.. -
establish a 'golden age' of exports to Japan. 
The Agreement owed more to the attempts of the New 
Zealand Dairy Industry to compete with Canada in the 
Japanese market rather than any political considerations, 
and though Japan was eager to make the most of the public 
relations aspects of such a treaty, and perhaps eager to 
establish a representative in New Zealand, the Trade 
Agreement was anomalous to the trends that b9th counties 
were following. Japan embarked upon empire-building and 
New Zealand became even closer to Britain. The Ottawa 
Conference of 1932 fully illustrated the Dominion's 
1 Sinclair, Walter Nash, p.81. 
Britishness. 
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Thus despite the fact that there were no 
restrictions on the flow of goods between New Zealand and 
Japan until the late 1930's, there were still major 
impediments to forming an extensive relationship based on 
exchanging complementary commodities. 
New Zealand did not, for example, acknowledge the 
value of trade with Japan during the Depression, especially 
the relief that cheap Japanese goods provided. Australia's 
trade with Japan was much greater, and there was less 
reticence to acknowledge its value and to question the 
wisdom of dependertce on Britain. This is true even of 
Labour in Australia, in contrast with Nash and Labour in 
New Zealand who were preoccupied with the low wage rates in 
Japan and their effect in New Zealand through imports. 
Japanese goods were also widely regarded as betng 'shoddy'. 
This was also combined with the belief that consumers in 
Japan lacked the purchasing power to buy New Zealand 
commodities, probably reinforced by the fact that Japan's 
major purchase from New Zealand was wool; an industrial 
raw material. Without an attempt to expand or diversify 
exports to Japan much of the trading relationship was 
determined by how much wool Japan bougnt as this also 
affected imports to New Zealand. Had Japan's purchases of 
wool been much greater (as they were briefly in 1936) then 
·imports would have been far greater too. :sut there are 
many reasons to believe that this would have been 
unacceptable for its effects on New Zealand and British 
industry. The 'influx' of cheap Japanese goods in the 
221 
1930's, for which the Depression in New Zealand was 
occasionally blamed, was after all only of some types of 
textiles and footwear. And even though these were imported 
in significant numbers, the effect on local industries is 
highly debateable. 
Thus the complementary relationship that did exist in 
the 1930's was not expanded upon as it was not seen to be 
beneficial to New Zealand; what Japanese goods were 
imported were in competition with British goods, and it was 
the British market that New Zealand was trying to protect: 
In the 1930's, New Zealand's trade was 
increasingly concentrated on Britain, whose 
barriers against New Zealand's exports were less 
substantial than those of other countries. 2 
This of course refers to the dairy products and meat 
for whidh Japan was not a market, and until she could 
become a market for at least some of these and reciprocate 
with better quality goods at a higher price, Japan could 
not hope to rival New Zealand's interest in Britain. The 
problems of infrastructure: shipping and representation 
were added hindrances to those who desired to expand trade, 
but overall only reflected the priorities of that time. 
World War II may have revealed the foolishness of 
relying on Britain for security, but it also tied New 
Zealand to Britain commercially, especially _by the Bulk 
Purchase Agreements. The devastation to Japanese industry 
Hawke, G.R., 'The Growth of the Economy' in Oliver, 
W.H. & Williams, B.R., eds. The Oxford History of New 
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and shipping, as well as the anti-Japanese sentiment 
absolutely precluded the possibility. of a recovery in trade 
relations, even to the minimal state they had been, until 
the early 1950's. By then a Trade Commissioner had been 
established in Japan, though this was inspired by the 
actions of other Allied countries first. National also had 
an incentive to increase trade ~ith Japan, but again this 
was essentially a political concept against Communism. It 
was not a desire t0 embark upon an extensive trade 
relationship, and National was powerless anyway to overcome 
the economic boom and slumps that threw the whole Sterling 
Area into crises in the 1950's. 
' 
In the War and its aftermath very litle had arisen to 
alter New Zealand's perception of her place in the world 
commercially, but from the 1950' s came the single most 
important change to New Zealand's trade with Britain: 
Britain's economic growth was slower than that of 
many countries, British governments became more 
concerned with their own farmers ..•. 3 
The British Government's rebuff to Holyoake in 1957 
and also Labour's trade Mission in 1958 finally established 
the need to diversify markets, and quickly. By 1958 the 
dependence on the British market had declined but for some 
major exports was still 'heavy to close to absolute'. 4 But 
at the same time Japan became a market for meat, and the 
quality of Japanese products had already been recognised as 
Hawke, 'The Growth of the Economy', p.375. 
Grattan, The Southwest Pacific Since 1900, p.323. 
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being far superior to those pre-war. Labour had to move 
for the first time to protect exports to Japan. 
Japan was equally anxious to sign a treaty with New 
Zealand as a step towards establishing GATT relations. 
Thus unlike the 19 2 8 Treaty when no real 'accord' was 
reached, the 1958 Trade Agreement established a true 
recognition of interests on both sides: the exchange of 
market protection for Most Favoured Nation treatment and 
the eventual establishment of GATT relations. The context 
of this Treaty was completely different to that of 1928. 
New Zealand's change of attitude combined with Japan's 
cnange of trade practices established a situation 
infinitely more conducive to establishing an extensive 
trade relationship. Britain's attempts to enter the EEC 
and Japan's phenomenal industrial growth only served to 
underline this new direction. The pre-modern era of trade 
relations was finally corning to a close, but it is 
significant that New Zealand had been pushed frorn·Britain 
rather than attracted to Japan. It is still debabeable as 
to how 'British' New Zealand would have remained in her 
trading relations had she not been forced to diversify 
markets, and consequently develop her relationship with 
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APPENDIX 1 NOTES ON STATISTICAL SOURCES 
From 1925 to 1948 statistics on New Zealand trade and 
shipping are contained in the series statistical Report on 
Trade and Shipping. These reports are divided into two 
parts; Part 1 contains headings of commodities under 
approximately 1000 classifications, Part II contains a 
summary of this but also a classification by country. The 
collection of statistics was reorganized in 1949. The 
series from 1925 to 1948 was published by a collaboration 
of both the Customs Department and the Census and 
statistics Department. From 1949 to 1962 the customs 
Department, which had compiled the statistics for Part 1 of 
the previous series, now published two volumes under the 
title Statistical Report on the External Trade of New 
Zealand (except for the transitory year 1950/51 which was 
published in one volume). This now contained approximately 
3000 classifications of commodities. 
The Census and Statistics Department (from 1956 the 
Department of Statistics) now divided the information in 
Part II of the 1925-1948 series into two parts; one on 
trade and another on shipping and transport. The volume on 
trade Report on. and Analysis of External Trade Statistics 
contains headings by country and it is from here that 
statistics for 1950 to 1958 are taken. Publication of 
statistics in this format stopped in 1961. 
The references cited in the text are the last 
available reports on any given year; they are the most 
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accurate figures available. However, several points need 
to be noted in dealing with the statistical data. 
1. New Zealand could have, and probably did, re-export 
some Japanese commodities to islands in the Pacific. 
2. The values given are in New Zealand currency. The New 
Zealand pound fluctuated in value against Sterling; 
depreciated in 1933, appreciated in 1948, and allowed 
to fluctuate to a certain extent against non-Sterling 
currencies from December 1951. 
3. Trade statistics for imports were based on their 
current ctomestic value (c.d.v.) in the country of 
origin plus 10% for duty reasons up to the end of 
1951. The 10% addition was dropped from 1952 onwards. 
4. Prices fluctuated over time and price values are not 
equivalent to quantity values. 
5. The classification of products changed in the 
statistical data from 'Article' to 'Statistical Class' 
to 'Commodity'. 'Article' and 'Commodity' are 
identical but the classification by 'Statistical 
Class' confuses the analysis. Cross reference to 
other statistical reports was necessary to complete 
the statistical analysis for these years. I am also 
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indebted to the Department of Statistics for help with 
this analysis. 
6. Commodities sent to J-force were not included in 
Statistics of Exports, but aid to Japan itself was 
included. 
7. Commodities for Diplomatic staff were not (and in fact 
never are) included in statistics of Exports. 
8. Analysis for quantities of goods imported into New 
Zealand are in some 
footwear, but in the 
available. 
instances available, 
case of textiles 
such as 
are not 
